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A  Critical  Analysis  of  Patriotism 
As  an  Ethical  Concept 


BY 

CLARENCE  iREIDENBACH 


IT 


A  DISSERTATION 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE 

GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF&ALE  UNIVERSITY 

IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THlTbEGREE  OF 

DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

MAY  1,  1918 


•  •   •  • 

•  •    •  • 

•  •    •  • 


A  Critical  Analysis  of  Patriotism 
As  an  Ethical  Concept 


BY 

CLARENCE  RE1DENBACH 

n 


A  DISSERTATION 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE 

GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  YALE  UNIVERSITY 

IN  CANDIDACY  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF 

DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

MAY  1,  1918 


EXCHANGE 


^ 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Page 

Part  I.     The  Impulses  of  Patriotism 

Chapter    I.    The  Impulses  of  Attachment 9 

Chapter  II.     The  Impulses  of  Antipathy 16 

Part  II.     The  Habituation  of  Patriotism 

Chapter  III.     The  Deliberate  Habituation 27 

Chapter  IV.    The  Spontaneous  Habituation 35 

Part  III.     The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism 

Chapter     V.    The  Country  as  Protector  of  Self 454* 

Chapter    VI.     The  Oneness  of  Country  and  Self 52^ 

Chapter  VII.    The  Intrinsic  Value  of  One's  Country. . .  57 

Part  IV.     The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism 

Chapter  VI II.    The  Will  to  National  Individuality 7*f  y 

Chapter     IX.     The  Nation  as  an  Individual 85 

Chapter       X.    The  Ethical  Value  of  Patriotism  in  the 

Concrete 99 

Notes 


Bibliography 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

Microsoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/criticalanalysisOOreidrich 


PREFACE 

Patriotism  is  a  live  issue.  It  is  almost  impossible  for  any  one  to 
be  neutral  about  it.  All  men  seem  to  feel  that  the  issue  involved  is 
one  that  touches  the  fundamental  interests  of  their  lives.  Patriotism 
is  an  important  concept. 

But  not  all  men  take  the  same  stand  regarding  patriotism.  There 
is  hot  disagreement  upon  the  question  of  its  moral  value.  Some 
champion  it  as  one  of  the  noblest  of  all  virtues;  others  spurn  it  as 
one  of  the  basest.  Therefore  it  is  highly  desirable  to  arrive  at  a  fair 
judgment  of  the  ethical  value  of  patriotism. 

One  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  radical  disagreement  about  the 
morality  of  patriotism  is  that  there  are  widely  different  assumptions 
as  to  its  nature.  It  is  a  sentiment  of  manifold  varieties,  and  the  word 
patriotism  may  carry  quite  different  implications  to  different  minds. 
The  first  necessary  step,  then,  before  one  can  pass  an  ethical  judg- 
ment upon  it,  is  to  find  out  what  the  core  of  patriotism  is. 

This  dissertation  begins,  therefore,  by  undertaking  to  determine 
the  nature  of  patriotism,  and  with  no  more  of  a  clue  in  hand  than 
the  one  that  it  is  "the  love  of  country"  tries,  by  an  inductive  investi- 
gation of  what  has  actually  been  called  patriotism,  to  bring  together 
the  important  facts  in  which  patriotism  is  manifested.  Hence,  while 
the  main  purpose  of  the  essay  is  an  ethical  one,  a  large  portion  of  it 
is  given  to  inductive  analysis.  The  first  three  parts  are  mainly  ana- 
lytical. The  fourth  part  endeavors  to  unify  in  a  central  concept  the  , 
data  gathered  together  in  the  preceding  parts,  and,  in  the  light  of 
that  concept  and  all  the  facts,  to  evaluate  patriotism  as  an  ethical 
ideal.  It  may  be  noted  here  that  the  first  three  parts  are  printed  as 
they  were  in  the  typewritten  form  presented  to  Yale  University  as  a 
thesis,  but  that  part  four  has  undergone  much  rearrangement  and 
revision.  Chapter  eight  has  been  largely  rewritten;  chapter  nine  is 
entirely  new;  and  what  here  appears  as  chapter  ten  has  been  some- 
what changed. 

Acknowledgement  is  hereby  made  to  the  members  of  the  faculty 
of  the  department  of  philosophy  in  Yale  University  for  many  helpful 
criticisms.  Especially  is  a  debt  owed  to  Professor  Charles  A.  Bennett, 
who  suggested  the  field  of  patriotism  as  a  fruitful  one  for  investigation, 


6  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

under  whose  direction  the  work  was  done,  and  whose  criticisms 
and  suggestions  have  made  more  definite  than  would  otherwise  have 
been  the  case,  the  problems  involved.  Thanks  are  due  to  Professor 
Luther  A.  Weigle,  who  read  the  manuscript,  and  helped  to  clarify  and 
make  accurate  the  expression  of  the  ideas.  And  my  gratitude  is 
given  to  my  wife,  whose  assistance  in  the  final  preparation  of  the 
manuscript  was  invaluable,  and  who  by  her  constant  helpfulness  and 
loyalty  made  it  possible  for  the  whole  work  to  be  brought  to  com- 
pletion. 

Indianapolis,  January,  1920. 


PART  I 
THE  IMPULSES  OF  PATRIOTISM 


1 


CHAPTER  I 

The  Impulses  of  Attachment 

When  in  1914  the  great  war  broke  out,  the  world  was  astounded. 
There  were  forces  at  work  which  men  were  confident  would  make 
another  war  between  first-class  powers  impossible.  International  re- 
lations and  groupings,  such  as  those  of  commerce,  labor,  art,  science, 
and  learning,  had  increased  in  strength  and  number.  The  terribleness 
and  waste  of  war  were  deemed  to  be  so  fully  realized  that  modern 
nations  would  have  no  taste  for  armed  conflict.  But  the  war  came  on, 
and  there  must  have  been  mighty  causes  to  be  able  to  produce  so 
gigantic  a  result.  What  were  they?  What  could  be  the  nature  of 
such  tremendous  causes,  that  yet  remained  concealed  and  in  their 
issuance  so  took  men  by  surprise?  The  factors  were  various,  and  some, 
of  course,  had  been  noted,  but  one  factor  which  was  unnoticed  by  the 
general  public  and  yet  which  is  one  of  fundamental  importance  is  the 
role  taken  in  patriotism  by  men's  unreasoned  dispositions  of  character. 
If  the  phenomenon  of  patriotism  is  to  be  fully  understood,  it  must  be 
analyzed  with  a  view  of  discovering  what  are  these  deeply  ingrained 
sets  of  mind  and  character  which  are  its  raw  material  and  which  make 
it  so  powerful.1 

Patriotism  is  a  complex  sentiment.  There  is,  in  other  words,  no 
single  instinctive  response  in  all  human  beings  to  the  stimulus,  country. 
What,  then,  are  some  of  the  dispositions  of  which  patriotism  is  com- 
posed? There  are  impulses  which  make  primarily  for  attachment,  and 
there  are  those  that  make  primarily  for  antipathy.  One  of  the  most 
important  of  the  impulses  of  attachment  is  the  disposition  of  gregarious- 
ness.  Hobbes,  indeed,  and  others  after  him,  built  their  theories  of  the 
state  upon  the  doctrine  that  man  would  have  been  able  to  live  alone 
had  not  the  company  of  others  been  forced  upon  him,  but  that  there 
is  an  impulse  of  gregariousness  seems  indisputable.  It  is  simply  an 
observable  fact  that  there  are  species  of  animals  that  not  only  live  in 
herds,  packs,  or  flocks,  but  which  also  show  uneasiness  and  distress  at 
being  separated  from  their  fellows.  James  cites  the  observation  of 
Galton  on  the  gregariousness  of  the  South  African  cattle.2  If  an  in- 
dividual of  this  species  were  separated  from  the  herd  it  would  direct 
its  whole  activity  towards  getting  back  once  more,  and  when  its  object 
was  attained,  would  plunge  into  the  heart  of  the  herd  as  if  to  bathe  its 
very  body  in  contact  with  its  fellows.    Now  man,  as  well  as  other 


io  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

animals,  lives  a  group  life,  and  it  seems  almost  inevitable  that  he 
should  develop  an  impulse  parallel  to  the  outward  facts  of  his  existence, 
even  were  it  not  probable  that  he  has  inherited  gregariousness  as  a 
psychical  disposition  from  his  animal  ancestors.  That  the  impulse  is 
actually  present  in  the  human  species  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  there 
is  in  man  a  strong  abhorrence  of  prolonged  solitude.  Professor  James' 
words  on  this  point  have  come  to  be  almost  classical:  "To  be  alone 
is  one  of  the  greatest  evils  for  him  [the  normal  man].  Solitary  con- 
finement is  by  many  regarded  as  a  mode  of  torture  too  cruel  and  un- 
natural for  civilized  countries  to  adopt.  To  one  long  pent  up  on  a 
desert  island  the  sight  of  a  human  footprint  or  a  human  form  in  the 
distance  would  be  the  most  tumultously  exciting  of  experiences."8 
But  the  impulse  is  also  apparent  in  more  normal  experiences.  So  much 
do  men  desire  the  company  of  others  that  it  is  not  only  an  element 
of  recreation  usually,  but  the  more  serious  tasks  of  life  often  derive 
their  value  not  more  because  of  the  ostensible  end  sought  after  than  be- 
cause of  the  human  association  which  is  involved. 

Wilfred  Trotter4  has  made  gregariousness  central  in  his  study  of 
society.  He  begins  by  approving  of  the  method  of  those  who  have 
come  at  the  study  from  the  standpoint  of  the  instincts,  but  expresses 
dissatisfaction  with  the  limits  of  their  results,  that  is,  dissatisfaction 
with  the  kind  of  analysis  that  would  explain  man  by  referring  the 
whole  of  his  conduct  to  the  instincts  of  self-preservation,  nutrition, 
and  sex.  Such  an  explanation,  he  finds,  has  been  historically  attempted, 
but  after  it  has  gone  as  far  as  it  could,  there  has  always  been  left  over 
an  unexplained  X.  Trotter  accepts  self-preservation,  nutrition,  and 
sex  as  fundamental  instincts,  but  completes  the  list  by  bringing  forward 
the  instinct  of  the  herd  which  he  offers  as  the  explanation  of  all  human 
activity  which  was  left  unexplained  by  the  other  three  instincts  men- 
tioned above.  To  Trotter  there  have  been  two  great  epoch-making 
forward  steps  in  the  evolution  of  life.  The  first  came  with  the  change 
from  unicellular  to  multicellular  organisms,  the  great  advantage  of 
which  was  to  make  the  group  of  cells  the  unit  of  selection,  thus  to  some 
extent  relieving  the  single  cell  of  the  burden  of  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, and  permitting  it  a  greater  chance  for  variability  without  running 
a  greater  risk  of  extinction.  This  arrangement,  says  Trotter,  had  im- 
portant influences  upon  all  the  cells  comprised  in  the  organism.  The 
second  great  evolutionary  advance  came  with  the  change  from  solitary 
to  gregarious  animals,  and  was  attended  by  modifications  just  as  pro- 
found as  had  accompanied  the  advance  from  unicellular  to  multicellular 


The  Impulses  of  Patriotism  ii 

organisms.  Here  again  the  power  of  natural  evolution  operated  upon 
the  group  as  a  unit,  thus  permitting  once  more  greater  variability  on 
the  part  of  the  individual.  Association  in  the  herd  became  increasingly 
valuable  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  tended  to  become  more  and 
more  strongly  fixed  as  a  disposition  of  animal  nature,  a  fact  which  had 
fundamental  influence  upon  the  mental  characteristics  of  the  individual. 
There  are  psychological  traits  which  would  not  exist  but  for  the  fact 
of  gregariousness.  Shyness,  embarrassment,  fear,  anger,  love,  sympathy, 
sorrow,  and  gratitude  would  be  devoid  of  meaning  apart  from  their 
connection  with  social  relations. 

'  The  first  important  result  of  the  instinct  of  gregariousness  is  that  *v 
it  makes  for  homogeneity.    That  is,  it  is  an  impulse  making  primarily 
for  attachment.     Each  individual  tends  to  become  thoroughly  assimi- 
lated in  the  life  of  the  group;  the  group's  ways  have  a  vital  meaning  to 
him.     Sensitiveness  to  the  behavior  of  his  fellows  is  heightened,  and 
resistiveness  to  the  suggestions  of  the  herd  is  lowered.     A  suggestion 
from  outside  is  likely  to  be  rejected,  and  direct  experience  tends  to  have 
little  meaning,  if  its  teachings  are  at  variance  with  the  beliefs  of  the         Vif 
group.    Altruism  arises;  it  is  a  natural  product  of  the  situation  where    / 
the  conditions  of  life  are  such  that  each  individual  is  of  necessity  con- 
stantly in  the  habit  of  regarding  the  welfare  of  others  as  well  as  that 
of  himself.     Danger  from  the  outside  stimulates  each  individual,  and 
spreads  fear  through  the  whole  group.    The  herd  huddles  together,  and; 
each  shares  in  the  panic  of  all.    Loneliness  at  such  a  time  is  unbear/ 
able. 

Now  man  is  a  social  creature,  and  has  the  characteristics  that  re- 
sult from  herd  instinct.  He  tends  to  become  solidified  with  those  of 
his  own  kind,  and  feel  uncomfortable  when  out  of  touch  with  them; 
to  be  suggestible  to  the  influences  of  his  group,  and  resistive  to  the 
influences  of  other  groups;  to  feel  altruism  towards  those  of  his  own 
herd  and  aversion  towards  those  of  other  herds;  to  be  aroused  when 
the  nation  is  threatened,  and  huddle  in  the  group  in  the  face  of  danger. 
All  these  characteristics  under  the  proper  stimuli  are  manifested  by 
patriotism.  A  definition  of  patriotism  from  the  standpoint  of  attach- 
ment to  the  group  is  that  of  Sumner:  "Patriotism  is  loyalty  to  the  civic 
group  to  which  one  belongs  by  birth  or  other  group  bond.  It  is  a 
sentiment  of  fellowship  and  cooperation  in  all  the  hopes,  work,  and 
sufferings  of  the  group.6 

The  herd  is  not  tolerant  of  the  nonconformist.    The  nonconformist 
has  in  a  way  become  a  stranger.    He  has  put  himself  out  of  touch 


1 


* 


12  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

with  the  group.  The  group  knows  him  and  his  ways,  but  he  has  not 
permitted  himself  to  be  thoroughly  assimilated  by  it.  And  the  very 
thing  that  the  herd  desires  and  insists  upon  is  homogeneity.  In  the 
words  of  one  writer,  "The  crowd  not  only  needs  to  make  adherents 
and  thus  maintain  its  existence  and  increase  in  volume  and  power;  it 
needs  no  less  to  assimilate,  to  digest,  the  individuals  which  it  swallows 
^up."fl  The  individual,-  then,  cannot  be  too  insistent  upon  the  expres- 
sion of  his  own  personality.  His  life,  even  his  inner  life,  must  con- 
form to  that  of  the  group.  His  emotions  will  not  be  a  matter  merely 
of  his  own  concern.  "Herd-union  does  not  intensify  all  emotions.  It 
intensifies  those  which  are  felt  in  common,  but  it  actually  deadens  and 
ishuts  down  those  which  are  only  felt  by  the  individual."7  And  inde- 
pendent thought  is  even  more  taboo.  "Thought  ...  is  markedly 
individual  and  personal.  .  .  .  Thought  is  critical,  and  the  Herd 
wants  unanimity,  not  criticism.  Consequently  Herd-union  dtadens 
thought."8  Hence  the  nonconformist  gets  himself  disliked,  and  the 
outcome  of  the  situation  has  usually  been  to  submerge  the  individual, 
and  assimilate  him  to  the  group.  The  moral  of  the  tale  is  that  patriot- 
ism acts  in  that  way.  "Patriotism,  which  is  the  crowd-emotion  of  a 
y  Nation,  makes  at  times  supreme  claims  on  every  citizen  and  enforces 
them  by  public  opinion  so  powerful  that  few  can  or  desire  to  evade 
them."9 

These  observations  throw  light  upon  the  question  whether  patriotism 
is  a  political  or  national  emotion.  Is  patriotism  attachment  to  the  gov- 
ernment or  state,  or  is  it  love  of  one's  national  group?  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  it  is  the  latter  rather  than  the  former.  It  is  an  out- 
growth of  tribal  feeling.  Bertrand  Russell  is  only  overstating  a  truth 
when  he  says  that  "Tribal  feeling,  which  always  underlay  loyalty  to 
the  sovereign,  has  remained  as  strong  as  it  ever  was,  and  is  now  the 
chief  support  for  the  power  of  the  State."10 

There  is  an  egoistic  element  in  the  attachment  of  patriotism.  It 
is  an  adhesion  to  one's  own,  and  one's  own  is  but  an  extension  of  him- 
self. Patriotism  is  a  personal  matter.  That  is,  it  is  based  upon  a 
personal  relationship.  One  cleaves  to  his  group  not  on  account  of  its 
intrinsic  worth  simply  but  because  of  what  it  is  worth  to  him.  The  ma- 
jority of  men  are  most  loyal  to  what  is  nearest  themselves.  Each  one  of 
them  seems  to  himself  to  be  the  center  of  his  sphere,  and  things  vary 
in  importance  in  direct  ratio  to  their  nearness  to  the  center.  This 
fact  gives  the  key  to  a  very  common  kind  of  patriotism.  It  is  simply  the 
loyalty  that  men  feel  to  the  extension  of  their  own  ego. 


The  Impulses  of  Patriotism  13 

"One's  own"  includes  the  people  of  his  group,  i.  e.,  the  people  who 
are  most  like  himself.  These  people  share  many  things  in  common 
with  himself.  They  have  similar  habits  and  customs,  and  all  this 
conduces  to  render  them  one's  own.  "One's  own"  also  includes  the 
soil.  It  is  that  which  is  beneath  one's  very  feet;  it  sustains  one;  it 
nourishes  one.  Furthermore,  one  knows  it  as  he  cannot  know  any 
strange  land,  and  as  no  stranger  can  know  his  land.  Me  lives  in  it 
throughout  the  whole  year,  and  knows  it  intimately  in  all  its  peculiar- 
ities and  changing  moods.  Consequently,  his  patriotism  has  in  it  a 
love  of  the  "land  where  his  fathers  died."  Virgil  understood  the 
meaning  of  this  love  of  the  soil.  He  himself  felt  it  keenly,  and  because 
of  it  refused  to  accept  the  old  home  estate  of  a  Roman  sent  into  exile. 
It  was  characteristic  that  he  made  ^Eneas  lament  Troy  even  when  he 
was  going  out  to  establish  Rome  itself.  It  was  because  of  this  under- 
standing, in  part  at  least,  that  he  was  led  to  urge  the  Romans  to  get 
back  to  the  soil,  realizing  that  from  a  love  of  the  soil  to  a  love  of  our 
soil  is  but  a  step.u 

However,  what  one  has  been  used  to  should  not  be  taken  as  the 
only  kind  of  the  patriotism  of  attachment  that  there  is.  If  adhesion 
to  one's  own  could  not  be  overcome,  loyalty  to  one's  earliest  home 
would  quite  uniformly  be  stronger  than  patriotism.  But  sometimes  one 
begins  to  feel  that  his  childhood  was  spent  in  cramped  quarters,  and 
that  his  early  opinions  were  inadequate.  The  emotion  that  he  may 
be  very  likely  to  feel  under  such  conditions  is  not  that  of  affection  but 
that  of  contempt  and  disgust.  1  Quite  often  when  there  is  a  conflict  be- 
tween loyalty  to  the  nation  and  loyalty  to  the  community,  loyalty  to 
the  nation  proves  the  strongerT^Another  indication  that  men  are  not 
inseparably  bound  to  what  they  have  been  used  to  is  that  they  change 
their  nation,  adopt  another  country,  and  side  with  it  even  against  the 
country  of  their  birth.  Some  time  ago  there  appeared  in  one  of  the 
large  newspapers  a  letter  from  a  naturalized  German  in  which  was  this 
sentence:  "Perhaps  you  would  appreciate  your  American  citizenship 
better  if,  like  me,  you  had  been  born  and  brought  up  in  Germany."19 

A  reason  for  this  attachment  to  one's  own  is  the  impulse  which  im- 
pels one  to  want  to  feel  at  home  in  his  world.  It  is  an  impulse  which 
craves  order;  and  it  shows  itself  in  a  desire  for  a  unified  world.  There 
seems  to  be  an  esthetic  element  in  it;  the  normal  mind  with  a  sense 
of  beauty  cannot  endure  chaos.  It  represents  a  rational  demand;  it 
is,  for  instance,  a  driving  force  in  philosophy.     It  finds  another  root 


1^ 


14  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

in  the  desire  for  safety.  One  wants  a  friendly  world  in  which  he  feels 
sure  of  himself  and  where  he  can  live  freely  without  being  troubled 
by  the  strange  or  unknown.  Now  one's  country  presents  a  world  that 
he  knows  and  can  find  his  way  in;  consequently,  it  satisfies  this  de- 
mand for  a  unified  world  organized  about  one's  own  life,  and  by  virtue 
of  this  character  it  is  able  to  furnish  an  additional  item  in  the  stimuli 
to  patriotism. 

Man  is  attached  to  his  country  very  much  as  he  is  attached  to 
himself;  he  could  not  very  well  help  the  one  any  more  than  he  could 
help  the  other.  But  what  is  in  one  way  a  mere  expression  of  egoism 
becomes  also  an  affection.  Unless  there  is  some  special  reason  for  the 
contrary,  one  is  likely  to  cherish  a  real  affection  for  that  with  which 
he  has  long  been  associated,  and  especially  so,  if  it  has  been  of  use 
to  him.  This  fact  gives  justification  for  the  popular  definition  of 
patriotism  as  "the  love  of  country."  This  affection  even  may  be 
selfish,  but  it  may  also  take  on  a  more  altruistic  character.  Altruism 
naturally  and  perforce  develops  in  a  gregarious  society.  And,  more- 
over, the  parental  instinct  adds  its  strength.  The  protection  of  the 
home  is  a  strong  sentiment  in  patriotism.  And  the  tender  emotion  of 
the  parental  instinct  may  be  extended  to  others  besides  offspring. 
Patriotism  gets  colored  by  it,  and  becomes  very  much  like  it.  Mc- 
Dougall  says  that,  "Like  the  fully  developed  parental  sentiment,  the 
patriotism  of  many  men  is  a  fusion  of  this  quasi-altrustic  extension  of 
the  self-regarding  sentiment  with  the  truly  altruistic  sentiment  of 
love."13  Patriotism  is,  then,  in  part  egoistic  and  in  part  altruistic)  In 
a  nation  beset  with  enemies  it  will  indeed  take  the  form  of  animosity 
toward  the  enemy,  but  in  a  prosperous  nation  will  direct  itself  very 
frequently  to  internal  improvement.  And  it  may  be  said  that  it  re- 
tains something  of  altruism  as  well  as  egoism  even  in  war.  It  is,  even 
while  being  combative  towards  the  out-group,  altruistic  towards  the 
in- group™ 

The  spirit  of  attachment  in  patriotism  may  even  go  so  far  as  to  be- 
come a  worship.  Religious  impulse  has  frequently  been  an  element  in 
patriotism.  Religion  and  patriotism  were  almost  the  same  thing  in 
Israel.  But  there  are  modern  parallels.  A  clergyman  not  long  ago  was 
reported  to  have  said  that  the  men  who  died  upon  the  field  of  battle 
(he  was  thinking  of  men  of  his  own  nation)  would  straightway  reach 
heaven,  since  they  had  died  for  their  fellow  men.  It  is  evident  that 
being  a  patriot  held  something  of  a  religious  fervor  for  that  clergyman. 
Probably  the  Kaiser  feels  a  religious  exaltation  which  sustains  him  in 
the  belief  that  he  is  the  instrument  of  God. 


The  Impulses  of  Patriotism  15 

Alfred  Loisy16  opposes  Christianity  and  patriotism  to  one  another, 
much  to  the  credit  of  patriotism.  According  to  Loisy,  the  teachings 
of  Christianity  and  patriotism  are  incompatible,  and  those  of  Chris- 
tianity are  quite  inadequate  for  the  present  crisis.  Therefore  patriotism 
is  much  nobler  and  not  only  should  but  will  supplant  Christianity.    The 

,  only  living  faith,  so  he  says,  is  that  of  devotion  to  one's  country.  For 
that  men  will  sacrifice.  "Certainly,"  says  Loisy,  "it  is  an  august  life 
for  which  a  man  will  sacrifice  his  own  without  grudging  it;  but  it  is 

J  not  for  a  blessed  immortality  in  the  company  of  Christ  and  the  saints; 

:  it  is  for  the  life  of  the  country."18  This  account  of  what  Loisy  says 
is  set  down  here  not  so  much  because  it  gives  an  idea  of  patriotism, 
but  because  through  it  Loisy  passionately  expresses  his  own  ideal.  In 
his  book  there  breathes  a  most  intense  love  for  France.  This  love,  he 
says,  is  the  absorbing  passion  of  the  people  of  France,  and  is  what 
unites  them.  Again  we  quote  his  own  words:  "There  are  a  faith  and 
love  in  which  it  [the  army]  is  unanimous  [as  against  the  lack  of  unan- 
imity in  Christianity] :  the  love  of  our  country,  and  an  imperishable 
belief  in  her  future;  over  these  sentiments,  all  are  in  communion,  and 
the  whole  country  agrees  with  the  army.  Here  is  our  common  religion: 
one  which  has  no  unbelievers;  in  which  those  who  are  faithful  to  the 
old  creed  may  fraternize  indiscriminately  with  the  adherents  of  the 
newer  principles.     .     .     .     Differences   [of  religion]   count  no  longer 

!  in  face  of  the  absorbing  interest,  the  burning  passion,  the  true  religion, 
both  of  this  and  of  every  moment,  namely  devotion  to  the  immortality 

1  of  France."17  "So  long  as  we  live,  we  are  determined  to  live  in  our  own 
way;  and  that  which  gives  us  our  vigour  now  against  the  invader  is 
neither  a  lust  of  conquest,  nor  the  hate  which  an  unjust,  cruel,  and 
fanatical  enemy  deserves,  but  the  love  of  our  ancient  France,  who  is 
our  all,  whom  we  yearn  to  preserve,  and  whom  we  are  vowed  to  save."1' 
Here  is  a  devotion  which  amounts  to  a  religion,  and  it  furnishes  an  ex- 
ample of  the  working  of  the  religious  impulse  in  patriotism. 

It  is  not  yet  time  to  draw  final  conclusions,  but  it  is  not  out  of  place 
to  note  in  passing  that  patriotism  was  not  condemned  by  its  egoistic 
ingredients,  and  is  not  now  justified  by  its  elements  of  altruism. 
Viewed  as  a  religion,  one  may  say  that  it  is  too  likely  to  become 
fanatical.  The  willingness  to  die  upon  the  battlefield,  rather  than  / 
goodness,  becomes  the  final  test  of  the  desirable  citizen.  Moreover, 
the  injury  worked  upon  others  is  apt  to  be  overlooked.  As  a  religion, 
patriotism  has  the  strength,  but  not  the  necessary  universality.  What 
it  does  is  wrongly  to  elevate  a  good  to  the  standard  of  the  Good. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Impulses  of  Antipathy 

The  impulses  of  antipathy  have  played  an  important  role  in  the 
development  of  patriotism.  When  one  becomes  aware  of  the  existence 
of  other  peoples  unlike  himself,  the  sense  of  difference  which  arises  is 
liable  to  take  on  the  character  of  a  strong  and  active  aversion  to  and 
depreciation  of  them.  Nothing  is  more  common  than  the  feeling  that 
one's  own  people  is  a  kind  of  chosen  race,  and  that  all  other  races 
are  inferior.  A  speaker  who  had  lived  many  years  among  the  Navajo 
Indians  once  said  that  they  regarded  and  called  themselves  "The  Peo- 
ple." They  were  at  the  top  of  mankind;  the  Mexicans  ranked  next 
to  them;  the  Americans  came  third  and  last.  This  was  their  arrange- 
ment of  all  the  peoples  that  they  knew.  The  same  attitude  appears  in 
civilized  man.  He  is  characterized  by  self-satisfaction,  and  the  peculi- 
arities of  others,  even  of  dialect  and  pronunciation,  are  enough  to 
call  forth  contempt  and  ridicule.  It  follows  that  strangers  can  easily 
be  enemies.  In  Latin,  the  word  hostis  which  at  first  meant  simply 
stranger  or  foreigner  came  later  to  mean  enemy.  The  words  of  Loisy 
are  again  appropriate:  "In  the  lower  stages  of  human  evolution,  a 
foreigner  is  not  far  from  being  an  enemy,  if  he  be  not  one  actually. 
In  the  higher  stages  of  our  evolution,  among  people  who  think  they 
are  really  civilized,  he  still  seems  in  practice  to  be  of  another  species, 
because  he  has  a  different  mentality,  and  unusual  ways.  Each  separate 
human  group  has  thus  a  fashion  of  collective  egoism,  whence  comes  self- 
satisfaction,  a  pride  which  may  possess  dignity,  which  may  be  a  power, 
but  which  also  may  become  a  source  of  blindness  and  wickedness."19 
This  antipathy  to  foreigners  has  been  strong  even  when  other  forces 
appeared  to  be  in  the  ascendancy.  Such  was  the  case,  for  instance, 
when  religion  seemed  to  have  the  center  of  the  stage;  nationalistic 
jealousy  was  a  factor  in  the  movements  which  centered  about  Wiclif, 
Huss,  Luther,  Henry  VIII,  and  John  Knox.  These  men  could  all 
count  upon  antipathy  to  foreigners.  And  the  same  antipathy  shows 
itself  today  in  the  fact  thajt  the  peoples  of  different  nations  not  only 
hate  the  enemy,  but  also  show  a  lack  of  solicitude  about  their  allies. 
In  the  outcry  for  increased  production  in  the  spring  of  1917,  some  in- 
dividuals expressed  themselves  as  being  ready  to  plant  for  American 
consumption,  but  unwilling  that  any  of  the  products  should  go  to 


The  Impulses  of  Patriotism  17 

foreigners.  And  the  "foreigners"  that  were  in  mind  in  some  in- 
stances were  the  Canadians,  our  next-door  neighbors.  It  may  be  added, 
however,  that  it  does  not  seem  as  if  there  is  in  race  hatred  any  in- 
surmountable obstacles  to  overcoming  it.  Races  which  are  thrown 
into  contact  become  accustomed  to  one  another,  and  are  able  to  live 
in  harmony. 

The  form  assumed  by  the  general  impulse  of  aversion  or  antipathy 
may  be  either  defensive  or  aggressive,  and  may  tend  toward  either 
self-preservation  or  self-assertion.  There  are  nations  which  of  their 
own  motion  will  not  be  warlike,  but  in  which  the  warlike  temper  will 
flare  up  when  they  are  once  attacked.  In  such  nations  patriotism  has 
been  associated  with  the  fight  for  freedoms  Sometimes  it  seems  as  if 
the  definition  of  the  patriot  was  that  he  was  one  who  defended  his 
country's  liberty.  This  love  of  freedom  is  featured  in  American  ex- 
pressions of  patriotism.  A  verse  from  "Hail,  Columbia,"  will  serve 
as  an  example: 

"Immortal  patriots!  rise  once  more: 
Defend  your  rights,  defend  your  shore: 
Let  no  rude  foe  with  impious  hand 
Let  no  rude  foe  with  impious  hand 
Invade  the  shrine  where  sacred  lies 
Of  toil  and  blood  the  well-earned  prize." 

The  call  in  this  verse  is  that  for  defense. 

There  is  an  instinct  that  attends  this  impulse  to  self-preservation 
that  strikes  one  forcibly  as  being  prominent  in  the  patriotism  of  the 
present  time,  and  that  is  fear.  It  is  an  impulse  that  manifests  itself 
when  one's  existence  or  vital  interests  are  threatened.  The  peoples  of 
the  world  today  are  in  an  excitement  of  fear  because  each  one  of  them 
believes  that  national  existence  and  the  personal  values  that  depend 
upon  it  are  endangered.  There  is  a  reason  why  it  is  easy  for  nations, 
while  trusting  in  their  own  good  intentions,  to  be  suspicious  of  one 
another.  When  the  individual  looks  at  his  own  country,  he  is  likely 
to  see  the  common  people  who  are  all  about  him  and  are  like  himself. 
And,  since  he  feels  that  his  own  purposes  are  good,  he  can  easily 
credit  good  motives  to  his  fellow-citizens.  But  when,  on  the  other 
hand,  he  looks  into  another  country,  he  is  likely  to  see  the  governing 
class  looming  up,  since  that  is  the  class  that  figures  most  prominently 
in  the  newspapers.     And  it  is  this  class  which  is  likely  to  be  most 


1 8  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

aggressively  nationalistic,  and  is,  moreover,  the  object  of  very  little 
understanding  by  the  ordinary  man.  Hence,  while  he  thinks  that  all 
the  good  people  that  he  knows  cannot  comprise  anything  that  is 
inhuman,  he  can  believe  that  there  may  very  well  be  foreign  monsters. 
The  result  is  fear,  fear  of  other  countries,  a  fear  that  breaks  out  into 
a  panic  when  danger  arises,  and  drives  men  to  seek  the  safety  of  the 
fatherland.  Now  the  present  is  a  time  of  panic,  and  the  impulse 
of  fear  has  put  its  impress  deep  upon  current  patriotism. 

But  what  is  feared  tends  to  become  hated  too,  and  so  patriotism 
gets  tinged  with  hate.  Examples  of  it  are  at  hand.  This  war  has 
produced  its  "Hymn  of  Hate,"  so  labeled,  and  others  not  so  labeled. 
Many  of  the  Psalms  are  expressions  of  patriotic  hate,  and  since  the 
war  began  have  been  read  as  such.  J.  M.  Robertson20  contends  that 
patriotism  is  nothing  else  but  fear  and  hatred.  To  his  mind  patriotism 
is  not  love  or  affection  at  all,  and  the  only  apparent  affection  there 
may  be,  is  that  which  is  compelled  by  the  necessity  for  common 
action  against  an  enemy.  Fear  itself,  Robertson  points  out,  implies  a 
hostile  impulse;  love  and  hate,  cohesion  and  repulsion,  are  to  him 
strictly  correlative  terms;  there  is  no  love  which  is  not  linked  with 
hate.  "It  is  not,"  he  says,  "brotherhood,  or  sympathy,  or  goodwill  that 
unites  the  general  population  in  a  flush  of  passion  against  another 
population:  the  ostensible  brotherhood  of  the  moment  is  merely  a 
passing  product  of  the  union  of  egoisms."21 

It  is  certain  that  in  great  measure  Robertson  is  right.  But  one 
may  well  doubt  the  truth  of  the  assertion  that  it  is  necessary  to  hate 
in  order  to  love.  It  is  not  necessary  to  hate  one  woman  in  order  to 
love  another,  or  to  have  an  enemy  in  order  to  possess  a  friend.  Neither 
does  it  seem  essential  in  the  nature  of  things  to  hate  one  country  in 
order  to  be  able  to  love  another.  Moreover,  hatred  is  not  unqualifiedly 
a  term  of  opprobrium.  How  can  one  rightly  care  for  anything  without 
in  some  way  resenting  attacks  upon  it?  There  are  such  things  as 
righteous  wrath  and  righteous  hatred  if  they  be  directed  against  what  is 
evil. 

These  remarks  upon  fear  and  hatred  throw  further  light  upon 
some  of  the  phenomena  of  patriotism  already  touched  upon.  One 
can  better  understand  now  the  frantic  excitement  that  often  attends 
a  national  crisis;  fear  "more  than  .  .  .  any  other  instinct,  tends 
to  bring  to  an  end  at  once  all  other  mental  activity,  riveting  the  atten- 
tion upon  its  object  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others."22  New  light  is 
thrown  upon  the  solidarity  the  group  shows.     Under  the  stimulus  of 


The  Impulses  of  Patriotism  19 

fear,  the  herd  instinctively  unites.  Unity  is  the  basis  of  morale.  And 
the  individual  subordinates  himself  to  the  group;  his  normal  intolerance 
of  isolation  is  heightened  in  the  presence  of  fear.  And  a  corollary  of 
all  this  is  that  the  patriotism  of  fear  is  destructive  of  thought,  but  is 
prolific  in  unity  of  emotion  and  action. 

Self-assertion  is  an  attitude  which  under  the  conflict  of  interests 
with  others  may  be  induced.  And  in  the  external  affairs  of  nations,  it 
may  be  brought  to  triumph  over  the  motive  of  security.  The  means 
by  which  this  is  done  is  through  the  argument  that  only  by  taking  an 
aggressive  part  can  one  defend  himself,  the  argument  in  other  words, 
that  the  best  defense  is  a  good  offense.  The  result  is  that  the  distinc- 
tion between  defensive  and  offensive  warfare  is  liable  to  be  obliterated, 
a  fact  which  adds  to  the  perplexities  of  the  problem  of  war.  "The 
feeling  that  war  is  always  defensive  wrecks  the  peace  propaganda. 
The  word  defensive  is  capable  of  being  stretched  indefinitely.  It  is  not 
confined  necessarily  to  preventing  an  invasion.  A  people  will  feel  that 
it  is  fighting  a  defensive  war  if  it  attacks  a  nation  which  may  attack 
it  in  the  future.  ...  Or  the  people  may  feel  that  what  it  re- 
gards as  its  legitimate  expansion  is  being  thwarted.  ...  So  by 
imperceptible  gradations  every  war  can  be  justified,  and,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  is  justified  as  defensive."23  When  once  a  war  is  started,  a 
people  will  support  it,  even  if  it  is  aggressive,  and  if  one  couples  with 
this  the  fact  that  when  a  nation  arms  in  self-defense,  it  acquires  the 
means  of  aggression,  he  can  understand  how  easily  a  patriotism  which 
supports  only  a  policy  of  self-preservation  can  be  brought  to  support  a 
policy  of  self-assertion. 

One  way  in  which  the  will  to  self-assertion  is  likely  to  manifest 
itself  is  as  an  impulse  to  expansion.  A  stationary  condition  is  not 
satisfactory  to  the  group;  it  desires  to  reach  out.  This  impulse  shows 
itself  in  churches  and  orders  of  all  kinds  by  the  constant  demand 
for  new  members.  The  group  wants  to  see  itself  grow.  But  if  na- 
tions grow,  they  are  apt  to  think  that  they  need  more  land.  And  when 
this  occurs  their  patriotism  will  attach  itself  to  the  desire  for  expan- 
sion, and  become  imperialism.  J.  M.  Robertson  couples  the  words 
Patriotism  and  Empire  in  the  title  of  a  book,  and  in  that  book  he  says, 
"Patriotism  conventionally  defined  as  the  love  of  country,  .  .  . 
turns  out  rather  obviously  to  stand  for  love  of  more  country."24  And 
where  there  is  coupled  with  this  the  impulse  of  acquisition,  it  becomes 
plain  why  the  economic  rivalry  of  nations  has  been  so  important  in 
bringing  about  the  situation  out  of  which  war  arises. 


20  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

The  impulse  of  expansion  undergoes  but  a  slight  change  to  become 
the  will  to  domination.  This  latter  is  a  primitive  impulse.  The  Indian 
was  taught  to  despise  manual  labor,  but  to  glory  in  the  overcoming  and 
plundering  of  other  tribes.  It  is  still  dominant  in  the  race.  What 
men  desire,  at  least  in  the  Western  world,  is  power,  and  they  would 
rather  exercise  dominion  over  others  than  be  free  themselves.  Goethe 
puts  the  idea  in  poetical  form: 

"How  often  has  it  arisen!    Yes,  and  it  will  arise 
Ever  and  evermore!     No  man  yields  sovereignty 
Unto  his  fellow:  none  will  yield  to  him 
Who  won  the  power  by  force,  and  by  force  keeps  his  hold. 
For  man,  who  cannot  rule  his  own  unruly  heart, 
Is  hot  to  rule  his  neighbor,  bind  him  to  his  will."25 

The  desire  for  dominion  was  awakened  by  the  Napoleonic  aggressions, 
and  has  played  a  great  part  in  fanning  the  flame  of  nationalism  in  the 
nineteenth  century.  It  has  given  nationalism  an  aggressive  and  militant 
character.  And  the  people  of  a  democratic  country  are  not  immune 
from  the  virus;  they  as  well  as  kings  sometimes  give  themselves  up  to 
the  thirst  for  domination,  a  fact  which  has  at  least  some  bearing  upon 
whether  or  'not  democracy  will  make  the  world  safe.  The  citizen 
rarely  disputes  the  external  sovereignty  of  his  country.  Consequently 
the  fact  of  internal  democracy  by  no  means  gives  assurance  that  a 
country  will  uniformly  abstain  from  assuming  the  attitude  of  a  dynastic 
state  when  it  faces  the  world.  Democracy  often  ceases  at  the  water's 
edge. 

/  Pride  is  a  part  of  patriotism.    Men  walk  with  heads  up  and  chests 
/  out  at  the  consciousness  of  belonging  to  a  conquering  or  respected  na- 
/    tion.    The  triumphal  processions  of  the  Romans  were  a  spectacle  that  no 
/      doubt  stirred  patriotism  of  this  variety  in  noble  Roman  hearts.    They 
could  "point  with  pride"  to  their  glory.    And  a  little  touch  of  glory 
makes  the  whole  world  kin;   modern  men  in  their  swelling  national 
\     pride  are  of  the  same  stock  as  the  ancient  men  of  Rome.     Men  now 
identify  themselves  with  their  group,  and  feel  that  along  with  it,  they 
\  themselves  rise  or  fall  in  importance.     If  the  country  submits  to  an- 
other's will,  they  hang  their  heads  in  shame;  if  it  imposes  upon  an- 
other its  own  will,  they  hold  their  heads  high.    An  important  practical 
consequence  of  national  pride  is  that  no  people  now  would  voluntarily 
consent  to  peace  without  honor,  which  is  food  for  thought  in  the 
planning  of  peace. 


The  Impulses  of  Patriotism  21 

The  patriotism  of  pride  is  not  loath  to  meet  its  adversary  upon  the 
field  of  honor.  When  nations  have  a  lively  sense  of  power  and 
prestige,  a  situation  is  created  which  furnishes  admirable  fuel  for 
trouble.  For  insecure  pride  will  induce  fear,  and  fearful  pride  will 
allow  no  nation  to  do  other  than  to  resent  insults,  real  or  supposed, 
promptly  and  bitterly.  Material  interests  need  not  clash  in  order  that 
a  war  be  provoked.  If  the  patriot  says  to  himself  that  the  country's 
honor  has  been  assailed,  the  fight  is  on,  no  matter  what  the  insult  may 
consist  in;  it  may  have  to  do  with  only  a  matter  of  mere  punctilio. 
An  insult  has  been  offered,  and  injured  pride  does  not  enjoy  itself  until 
it  reaps  revenge.  Of  course  the  crime  is  that  the  insult  is  a  public 
one.  "The  act  that,  more  certainly  than  any  other,  provokes  vengeful 
emotion  is  the  public  insult,  which,  if  not  immediately  resented,  lowers 
one  in  the  eyes  of  one's  fellows.  Such  an  insult  calls  out  one's  positive 
self-feeling,  with  its  impulse  to  assert  oneself  and  to  make  good  one's 
value  and  power  in  the  public  eye."26 

But  it  does  not  happen  that  any  one  country  is  allowed  to  assert 
itself  without  opposition.  Others  will  follow  the  example,  attempt  to 
assert  themselves,  and  make  good  their  prestige.  What  then  happens 
is  that  there  is  a  race  for  power,  and  patriotism  becomes  a  spirit  of 
rivalry  or  emulation.27  The  fact  is  that  what  most  of  us  desire  is  not 
only  well-being  but  prestige,  not  only  the  Good,  but  the  Better  or  the 
Best.  Athletic  contests  are  invested  with  such  great  interest  not  only 
because  they  may  be  good  games,  but  because  they  are  contests,  con- 
tests perhaps  between  traditional  rivals,  or  are  for  the  championship  of 
this,  that,  or  the  other.  It  is  likewise  with  countries.  National  wel- 
fare is  viewed  at  the  present  time  very  largely  as  a  competitive  success. 
And  affairs  have  come  to  such  a  condition  that  no  one  country  dares 
to  let  up  in  its  vigilance  in  the  universal  competition.  Individually  it 
is  helpless.  If  it  relaxes,  its  competitor  will  monopolize  all  the  ad- 
vantages, its  own  prestige  will  be  lowered,  and  it  will  be  inviting 
aggression  in  which  it  will  be  preyed  upon.  There  doesn't  seem  to  be 
much  help  for  the  situation  except  in  the  concerted  action  of  nations. 
But  in  the  meanwhile  the  struggle  goes  on,  and  patriots  throw  them- 
selves into  the  spirit  of  it  with  abandon. 

It  should  be  said  that  it  is  not  inevitable  that  the  impulse  of  rivalry 
should  issue  exclusively  in  destructive  conflict.  One  does  not  need  to 
destroy  his  competitor  in  order  that  he  himself  should  be  benefited,  and 
in  fact  enlightened  competition  does  desire  the  preservation  and  wel- 
fare of  the  competitors.     One  way  in  which  the  emulative  impulse 


22  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

differs  from  the  combative  impulse,  for  instance,  is  just  this,  that 
it  does  seek  to  preserve  a  defeated  competitor.  The  possibility  is, 
then,  that  patriotism  may  be  sublimated  into  a  higher  and  more  inno- 
cent form  of  rivalry  than  what  we  have  at  present. 

We  have,  however,  to  deal  with  the  present  fact  that  the  rivalry 
of  nations  is  likely  to  issue  in  war.  And  hence  it  becomes  necessary 
to  take  into  consideration  the  impulse  of  pugnacity.  The  plain  fact  is 
that  war  has  a  fascination.  Even  if  one's  own  country  be  not  involved, 
one  turns  eagerly  to  the  war  news  in  the  daily  papers.  History  is 
the  history  of  wars.  The  attractiveness  of  war  is  expressed  in  the  fol- 
lowing verse  of  Richard  Le  Gallienne: 

"War 
I  abhor 

And  yet  how  sweet 

The  sound  along  the  marching  street 
Of  drum  and  fife!  and  I  forget 
Wet  eyes  of  widows,  and  forget 
Broken  old  mothers,  and  the  whole 
Dark  butchery  without  a  soul." 

There  is  that  about  the  martial  life  which  excites  enthusiasm,  and  that 
enthusiasm  gets  connected  with  patriotism.  Patriotism  runs  at  high 
tide  in  war  times.28 

And  now,  does  the  presence  of  the  instinct  of  pugnacity  compel  at 
once  an  unfavorable  verdict  on  patriotism?  There  is  no  doubt  that 
pugnacity  may  lead  to  what  is  undesirable;  it  does  become  "dark 
butchery  without  a  soul."  Is  patriotism  for  that  to  be  condemned?  In 
answer  to  this  two  things  may  be  said.  To  begin  with,  militancy  may 
be  a  good,  and  can  no  more  be  condemned  in  the  abstract  than  can 
pacifism.  There  is  no  ground  for  saying  that  pacifism  is  a  virtue  in 
itself.  One  might  be  pacifistic  simply  because  he  did  not  care  about 
his  fellow  men,  or  simply  because  he  was  afraid  to  fight.  Nonresist- 
ance  is  indeed  under  some  conditions  a  good,  and  so  is  the  impulse  of 
pugnacity.  Totally  devoid  of  it,  neither  the  individual  nor  the  nation 
can  live  in  other  than  pusillanimous  cowardice;  their  ideals  will  not 
be  much,  and  from  them  shall  be  taken  even  the  little  that  they  have. 
In  the  second  place,  patriotism  does  not  issue  exclusively  in  war.  It 
has  already  been  shown  that  it  has  a  positive  character  of  attachment, 
and  may  develop  without  reference  to  war,  but  wholly  with  reference 
to  the  pursuits  of  peace. 


The  Impulses  of  Patriotism  23 

The  analysis  of  the  impulses  of  patriotism  has  emphasized  the  truth 
of  a  proposition  that  was  stated  at  the  beginning;  patriotism  is  a  com- 
plex phenomenon.  It  is,  as  it  actually  appears,  composed  of  a  wide 
variety  of  impulses,  which  appear  in  shifting  combinations,  and  show 
themselves  now  in  one  person  and  time  and  now  in  another. 

The  conclusion  may  also  be  drawn  that  there  has  been  found  here 
no  ground  for  passing  a  final  verdict  either  favorable  or  unfavorable 
upon  patriotism.  There  has  been  found  in  the  instinctive  basis  of 
patriotism  an  element  which  gives  it  its  tremendous  power,  but  that 
result  does  not  answer  the  question  regarding  the  moral  worth  of 
patriotism.  Instincts  are  just  tendencies  that  taken  simply  as  instincts 
have  no  moral  character  at  all.  Their  moral  worth  depends  upon  the 
way  in  which  they  are  used.  Consequently,  before  one  can  estimate 
the  worth  of  patriotism,  he  must  see  how  these  impulses  are  used  in  it. 

The  impulses  themselves  are  not  patriotism.  They  form  raw  material 
for  and  give  character  to  it,  but  they  themselves  are  not  patriotism. 
They  serve  equally  well  as  raw  material  for  other  human  interests  far 
removed  from  this  one.  Instincts  alone  are  unorganized,  and  are  cap- 
able of  being  shaped  into  an  indefinite  number  of  meanings.  The 
further  question  that  will  ultimately  have  to  be  answered  is  that 
concerning  what  the  organizing  factor  is  that  can  ever  give  to  any 
combination  of  impulses  the  meaning, — patriotism.  That  investigation 
will  next  be  entered  upon. 


PART  II 
THE  HABITUATION  OF  PATRIOTISM 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Deliberate  Habituation 

One  way  by  which  the  impulses  and  dispositions  of  human  character 
are  amalgamated  in  patriotism  is  by  habituation.  The  habits  of 
patriotism  are  just  as  powerful  and  important  as  the  impulses.  The 
impulses,  in  fact,  are  molded  into  habits,  and  are  profoundly  modified 
by  the  environment  and  regimen  to  which  they  are  subjected.  The 
habits  become  the  masters  of  the  impulses.  Thought  at  this  point 
enters  into  the  problem,  but  it  is  not  the  individual's  own  thought;  it 
is  the  thought  of  the  society  which  surrounds  him.  His  articles  of 
faith  are  habits  acquired  from  society.  "...  It  is  through 
habit  that  the  influence  of  intelligence  has  most  control  over  the  lives  of 
the  majority  of  civilized  men."1  On  the  part  of  the  individual,  the 
thought  is  involuntary,  or  at  least  unvoluntary,  and  is  accompanied  by 
like  action.  Most  of  man's  beliefs  are  nonrational,  even  though  he 
supposes  that  he  has  come  to  hold  them  by  his  own  free  and  deliberate 
choice.  Society  holds  tremendous  power  over  the  building  of  character; 
in  large  measure,  it  controls  the  material  that  the  mind  has  to  work 
on.  And  this  control  is  of  primary  importance.  "...  The 
essential  fact  which  has  made  the  Great  Society  possible  is  the  dis- 
covery, handed  down  by  tradition  and  instruction,  that  Thought  can 
be  fed  by  deliberately  collected  material,  and  stimulated,  sustained, 
and  to  a  certain  extent,  controlled  by  an  effort  of  will."2 

Now,  the  patriotic  spirit,  along  with  other  dispositions,  may  be* 
acquired  as  a  habit,  and  the  mold  into  which  patriotism  runs  is  no-i 
toriously  with  most  men  a  matter  of  circumstances  and  habituation.! 
Along  this  line,  it  is  interesting  to  speculate  as  to  what  American 
patriotism  would  be  if  this  country  had  never  separated  from  England, 
if  the  thirteen  colonies  had  not  been  able  to  form  a  federation,  or 
if  the  South  had  been  successful  in  the  Civil  War.  The  loyalty  of 
Americans  would  have  been  totally  different,  but  no  doubt  would  be 
just  as  devoted  as  it  actually  is.  It  is  a  historical  fact  that  English 
patriotism  has  modified  itself  to  correspond  to  the  expansion  of  the 
empire.  In  view  of  all  this,  one  can  hardly  resist  the  conclusion  that 
patriotism  depends  quite  largely  upon  habituation  and  use  and  wont.  Pa- 
triotism is  a  national  habit;  and  it  is  a  habit  which  even  were  it  proved 

j  to  be  nothing  but  evil,  would  not  be  easily  broken,  since  it  is  acquired 

|  from  life's  earliest  years  onward. 


28  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

"The  superstitions  of  our  early  years, 
E'en  when  we  know  them  to  be  nothing  more, 
Lose  not  for  that  their  hold  upon  our  hearts; 
Not  all  are  free  who  ridicule  their  chains."3 

There  are  two  kinds  of  the  habituation  of  patriotism,  deliberate  and 
spontaneous,  conscious  and  unconscious,  direct  and  indirect. '  The  more 
obvious  of  the  two  is  that  of  conscious  and  deliberate  habituation. 
There  are  agencies  that  are  constantly  being  used  with  deliberate  pur- 
pose towards  the  regimentation  of  the  populace  in  patriotism.  "Pa- 
triotism is  systematically  cultivated  by  anniversaries,  pilgrimages,  sym- 
bols, songs,  recitations,  etc."4  There  are  numerous  patriotic  societies, 
such  as  the  Grand  Army  of  the  Republic,  the  Daughters  of  the  Amer- 
ican Revolution,  the  Sons  of  Veterans,  the  Woman's  Relief  Corps,  the 
Daughters  of  the  Confederacy,  and  others.6 

But  there  are  other  and  more  important  forces  back  of  the  inculca- 
tion of  patriotism.  In  most  countries  the  state  with  all  its  power  is 
vigilant  lest  patriotism  be  allowed  to  become  otiose.  And  it  has  means 
at  its  disposal  that  range  from  the  selection  and  repression  of  news 
to  the  active  use  of  all  sorts  of  influences  which  sway  the  mind  of  the 
public.  And  these  influences  do  not  go  unemployed.  There  are  those 
in  the  state  who  have  a  special  interest  in  arousing  a  strong  sentiment  of 
patriotism.  Conspicuous  among  such  are  the  professional  soldiers. 
They,  of  course,  want  a  solidified  population.  Their  training  has  em- 
phasized their  appreciation  of  the  value  of  obedience  and  uniformity. 
These  virtues  are  essentials  in  the  disipline  of  an  army,  and  in  terms 
of  military  logic  they  seem  to  be  essentials  in  the  organization  of  a 
country.  J.  M.  Robertson  has  a  division  of  a  book  which  he  has 
devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the  regimentation  of  militarism.6  But  the 
guardianship  of  the  patriotic  fire  within  the  state  is  not  turned  over 
entirely  into  soldierly  hands.  Other  interests,  whose  nature  and  motives 
in  contrast  with  the  straightforward  purposes  of  the  country's  guardians 
are  such  as  to  make  it  difficult  to  describe  them  in  the  dispassionate 
spirit  of  scientific  and  philosophic  discourse,  are  ready  with  their  assist- 
ance. And,  of  course,  the  ordinary  civilian  temper  is  not  averse  to  the 
rigorous  regimentation  of  patriotic  loyalty. 

Hegel7  thought  that  it  was  both  right  and  necessary  that  the  state 
should  control  public  opinion.  He  considered  that  the  people  had  no 
opinions  of  very  great  worth.  ".  .  .  The  people,  in  so  far  as  this 
term  signifies  a  special  part  of  the  citizens,  does  not  know  what  it 


The  Habituation  of  Patriotism  29 

Iwills.  To  know  what  we  will,  and  further  what  the  absolute  will, 
(namely,  reason,  wills,  is  the  fruit  of  deep  knowledge  and  insight,  and 
'is  therefore  not  the  property  of  the  people."8  Public  opinion  without 
ithe  guidance  of  the  state  was  unorganized  and  dangerous.  "The  many 
jas  individuals,  whom  we  are  prone  to  call  the  people,  are  indeed  a 
jcollective  whole,  but  merely  as  a  multitude  or  formless  mass,  whose 
(movement  and  action  would  be  elemental,  void  of  reason,  violent,  and 

I 'terrible."9  Therefore  it  was  necessary  for  the  proper  source  of  authority 
to  organize  public  opinion.  And,  of  course,  this  work  of  organization 
and  direction  was  to  be  the  task  of  the  officials  of  the  state.  "The 
highest  state  officials  have  necessarily  deeper  and  more  comprehensive 
insight  into  the  workings  and  needs  of  the  state,  and  also  greater  skill 
and  wider  practical  experience."9  There  are  others  who  do  not  hold 
Hegel's  philosophical  system  that  yet  agree  with  him  in  upholding  the 
high  sovereignty  and  controlling  supervision  of  the  state. 

Ecclesiastical  institutions  often  serve  as  habituators  of  nationalistic 
spirit.  The  rise  of  nationalism  in  Spain  affords  an  interesting  example, 
for  religious  motives  were  at  the  height  of  their  strength  in  those 
days.  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  got  control  of  the  hierarchical  religious 
organizations  in  their  dominions  by  taking  from  the  Pope  and  to  them- 
selves the  power  to  name  the  prelates  of  the  Catholic  church  in  Spain. 
The  Crusading  Orders  had  great  vogue  in  the  country,  and  Ferdinand 
got  himself  elected  to  the  office  of  Grand  Master  in  the  most  important 
of  them.  These  measures  accomplished,  they  were  made  to  tell  by  the 
rulers  of  Spain  in  the  process  of  furthering  their  dynastic  and  na- 
tionalistic ambitions.  In  Japan,  Bushido,  a  mixture  of  Confucian  and 
Shinto  elements,  is  a  spirit  of  patriotism  which  is  at  the  disposal  of 
the  state.  In  Germany,  the  pastors  of  the  established  churches  are 
state  officials;  they  are  state-appointed  and  state-paid,  and  they  re- 
flect the  state's  purposes.  In  all  Christian  countries,  including  our  own, 
the  churches  observe  the  national  patriotic  holidays  both  in  time  of 
war  and  peace,  and  in  time  of  war  preach  patriotism  from  the  pulpits, 
sometimes  at  the  solicitation  of  the  state,  sometimes  of  their  own 
volition. 

The  newspapers  are  of  cardinal  importance  as  agencies  of  the  in- 
culcation of  patriotism.  It  is  natural  that  the  newspapers  should  be 
insurgently  patriotic.  They  are  dependent  upon  the  public  for  their 
subsistence.  And  the  mass  of  the  public  is  conservative.  Consequently, 
the  newspapers  are  as  a  rule  conservative  also.  Now  patriotism  is  a 
venerable  virtue  easy  for  the  public  to  believe  in,  and  it  is  almost 


30  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

inevitable  that  journalism  should  play  up  that  virtue.  It  is  also  almost 
as  inevitable  that  the  patriotism  of  the  press  should  be  of  the  militant 
kind.  To  take  that  character  is  simply  to  follow  the  line  of  least  re- 
sistance. Public  opinion  reacts  upon  the  press  and  circumscribes  its 
initiative.  And  when  a  people  becomes  inflamed  against  another  peo- 
ple, the  newspapers  as  a  rule  (there  are,  of  course,  some  that  are  in- 
dependent in  their  thought  and  leadership)  have  to  fall  in  line;  the 
sheet  that  opposed  the  trend  of  public  emotion  would  have  to  pay  for 
its  folly.  The  newspapers,  moreover,  on  the  whole  represent  the  gen- 
tlemanly business  class,  and  wars  promise  most  to  the  interests  of  that 
class.  Conflict  is  quite  apt  to  grow  out  of  economic  rivalry,  whence  it 
naturally  follows  that  those  who  are  most  nearly  concerned  in  that 
rivalry  (and  the  newspapers  are  controlled  by  such  as  are  of  that 
class)  will  be  most  interested  in  the  prosecution  of  a  war  which  bids 
fair  to  enlarge  the  economic  opportunities  of  their  own  country. 

Along  with  the  newspapers  as  habituators  of  patriotism  go  also  less 
ephemeral  kinds  of  literature.  "The  Man  Without  a  Country,"10  for 
instance,  has  a  definite  patriotic  purpose.  And  patriotic  orations, 
songs,  and  poetry  have  the  same  purpose.  Sometimes  these  composi- 
tions are  not  jingoistic,  but  very  often  they  are.  Wordsworth's  poetry, 
for  instance,  is  of  the  nonjingoistic  character;  it  is  strongly  marked  by 
love  of  the  soil.  But  Wordsworth  was  of  unusually  broad  sympathies, 
and  his  is  not  the  kind  of  poetry  usually  made  use  of  in  teaching 
patriotism.  J.  M.  Robertson  has  written  an  essay  in  which  he  called 
attention  to  the  proclivity  of  poets  to  write  in  a  jingoistic  strain." 
Virgil,  himself  a  man  of  broad  sympathies,  wrote  the  iEneid  at  the 
request  of  Augustus,  whose  empire-building  purposes  needed  an  epic 
after  the  model  of  Homer  about  the  founding  of  Rome. 

An  important  habituator  of  patriotism  in  the  training  of  the  young 
is  the  public  school  system.  The  public  schools  are  almost  always  used 
by  those  who  have  them  in  charge  for  the  maintenance  of  the  existing 
order.  But  the  "existing  order"  quite  regularly  means  the  political  one, 
and  hence  the  road  is  opened  for  the  teaching  of  patriotism.  Prussia 
seems  to  be  an  extreme  case  of  the  deliberate  use  of  the  schools  for 
pushing  the  pet  programs  of  the  politically  favored  classes.  "In  Prussia 
the  avowed  use  of  the  schools,  not  for  the  spread  of  truth  but  for  the 
'War  against  social-democracy'  may  be  in  part  responsible  for  that 
absence  of  Love  between  members  of  different  classes,  that  class-war  of 
which  the  growth  of  social-democracy  is  only  one  symptom."12  Prussia 
also  exhibits  a  peculiarly  active  brand  of  patriotism.    It  has  been  com- 


The  Habituation  of  Patriotism  31 

monly  assumed  in  the  United  States  that  education  will  make  for 
democracy  but  it  is  not  necessarily  so.  ^--Education,  instead  of  being  ^ 
aimed  at  freeing  and  developing  the  mind,  may  be  aimed  only  at^rd 
regimentation  in  a  certain  system  of  ideas!/  The  fact  of  the  business  /  ' 
is  that  as  a  rule  it  is  so  aimed,  even  where  tftere  is  no  such  clear  and  per- 
sistent purpose  as  there  is  in  Prussia;  it  is  all  too  easy  to  fall  into  the  rut  I 
of  doing  the  same  old  things  in  the  same  old  way.  It  is  simply  easier 
to  inculcate  the  same  old  ideas  than  it  is  to  teach  the  ever-varying  young 
idea  how  to  shoot.  And  what  education  turns  out  under  such  methods 
is  not  free  and  independent  thinkers,  but  a  habituated  uniform  product. 
"School  education,  unless  it  is  regulated  by  the  best  knowledge  and  / 
good  sense,  will  produce  men  and  women  who  are  all  of  one  pattern,  / 
as  if  turned  in  a  lathe.  .  .  .  Any  institution  which  runs  for  years  in 
the  same  hands  will  produce  a  type.  ...  In  the  continental 
schools  and  barracks,  in  newspapers,  books,  etc.,  what  is  developed  by 
education  is  dynastic  sentiment,  national  sentiment,  soldierly  senti- 
ment."13 And  so  the  schools  are  used  for  the  maintenance  of  patriotism,  ^ 
— patriotism  which  only  too  often  is  narrow  and  militaristic.  An  ex- 
ample of  the  better  kind  of  purpose  to  teach  patriotism  is  that  in  view 
in  Bosanquet's  lecture  on  the  subject.14  An  example  of  the  kind  which 
is  likely  not  to  be  so  temperate  and  well-considered  is  that  which  grows 
out  of  the  demand  for  the  teaching  of  patriotism  which  arises  under 
the  stimulus  of  war.  On  May  17,  191 7V  there  appeared  in  a  small- 
town newspaper15  an  article  dated  from  New  York  City,  and  which 
was  evidently  furnished  by  some  news  association.  The  headlines  were 
as  follows:  "College  Course  in  Patriotism.  Chicago's  Mayor  Starts 
Chair  in  Lincoln  University.  Students  True  Americans."  The  open- 
ing paragraph  ran  thus:  "For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  American 
education  a  chair  has  been  established  for  the  teaching  of  American 
Patriotism.  Inspired  by  the  work  being  done  by  the  Lincoln  Memorial 
University,  William  Hale  Thompson,  Mayor  of  Chicago,  will  provide 
$25,000  for  this  purpose."  A  little  further  on  occurred  the  sentence, 
"Plans  have  already  been  made  for  the  opening  of  the  Patriotism  De- 
partment." These  plans  may  not  have  been  actually  carried  out,  and 
if  they  were,  may  have  obtained  solid  results,  but  the  sound  of  the 
article  was  such  as  would  lead  one  to  suspect  that  what  was  accom- 
plished would  rather  prove  to  be  superficial  and  sensational.  This  whole 
attempt  has  been  cited  here  not  because  it  is  an  isolated  incident, 
but  for  the  reason  that  it  is  an  illustration,  extreme  though  it  may 
be,  of  a  tendency. 


32  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

The  public  schools  have  textbooks  for  the  purpose  of  training  in 
patriotic  loyalty,  books  which  tell  of  the  duties  of  citizens,  and  are 
replete  with  songs  and  poems  to  illustrate  the  points  brought  out.18 
The  schools  of  our  land  make  it  a  part  of  their  chief  business  to  teach 
loyalty  to  the  country.  For  this  business  history  is  plastic  material. 
"History,  in  every  country,  is  so  taught  as  to  magnify  that  country: 
children  learn  to  believe  that  their  own  country  has  always  been  in  the 
right  and  almost  always  victorious,  that  it  has  produced  almost  all 
the  great  men,  and  that  it  is  in  all  respects  superior  to  all  other  coun- 
tries. Since  these  beliefs  are  flattering,  they  are  easily  absorbed,  and 
hardly  ever  dislodged  from  instinct  by  later  knowledge."17  The  un- 
pleasant facts  are  not  brought  out.  Americans,  for  example,  do  not  usu- 
ally have  it  called  to  their  attention  that  in  the  War  of  1812,  most  of 
their  vessels  were  tied  up  in  port  at  the  end  of  the  war,  their  national 
capital  was  captured  by  the  enemy,  they  won  only  one  important  land 
battle  and  that  after  the  war  was  over,  and  that  their  representatives  in 
the  peace  negotiations  had  to  surrender  the  principle  for  which  the  war 
was  fought.  The  war  ended  because  both  sides  were  willing  to  re- 
turn to  the  status  quo  ante.  The  patriotic  bias  dominates  even  the 
historian  himself.  "No  historian  ever  gets  out  of  the  mores  of  his  own 
society  of  origin.  .  .  .  Even  if  he  rises  above  the  limitations  of 
party,  he  does  not  get  outside  the  patriotic  and  ethical  horizon  in  which 
he  has  been  educated,  especially  when  he  deals  with  the  history  of  other 
countries  and  other  times  than  his  own.  Each  historian  regards  his 
own  nation  as  the  torchbearer  of  civilization;  its  mores  give  him  his 
ethical  standards  by  which  he  estimates  whatever  he  learns  of  other 
peoples.  ...  In  modern  Russian  literature  may  be  found  passages 
about  the  'Civilizing  mission'  of  Russia  which  might  be  translated, 
mutatis  mutandis,  from  passages  in  English,  French,  or  German  liter- 
ature about  the  civilizing  mission  of  England,  France,  or  Germany. 
Probably  the  same  is  true  of  Turkish,  Hindoo,  or  Chinese  literature. 
The  patriotism  of  the  historian  rules  his  judgment,  especially  as  to  ex- 
cuses and  apologies  for  things  done  in  the  past,  and  most  of  all  as  to  the 
edifying  omissions, — a  very  important  part  of  the  task  of  the  historian. 
.  .  .  There  is  a  compusion  on  the  historian  to  act  in  this  way, 
for  if  he  wrote  otherwise,  his  fellow-countrymen  would  ignore  his 
work."18 

The  habituation  of  patriotism  finds  in  symbols  an  instrument  ad- 
mirably suited  to  its  purpose.  The  mind  really  reacts  more  strongly 
to  symbols  than  it  does  to  the  facts  of  sense-experience.    The  potency 


The  Habituation  of  Patriotism  33 

of  symbols  does  not  suffer  from  the  admixture  of  distractions  by  which 
direct  sense-experience  is  accompanied.  Symbols  are  more  purely  mean- 
ing, and  they  come  with  the  momentum  of  their  meaning.  Now  the 
word  "country,"  embodying  an  abstract  and  fairly  simple  idea,  serves 
as  a  symbol  and  produces  a  pure  emotion  as  in  art.  Other  words  and 
phrases  could  be  named  that  are  similar  in  the  responses  that  they 
elicit.  "The  Monroe  Doctrine"  is  one  of  the  pet  symbols  of  the 
United  States.  In  patriotic  poetry  and  hymnology  the  flag  is  featured. 
It  is  a  symbol  of  the  country.^jChildren  are  taught  to  sing  about  the 
flag,  by  means  of  which  a  symbol  is  implanted  in  their  minds,  the 
love  of  music  is  appealed  to,  and  patriotism  is  connected  with  their 
childhood  sentiments.^  The  appeal  of  symbols  comes  home  to  one 
when  he  stands  at  the  dividing  line  between  two  countries,  at  Niagara 
Falls,  let  us  say,  and  gazes  upon  two  flags,  one  of  them  his  own  and 
the  other  not.  At  the  present  time  Great  Britain  is  our  ally,  but  the 
emotion  upon  beholding  the  British  flag  is  nothing  as  compared  with 
the  feeling  of  affection  experienced  upon  beholding  the  American  flag. 
The  British  emblem,  though  respected,  is  strange;  the  American  flag 
is  one's  own.  Sumner  discusses  what  he  calls  the  tyranny  of  the 
apparatus  of  suggestion,  that  is,  symbols  or  tokens,  and  from  him  is 
worth  quoting  the  following  pertinent  passage:  "The  tyranny  is  great- 
est in  regard  to  'American'  and  'Americanism.'  Who  dare  say  that 
he  is  not  'American'?  Who  dare  repudiate  what  is  declared  to  be 
'Americanism'?  It  follows  that  if  anything  is  base  and  bogus  it  is 
always  labeled  'American.'  If  a  thing  is  to  be  recommended  which  can- 
not be  justified,  is  is  put  under  'Americanism.'  Who  does  not  shudder 
at  the  fear  of  being  called  'unpatriotic'?  And  to  repudiate  what  any 
one  chooses  to  call  'American'  is  to  be  unpatriotic.  If  there  is  any 
document  of  Americanism,  it  is  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  Those 
who  have  Americanism  especially  in  charge  have  repudiated  the  doc- 
trine that  'governments  derive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of 
the  governed,'  because  it  stood  in  the  way  of  what  they  wanted  to  do. 
They  denounce  those  who  cling  to  the  doctrine  as  un-American.  Then 
we  see  what  Americanism  and  patriotism  are.  They  are  the  duty 
laid  upon  us  all  to  applaud,  follow,  and  obey  whatever  a  ruling  clique 
of  newspapers  and  politicians  chooses  to  say  or  wants  to  do.  'England' 
has  always  been,  amongst  us,  a  kind  of  counter  token,  or  token  of 
things  to  be  resisted  and  repudiated.  The  'symbols'  or  'tokens'  always 
have  this  utility  for  suggestion.  They  carry  a  coercion  with  them  and 
overwhelm  people  who  are  not  trained  to  verify  assertions  and  dissect 


34  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

fallacies."19  When  one's  attention  is  called  to  these  things,  it  cannot 
help  but  impose  upon  him  the  obligation  of  examining  the  bases  and 
nature  of  his  own  patriotic  enthusiasm. 

The  deliberate  habituation  of  patriotism  has  a  bearing  upon  the 
problem  of  peace.  Knowledge  of  other  peoples  will  not  bring  harmony 
and  mutual  goodwill  unless  it  is  sympathetic  knowledge,  and,  if  it  is 
to  be  sympathetic,  our  mental  prepossessions  must  be  shaped  so  as  to 
open  our  minds  to  a  just  appreciation  of  unwelcome  facts  and  ways 
at  variance  with  our  own.  And  to  accomplish  this,  the  teaching  of 
patriotism  will  have  to  be  directed  towards  the  realizing  of  the  de- 
voutly to  be  wished  consummation. 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Spontaneous  Habituation 

The  spontaneous  habituation  of  patriotism  has  no  conscious  and  set 
purpose,  institution,  or  program.  This  is  the  habituation  that  makes 
itself  felt  from  the  mere  fact  that  individuals  in  a  society  tend  more 
and  more  to  become  assimilated  to  one  another.  Germany  affords  an 
extreme  example  of  the  deliberate  habituation  in  patriotism.  Every 
agency  within  the  empire,  including  state,  church,  newspapers,  schools, 
and  so  on,  has  been  used  towards  securing  a  uniform  result,  that  of 
nationalistic  passion.  But  every  country  offers  an  example  of  the 
spontaneous  habituation  of  patriotism.  There  is  no  less  of  nationalistic 
loyalty  among  the  Allies  than  there  is  in  Germany.  It  is  interesting 
that  the  two  kinds  of  habituation  have  come  into  combat.  "Among  the 
number  of  embattled  principles  and  counter  principles  which  this  war 
has  brought  into  the  field,  we  must  include  as  not  the  least  interesting 
the  duel  between  conscious  national  direction  on  the  one  side  and 
unconscious  national  will  and  knowledge  on  the  other."20  In  the 
spontaneous  habituation  of  patriotism  we  are  dealing  with  a  more 
subtle  and  powerful  force  than  the  deliberate  habituation.  The  former 
goes  deeper  than  the  latter  into  human  life.  What  we  try  to  teach  may 
not  be  learned,  but  what  we  are  sets  copy  in  the  copybook  of  life. 
"The  genuine  beliefs,  though  not  usually  the  professed  precepts,  of 
parents  and  teachers  are  almost  unconsciously  acquired  by  most  chil- 
dren; and  even  if  they  depart  from  these  beliefs  in  later  life,  something 
of  them  remains  deeply  implanted,  ready  to  emerge  in  a  time  of  stress 
or  crisis."21 

It  is  natural  that  the  citizens  of  a  country  should  be  thus  habituated. 
In  fact,  in  large  measure,  they  habituate  themselves.  The  basis  of  it 
is  first  of  all  that  men  are  alike,  and  are  faced  with  similar  problems. 
The  fact  that  men  have  like  instincts,  instincts,  moreover,  that  have 
to  adjust  themselves  to  identical  life  conditions,  makes  it  easy  to 
assimilate  them  to  one  another  and  to  the  group.  Suggestibility  is  one 
of  these  dispositions  of  human  nature.  McDougall  defines  it  as  "a 
process  of  communication  resulting  in  the  acceptance  with  conviction 
of  the  communicated  proposition  in  the  absence  of  logically  adequate 
grounds  for  its  acceptance."22  Suggestion,  of  course,  is  not  omnipotent. 
There  is,  for  one  thing,  what  is  known  as  a  contra-suggestion,  that  is, 


36  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

behavior  in  which  people  do  just  the  opposite  to  what  one  tries  to 
persuade  them  to  do.  Early  in  the  regime  of  Mr.  Herbert  Hoover  as 
food  administrator  one  butcher  reported  that  his  customers  wanted 
meat  more  on  meatless  than  on  any  other  days.  And  there  is  always 
the  possibility  that  suggestion  may  be  disregarded  altogether.  But 
human  beings  are  interdependent,  and  are  open  to  guidance  through 
suggestions  from  the  ideas  and  practices  of  their  fellows.  An  in- 
dividual cannot  think  everything  out  for  himself.  Some  hardly  ever 
do  any  serious  thinking  and  even  the  more  serious  take  the  bulk  of 
their  thoughts,  at  least  in  other  fields  than  their  own  special  one,  upon 
suggestion.  Choice  is  exhausting.  It  is  hard  business  thinking,  and 
we  are  likely  to  shirk  the  irksomeness  of  it  if  we  can.  "Either  to  be 
exceptional  or  to  appreciate  the  exceptional  requires  a  considerable 
expenditure  of  energy,  and  no  one  can  afford  this  in  many  directions."23 
The  chances  are,  then,  that  except  in  such  cases  as  where  for  some 
reason  we  are  specially  critical,  an  idea  suggested  will  find  lodgement  in 
the  mind  and  tend  to  issue  in  action;  and  this  fact  is  tremendously  im- 
portant in  the  understanding  of  a  social  phenomenon  such  as  patriotism. 

It  is  rather  ominous  that  today  political  thought  does  not  seem  to 
be  as  active  as  it  once  was.  "My  own  impression,"  says  Graham  Wallas, 
"formed  after  questioning  a  good  many  people  in  different  parts  of 
England  is  that,  in  our  country,  the  quantity  of  such  discussion 
[serious  discussion  on  public  questions]  which  takes  place  ...  is 
diminishing."24  The  great  cause  of  this  is  the  modern  industrial  sys- 
tem, and  it  is  likely  that  what  is  true  of  England  is  true  also  of 
America.  And  if  serious  discussion  is  diminishing  it  means  probably 
that  men  are  doing  less  serious  thinking  on  political  subjects,  and  that 
they  are  likely  to  become  more  suggestible  with  regard  to  them.  The 
application  to  the  subject  of  patriotism  is  obvious. 

Imitation25  is  another  disposition  of  human  nature  that  is  close  to 
that  of  suggestibility.  There  is  contra-imitation  as  well  as  contra-sug- 
gestion,  and  besides  imitation  there  is  also  invention.  But  it  is  a  power- 
ful social  force.  For  the  interdependence  of  man  makes  for  imitation 
as  well  as  suggestibility.  And  society  really  owes  a  great  deal  to  it. 
An  invention  in  social  living  cannot  hope  to  survive  unless  it  is  freely 
adopted  by  masses  who  have  no  thought  of  stopping  to  reason  out  its 
utility.  And  the  effect  of  imitation  is  that  it  causes  an  immense  impetus 
towards  uniformity  and  solidarity  within  the  group.  "...  Men 
and  other  animals  imitate  what  they  see  others,  especially  they  of  their 
own  species,  do."26    And  imitation  of  one's  own  group  tends  to  assimilate 


The  Habituation  of  Patriotism  37 

him  to  it,  to  habituate  him  in  its  ways,  and  secure  his  loyalty  to  it 
and  its  ideals,  which  is  to  say,  that  imitation  is  a  factor  in  the  making 
of  patriotism. 

The  fact  that  suggestion  and  imitation  exercise  their  greatest  force 
within  the  group  makes  it  pertinent  to  recognize  the  part  that  the  group 
plays  in  the  process  of  habituation  in  patriotism.  The  fact  is  that 
because  of  the  individual's  membership  in  a  group,  the  suggestions  that 
come  to  him  impinge  upon  his  consciousness  with  a  good  deal  of  force. 
They  strike  him  from  all  directions  at  almost  the  same  time,  and  have 
a  multiple  dynamic  behind  them.  Now  the  nation  is  a  group.  The 
space-annihilating  devices  of  the  present  day  in  conjunction  with  the 
photographs  and  vivid  descriptive  reporting  of  the  newspapers  have 
extended  and  intensified  the  connections  between  the  individual  and  his 
national  group.  The  crowd  for  the  individual  may  now  well  be,  and  in 
time  of  national  crisis  is,  the  people  of  his  country. 

This,  however,  is  especially  true  of  city  populations,  a  fact  which 
must  have  allowance  made  for  it  in  the  gauging  of  public  opinion.  It 
is  the  voice  of  the  city-population  that  has  too  often  been  taken  as 
the  expression  of  public  opinion.  "The  voice  of  'the  people'  is  very 
often  nowadays  only  the  voice  of  the  city  crowd,  faintly  re-echoed,  if 
echoed  at  all,  in  the  smaller  towns.  Sometimes  also  the  noise  is  that 
of  a  few  editors  of  newspapers."27  Another  fact  which  ought  to  be 
noted  is  that  there  are  prestige-groups  within  society.  Examples  of 
such  are  an  old-fashioned  aristocracy,  the  governing  class,  and  in  a 
democracy,  the  majority.  Such  groups  often  exercise  compelling  co- 
ercive power. 

The  coerciveness  of  the  crowd  makes  for  national  unity,  but  it 
has  unwelcome  features.  It  is  too  likely  to  lead  to  a  high  disregard 
of  the  rights  of  the  nonconformist  and  an  unsympathetic  and  uncom- 
promising attitude  towards  other  nations.  There  are  no  incentives  to 
broad-minded  thought  and  sympathy  within  a  homogeneous  crowd. 
Opposition  is  the  real  matrix  out  of  which  reason  and  tolerance  are 
extracted.  The  government  of  the  United  States  of  America  had  a 
tolerant  spirit  stamped  upon  it  because  the  makers  of  our  institutions 
were  many  men  of  many  minds.  The  only  way  to  do  justice  to  their 
differences  was  by  compromise.  Close  agreement  confirms  convictions, 
but  does  not  stimulate  the  imagination.  "Where  all  think  alike,  no  one 
thinks  very  much.  But  whatever  he  does  think,  he  can  think  with 
all  his  soul."28  Without  the  differences  it  is  more  than  likely  that 
America  would  not  have  been  quite  so  tolerant.     It  follows  that  the 


38  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

nation,  because  it  has  no  critic  to  which  it  listens,  is  likely  to  be 
hard-minded,  fanatical,  and  unyielding. 

The  atmosphere  in  which  the  individual  lives  and  moves  and  has 
his  being  is  that  of  his  people's  customs  or  mores.  These  are  in- 
tellectualized  folkways.  Folkways  are  the  group's  ways  of  dealing  with 
its  environment.  Mores  are  the  folkways  plus  the  convictions  as  to 
their  relation  to  welfare.  Sumner  defines  them  as  follows:  "The  mores 
are  the  folkways,  including  the  philosophical  and  ethical  generalizations 
as  to  societal  welfare  which  are  suggested  by  them,  and  inherent  in 
them,  as  they  grow."29  Tradition,  which  is  crowd-memory,  perpetuates 
the  mores,  and  they  become  the  life  milieu  of  the  individuals  of  each 
generation.  A  large  part  of  one's  education,  especially  his  moral  educa- 
tion, is  gained  from  the  traditions  and  mores  of  his  people.  And  their 
teachings  are  all  the  more  authoritative  because  one  is  almost  wholly 
unconscious  of  learning  from  them.  "We  learn  the  mores  as  uncon- 
sciously as  we  learn  to  walk  and  eat  and  breathe.  The  masses  never 
learn  how  we  walk,  and  eat,  and  breathe,  and  they  never  know  any 
reason  why  the  mores  are  what  they  are.  The  justification  of  them  is 
that  when  we  wake  to  consciousness  of  life  we  find  them  facts  which 
already  hold  us  in  the  bonds  of  tradition,  custom,  and  habit.  .  .  . 
The  most  important  fact  about  the  mores  is  their  dominion  over  the 
individual.  Arising  he  knows  not  whence  or  how,  they  meet  his  open- 
ing mind  in  earliest  childhood,  give  him  his  outfit  of  ideas,  faiths,  and 
tastes,  and  lead  him  into  prescribed  mental  processes.  They  bring  to 
him  codes  of  action,  standards,  and  rules  of  ethics."30 

The  mores  have  a  bearing  upon  patriotism  in  various  ways.  In 
the  first  place,  they  are  teachers  of  loyalty.  They  teach  loyalty  to  the 
group  and  to  country.  Patriotism  has  become  imbedded  in  the  mores, 
and  when  one  learns  from)  them,  he  becomes  indoctrinated  with 
patriotism.  The  concept  of  patriotism  has  a  long  history,  and  has 
become  a  venerable  ideal.  It  is  not  possible  that  the  masses  should 
escape  having  it  taught  them.  The  Japanese  provide  an  example  of  a 
race  that  par  excellence  shows  the  effects  of  centuries  of  training  in 
nationalistic  loyalty;  it  has  given  to  them  a  marvellous  solidarity.  "In 
the  war  with  Russia,  in  1904,  this  people  showed  what  a  group  is 
capable  of  when  it  has  a  strong  ethos.  They  understand  each  other; 
they  act  as  one  man;  they  are  capable  of  discipline  to  the  death.  Our 
western  tacticians  have  had  rules  for  the  percentage  of  loss  which 
troops  would  endure,  standing  under  fire,  before  breaking  and  run- 
ning.   The  rule  failed  for  the  Japanese.    They  stood  to  the  last  man. 


The  Habituation  of  Patriotism  39 

Their  prowess  at  Port  Arthur  against  the  strongest  fortifications,  and  on 
the  battlefields  of  Manchuria,  surpassed  all  record.  They  showed  what 
can  be  done  in  the  way  of  concealing  military  and  naval  movements 
when  every  soul  in  the  population  is  in  a  voluntary  conspiracy  not  to 
reveal  anything.  These  traits  belong  to  a  people  which  has  been 
trained  by  generations  of  invariable  mores."31  One  of  the  most  thor- 
oughly grounded  ideals  of  the  Japanese  mores  is  that  of  patriotism. 

In  view  of  the  function  of  the  mores  as  teachers  of  loyalty,  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  recognize  that  peace  is  not  going  to  be  easily  pro- 
vided for  by  facile  external  arrangements  or  even  by  the  use  of  in- 
formation, persuasion,  and  reason.  If  patriotic  loyalty  is  in  such  large 
part  a  matter  of  habituation,  then  a  change  in  it  will  have  to  be  some- 
thing of  a  matter  of  habituation  too. 

The  mores  are  the  objects  of  loyalty.  One  gets  into  the  way  of 
saying,  "These  ways  are  my  ways  and  I  am  going  to  stick  by  them. 
They  are  mine;  I  am  going  to  preserve  and  foster  them,  and  no  one 
shall  take  them  from  me."  Loyalty  to  the  mores  forms  national 
character.  It  is  tradition  which  forms  a  nation  of  British,  Saxon,  and 
Norman  strains.  Tradition  unites  Walloon  and  Fleming  in  Belgium, 
Breton  and  Gens  du  Midi  in  France.32  The  likenesses  of  a  people  owe 
no  more  to  the  fact  of  race  than  to  that  of  the  mores.  And  so  the  mores 
become  what  the  patriot  is  conscious  of  being  loyal  to.  His  patriotism 
is  not  so  much  love  of  country  as  love  of  the  mores.  The  mores  for 
such  a  spirit  of  loyalty  are  the  country.  When  it  sings,  its  song  should 
be,  "My  mores,  'tis  of  thee,  of  thee  I  sing."  What  it  claims  for  itself  is 
the  right  to  be  true  to  the  traditions  of  its  own  people.  When  asked  to 
justify  its  allegiance,  it  in  turn  asks  the  question: 

"And  who  are  they  who  best  may  claim  our  trust? 
Surely  our  own  people,  of  whose  blood  we  are; 
Who  from  our  infancy  have  proved  their  love, 
And  never  have  deceived  us,  save,  perchance, 
When  kindly  guile  was  wholesomer  for  us 
Than  truth  itself."" 

The  loyalty  to  national  customs  stiffens  patriotism,  and  because  of  that 
is,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  patriot,  highly  desirable,  but  the  problem 
that  it  sets  is  that  of  preventing  it  from  being  satisfied  to  remain  a 
mere  unreasoning  superstition. 

The  mores  get  embodied  in  character,  and  come  to  be  a  veritable 


40  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

spirit  of  loyalty.  They  grow  out  of  the  life  of  the  people,  and  return 
to  that  life.  They  become  actually  constituent  in  personality.  The 
mores  become  a  part  of  ourselves;  we  not  only  think  of  them,  we 
think  with  them.  They  are  so  natural  tfrat  we  do  not  notice  them. 
"The  more  thoroughly  American  a  man  is,  the  less  he  can  perceive 
Americanism.  He  will  embody  it ;  all  he  does,  says,  or  writes  will  be  full 
of  it;  but  he  can  never  truly  see  it,  simply  because  he  has  no  exterior 
point  of  view  from  which  to  look  at  it."34  Under  such  conditions,  how 
could  one  help  being  patriotic?  It  is  not  something  that  he  strives 
after;  it  is  to  be  what  he  cannot  help  being.  He  is  patriotic  simply 
because  he  is  himself. 

Some  conclusions  from  the  study  of  the  habits  of  patriotism  may 
now  be  drawn.  The  complexity  of  patriotism  has  further  manifested 
itself.  And  it  is  evident  that  the  habits  of  patriotism,  like  the  im- 
pulses, may  be  either  good  or  bad,  or  so  far  as  the  motive  of  the  in- 
dividual is  concerned,  ethically  colorless.  The  patriotism  of  habituation 
is  natural,  like  breathing.  The  habituated  patriot  will  go  with  the 
group,  and  groups  like  individuals  sometimes  fall  into  bad  habits.  But 
groups  also  acquire  good  habits,  and  will  in  those  matters  be  worth 
serving.  Habituation  and  conformity  in  such  a  case  will  be  valuable. 
Their  weakening  would  often  be  really  disastrous.  "There  are  cases 
in  which  the  discrediting  of  tradition  is  like  picking  out  the  mortar 
that  holds  together  the  fabric  of  society."35  There  are  times  when  the 
discrediting  of  patriotism  would  mean  the  destruction  of  the  nation. 

The  great  objection  to  the  patriotism  of  habituation  is  that  it  cannot 
criticize  itself.  The  lack  of  criticism  will,  of  course,  make  for  over- 
whelming strength.  In  commenting  upon  the  patriotism  of  the  pres- 
ent time,  Russell  has  written  as  follows:  "This  instinct  [patriotism], 
just  because,  in  its  intense  form,  it  was  new  and  unfamiliar,  had  re- 
mained uninfected  by  thought,  not  paralyzed  or  devitalized  by  doubt 
and  cold  detachment."38  But  it  is  just  an  accident  if  such  patriotism 
is  good.  It  may  easily  be  the  patriotism  of  the  man  who  takes  the 
stand,  "My  country,  right  or  wrong,"  a  position  which,  while  there  is 
something  to  be  said  for  it  on  the  ground  that  countries  are  fundamental 
institutions  which  must  not  be  lightly  abandoned  to  destruction,  is 
hardly  one  to  be  striven  for  as  an  ethical  ideal.  The  road  to  goodness 
is  not  by  chance,  but  by  intelligent  self-direction.  And  the  goodness 
of  patriotism  rests  upon  the  use  of  intelligence.  Patriotism  could  not 
as  matters  now  stand  be  done  away  with  by  criticism,  but  its  nature 


The  Habituation  of  Patriotism  41 

could  be  molded.  We  could  habituate  ourselves  to  admire  and  serve 
in  our  life  what  really  was  to  be  admired  and  served. 

But  the  process  of  habituation,  while  it  produces  a  powerful  spirit 
of  group  loyalty,  can  hardly  give  a  full  account  of  the  rise  of  a  con- 
scious ideal  like  patriotism.  The  question  would  remain,  "Why  the 
habituation,  and  why  so  much  insistence  upon  it?"  The  process  im- 
plies a  reason  for  its  existence.  And  reasons  become  effective  through  the 
action  of  an  intelligent  agent.  The  objection  to  a  theory  like  that  of 
Sumner  is  that  by  it  social  activity  is  looked  at  too  exclusively  on  the 
outside  when  it  ought  also  to  be  looked  at  on  the  inside.  The  theory 
does  not  do  justice  to  the  initiative  of  the  mind.  The  mores  for  the 
most  part  seem  almost  to  be  active  entities,  which,  starting  from  en- 
vironmental conditions,  develop  themselves.  Minds  are  held  in  their 
grip.  But  mores  are  products  of  human  activity  and  reflection,  and  if 
one  would  understand  them,  he  must  understand  the  mind,  with  not 
only  its  impulses,  but  also  its  ways  of  thought.  Sumner's  own  work 
shows  that  he  believes  in  something  beyond  the  mores,  and  that  he 
has  an  ideal  of  acting  above  them.  His  confidence  is  placed  in  thought. 
He  believes  that  he  at  least  can  reflect  upon  the  group  ways,  and  that 
a  science,  or  perhaps  even  a  philosophy,  of  the  mores  can  be  established. 
The  following  are  his  own  words:  "Since  it  appears  that  the  old  mores 
are  mischievous  if  they  last  beyond  the  duration  of  the  conditions  and 
needs  to  which  they  are  adapted,  and  that  constant,  gradual,  smooth, 
and  easy  readjustment  is  the  course  of  things  which  is  conducive  to 
healthful  life,  it  follows  that  free  and  rational  criticism  of  traditional 
mores  is  essential  to  societal  welfare."37 

Human  beings  are  moved  not  only  by  instincts  and  habits,  but  also 
by  reasons.  And  it  is  with  the  reasoned  beliefs  of  patriotism  that  the 
following  part  will  deal. 


PART  III 
THE  BELIEFS  OF  PATRIOTISM 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Country  As  Protector  of  Self 

Patriotism  has  reasons  upon  which  it  rests;  it  is  not  a  mere  in- 
stinctive reaction,  nor  yet  simply  a  habit.1  Thought  exists,  and  men 
think.  Graham  Wallas  says  that  there  is  an  impulse  to  think.  "This 
independent  action  of  Intelligence  is,  I  believe,  in  its  simplest  forms 
as  'natural'  to  us,  as  much  due  to  inherited  disposition,  as  is  the  work- 
ing of  anyone  of  the  usual  list  of  instincts."2  There  is  a  rationale  of 
patriotism.  Patriotism  may  be  unreasoned,  but  is  not  for  that  neces- 
sarily unreasonable.  It  may  coincide  with  the  passions  of  the  masses, 
but  may  nevertheless  rest  on  logical  grounds,  and  on  ideals.  It  may  be 
the  object  of  conscious  choice.  The  treatment  of  the  immigrant  shows 
that  we  have  a  belief  that  patriotism  can  be  chosen  by  the  individual. 
We  insist  on  the  loyalty  of  the  German-American,  which  being  inter- 
preted means  that  we  are  demanding  loyalty  to  a  country  of  choice 
rather  than  to  the  country  of  birth.  And  for  those  born  Americans, 
we  adopt  the  injunction  of  Tennyson, 

"Love  thou  thy  land,  with  love  far-brought 
From  out  the  storied  Past,  and  used 
Within  the  Present,  but  transfused 
Thro'  future  time  by  power  of  thought."" 

The  fact  that  men  do  think  and  have  ideals  is  one  of  the  very  reasons 
why  patriotism  is  now  so  strong. 

What  are  the  reasons  urged  why  one  should  be  patriotic?  One 
belief  is  that  one  owes  his  earthly  salvation  to  his  country.  It  is  a 
belief  that  expresses  on  the  level  of  consciousness  the  impulse  to  seek 
safety  and  help.  Men  believe  that  the  country  is  the  protector  in 
this  present  world  of  all  the  values  of  life.  It  is  the  feeling  that 
Spencer  expressed  when  he  apostrophized  the  state  in  the  following 
language:  "I  supposed  you  were  to  act  the  part  of  an  Argus-eyed  and 
Briareus-armed  guardian,  ever  watching  over  my  interests,  ever  ready 
to  step  in  and  defend  them;  so  that  whether  sleeping  or  waking,  ab- 
sorbed in  business  or  immersed  in  pleasure,  I  might  have  the  gratifying 
consciousness  of  being  carefully  shielded  from  injury."*  Webster  ap- 
pealed to  the  same  feeling  in  his  reply  to  Hayne:  "It  is  to  that 
Union  we  owe  our  safety  at  home,  and  our  consideration  and  dignity 
abroad.     ...    It  has  been  to  us  all  a  copious  fountain  of  national, 


46  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

social,  personal  happiness."5  And  the  patriot  feels  that  for  the  pro- 
tection that  he  has  received  he  must  show  his  gratitude.  In  return 
for  the  blessings  of  the  country,  he  will  offer  up  the  sacrifice  of  patriot- 
ism. If  one  asks  the  plain  man  why  he  is  patriotic,  why  he  thinks,  for 
instance,  that  he  ought  to  enlist,  the  answer  that  is  often  made  is  that, 
"The  country  has  done  a  lot  for  me,  and  now  she  needs  me.  I  am 
going  to  do  what  I  can  for  my  country." 

The  country  affords  protection  within  the  group  that  it  organizes. 
And  for  this  reason,  the  citizens  will  support  the  state.  They  feel  that 
government  is  a  good  thing;  it  guarantees  justice  and  fair  play.  And 
patriotism  with  them  will  grow  out  of  that  feeling.  It  will,  of  course, 
be  a  give  and  take  affair.  It  will  not  be  selfless,  altruistic  devotion. 
Patriotism  of  this  kind  demands  that  justice  be  consistently  dispensed. 
Most  men  will  not  long  serve  a  state  that  treats  them  unfairly.  No 
patriotism  will  survive  flagrant  and  continued  injustice.  And,  in  truth, 
why  should  it?  Green  states  the  answer:  "If  the  authority  of  any 
government — its  claim  on  our  obedience — is  held  to  be  derived  not  from 
an  original  covenant,  or  from  any  covenant,  but  from  the  function 
which  it  serves  in  maintaining  those  conditions  of  freedom  which  are 
conditions  of  the  moral  life,  then  no  act  of  the  people  in  revocation  of 
a  prior  act  need  be  reckoned  necessary  to  justify  its  dissolution.  //  it 
ceases  to  serve  this  function,  it  loses  its  claim  on  our  obedience."* 

A  country  is  a  peace  unit.  And  men  will  welcome  it  as  such,  for 
there  is  in  men  an  impulse  to  peace.  The  state  in  modern  times  arose 
in  part  as  a  keeper  of  the  peace.  The  church  was  once  the  power  that 
policed  Europe,  and  when  that  was  so,  men  gave  the  church  their 
supreme  allegiance.  But  the  time  came  when  the  fear  of  God  was 
no  longer  a  sufficient  power  to  keep  men  in  order,  so  it  became  neces- 
sary for  some  other  agency  than  the  church  to  take  up  the  task.  Semi- 
official bodies  arose  whose  business  it  was  to  preserve  peace,  but  they 
passed  away.  There  was  then  no  power  to  keep  the  lawless  forces  in 
check.  The  nobles  of  feudalism  fought  with  one  another,  and  were 
petty  and  irresponsible  tyrants  over  their  people.  Their  regime  became 
unbearable.  Consequently  the  people  united  with  the  kings,  and  a 
central  power  was  established  that  stopped  the  wars  of  the  nobles  and 
cities,  and  gave  peace. 

The  state  within  its  boundaries  is  the  preserver  of  law  and  order. 
And  the  discharge  of  that  function  recommends  the  state  to  its  citizens. 
Hobbes7  exalted  the  state  because  of  his  desire  for  order.  The  Eng- 
land of  his  day  was  torn  by  civil  war.    Even  J.  S.  Mill8  expressed  some 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  47 

sympathy  with  speculative  Toryism,  as  for  instance  it  appeared  in 
Wordsworth,  because  what  it  meant  in  such  a  case,  Mill  said,  was 
the  proposition  that  man  ought  to  be  governed.  Patriotic  eloquence 
takes  account  of  the  benefit  that  the  state  affords  as  the  preserver  of 
the  peace.  Josiah  Quincy,  Jr.,  called  for  patriotic  loyalty  to  country 
on  the  ground  that  in  it  "Each  individual,  of  whatever  condition,  has 
the  consciousness  of  living  under  known  laws,  which  secure  equal  rights, 
and  guarantee  to  each  whatever  portion  of  the  goods  of  life,  be  it  great 
or  small,  chance  or  talent  or  industry  may  have  bestowed."9 

The  civilized  life  itself  at  present  depends  upon  the  state.  The 
word  civilization  is  derived  from  a  stem  meaning  "state."  Civilization 
is  that  which  is  possible  to  men  in  states,  that  is,  where  peace,  law,  and 
order  prevail.  The  state  has  been  a  tremendous  gain  because  it  has 
been  a  larger  integration  of  men,  a  larger  unit  of  cooperation.  Just 
that  is  its  primary  function, — to  make  it  possible  for  men  to  live 
together.  And  without  the  exercise  of  that  function  by  the  state,  we 
should  be  likely  to  be  plunged  back  again  into  the  chaos  of  petty 
warring  factions.  Now  patriotism  gets  connected  with  this  desire 
that  government  be  preserved.  The  patriot  is  very  apt  to  feel  that  if 
his  country  should  be  destroyed,  it  would  be  a  blow  at  the  very 
foundations  of  all  government  and  safety.  He  connects  civilization 
with  his  own  state,  and  feels  that,  "...  they  who  assail  the  idea, 
the  ideal,  of  the  country  itself,  assail  all  civilized  life  and,  so  far  forth, 
are  suicides  as  well  as  traitors."10 

But  the  state  does  not  stop  with  the  bare  maintenance  of  law  and 
order.  It  does  other  things  which  are  believed  to  be  for  the  general 
welfare.  It  looks  out  for  education,  transportation,  sanitation,  the 
care  of  the  infirm,  and  so  forth;  it  works  for  better  social,  industrial, 
and  class  conditions.  The  state,  in  other  words,  is  felt  to  have  a  right 
to  do  all  those  things  which  will  promote  the  welfare  of  mankind.  Mill 
said,  "...  it  is  not  admissable  that  the  protection  of  persons 
and  that  of  property  are  the  sole  purposes  of  government.  The 
ends  of  government  are  as  comprehensive  as  those  of  the  social  union."11 
And  Aristotle12  intimated  that  the  state  should  not  only  make  bare 
existence  possible,  but  should  promote  the  good  life. 

The  result  has  been  that  men  have  taken  an  attitude  toward  the 
state  very  much  like  the  attitude  that  they  have  taken  toward  God. 
To  many  people  the  state  has  become  God.  They  feel  that  all  the 
values  of  life  depend  upon  it,  as  Plato13  felt  that  all  the  values  of  life 
depended  upon  the  state  that  he  described.    That  does  not  mean  that 


48  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

they  go  directly  to  the  state  for  everything  that  they  want;  they  do 
not  do  that  with  God.  They  simply  expect  the  state  somehow  to 
guarantee  these  values,  and  to  supply  them  only  as  a  last  resort.  But 
they  will  go  to  it  for  everything  that  they  want  and  which  they  can 
secure  in  no  other  way.  In  the  following  quotation,  the  state  is  de- 
scribed in  terms  that  might  almost  refer  to  Providence:  "No  Amer- 
ican boy  or  girl  .  .  .  lived  a  day,  even,  at  the  beginning  of  his  life, 
when  he  was  not  protected  by  the  law  of  the  United-States.  From  that 
moment  the  United-States  watched  over  him  in  ways  perhaps  which 
he  never  thought  of.  Perhaps  the  school  in  which  these  words  are  read 
would  not  have  existed  except  for  the  United-States  laws  with  regard 
to  education.  Very  likely  the  bread  and  butter  which  the  boy  had 
for  breakfast  could  never  have  existed  but  that  the  country  called  the 
United-States  had  made  laws  and  carried  on  government  in  such  ways 
that  the  grain  could  be  raised,  that  the  cattle  could  be  fed,  and  the 
butter  made.  It  is  in  a  thousand  such  ways  as  this  that  the  country 
in  which  we  live  takes  care  of  us  in  every  hour  of  our  lives.  .  .  . 
The  tie  which  binds  you  and  me  to  the  country  which  takes  care  of 
us  is  a  tie  as  real  and  it  involves  duties  as  distinct  as  the  ties  which 
binds  a  boy  to  his  mother  to  whom  he  owes  his  life  and  who  has  always 
taken  care  of  him."14  What  happens  when  a  country  towards  which 
men  have  felt  in  this  way,  calls  for  the  allegiance  of  its  citizens?  Their 
loyalty  will  be  accorded  it  in  the  same  measure  as  the  completeness  with 
which  they  have  trusted  to  it. 

The  state  is  the  only  institution  in  a  given  area  that  embodies  the 
general  will,  and  consequently  it  federates  the  largest  number  of  loyalties 
among  the  people  who  live  there.  A  class  organization  could  not  fed- 
erate so  many  loyalties.  It  could  not  be  done,  for  instance,  by  syndical- 
istic organizations.15  If  a  man  were  a  member  of  all  such  organizations 
that  he  was  eligible  to,  his  whole  life  would  still  lack  unity.  There 
must,  then,  be  something  that  will  unify  the  life  of  the  individual, 
and  unify  the  whole  of  society.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  the 
state  at  the  present  time  is,  and  in  the  predictable  future  is  likely 
to  be,  the  factor  which  does  this.  And  it  is  therefore  likely  also  to  con- 
tinue to  draw  the  supreme  loyalty  of  men. 

One  kind  of  patriotism  is,  then,  based  upon  the  belief  that  the 
country  is  the  preserver  of  law  and  order.  If  necessary,  the  patriot 
will  place  himself  at  the  service  of  the  state  in  order  to  help  it  dis- 
charge its  function  as  a  police  power.  And  he  feels  it  to  be  neces- 
sary also  to  show  his  patriotism  in  his  own  obedience  to  the  laws.    In 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  49 

the  Crito,18  Socrates,  who  had  shown  his  patriotism  upon  the  battle- 
field, showed  it  again  by  submitting  himself  to  the  laws  of  that 
country  which  by  its  institutions  had  nourished  and  protected  him. 
Bosanquet  cites  this  action  of  Socrates,  and  himself  adds  the  comment: 
"That  is  one  thing;  true  patriotism  is  the  law-abiding  spirit."17 

The  state  also  acts  as  a  protector  against  aggressions  from  with- 
out, and  on  this  account  men  cling  to  it.  The  patriot  fears  other  na- 
tions; he  believes  that  they  are  actuated  by  sinister  designs.  The  foe 
in  patriotic  songs  and  poetry  is  always  'haughty'  and  'wicked.'  He 
believes  also  that  if  the  opportunity  is  presented,  they  will  work  those 
sinister  designs  against  his  country.  Nor  is  the  fear  altogether  ground- 
less. To  say  the  least,  most  governments  cannot  be  trusted  to  look 
after  the  interests  of  their  competitors  as  well  as  they  look  after  their 
own,  and  the  way  in  which  the  world  is  at  present  organized  makes 
it  seem  necessary  for  each  nation  to  look  out  for  itself.  Even  Russell 
says  that  "the  fear  by  which  the  State  is  strengthened  is  reasonable 
under  present  circumstances."18  Then  why  should  not  the  state  protect 
its  own  interests  and  the  interests  of  its  citizens?  The  citizen  himself 
will  not  admit  that  the  state's  protection  should  simply  be  limited  to  the 
prevention  of  the  harm  that  his  fellow-citizens  might  do.  He  will 
say:  "When  we  agreed  that  it  was  the  essential  function  of  the  state 
to  protect — to  administer  the  law  of  equal  freedom — to  maintain  men's 
rights — we  virtually  assigned  to  it  the  duty,  not  only  of  shielding 
each  citizen  from  the  trespasses  of  his  neighbours,  but  of  defending 
him,  in  common  with  the  community  at  large,  against  foreign  aggres- 
sion."19 The  efforts  to  provide  protection  has  indeed  proved  to  be  too 
big  a  job  for  even  the  state,  acting  alone,  and  has  led  to  alliances  be- 
tween states.  Such  alliance  is  deemed  essential.  Diplomatic  isolation 
could  not  now  be  tolerated  by  scarcely  any  government  or  population 
but  the  most  primitive.  Perhaps  in  this  very  direction  lies  a  way 
to  world  internationalism.  But  the  protection  is  still  state  protection; 
the  alliances  themselves  are  the  results  of  the  activities  of  states. 

The  fear  of  other  states  sometimes  gets  expressed  as  the  belief  that 
existence  itself,  both  national  and  personal,  is  threatened.  Loisy  gives 
vent  to  this  belief:  "Are  we  then  right  to  be  patriotic,  even  at  the 
risk  of  being  less  or  not  at  all  Christian?  Doubtless;  because  our  only 
chance  of  living  is  bound  up  with  our  patriotism."20  What  he  seems 
to  fear  is  French  extermination.  But  more  often  the  patriot  believes 
that  by  his  loyalty,  his  own  and  his  country's  freedom  are  preserved. 
Patriotism  is  a  demand  for  freedom.     Zimmerman  a  long  time  ago 


J 

50  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

pointed  out  that  nearly  every  people  glories  in  its  real  or  supposed 
freedom.  "Not  a  few  nations,"  he  says,  "are  seen  resembling  the 
primitive  Greeks,  in  overvaluing  themselves  on  their  real  liberty;  and 
others,  like  the  degenerate  Greeks,  priding  themselves  only  on  the 
shadow  of  an  antiquated  liberty."21  The  United  States  came  into  ex- 
istence only  after  a  severe  fight  for  liberty,  and  consequently  American 
patriotism  has  had  the  ideal  of  freedom  deeply  impressed  upon  it.  The 
words  of  Patrick  Henry  come  the  nearest  to  being  classical.  "Is  life 
so  dear,  or  peace  so  sweet,  as  to  be  purchased  at  the  price  of  chains 
and  slavery?  Forbid  it,  Almighty  God!  I  know  not  what  course  others 
may  take;  but  as  for  me,  give  me  liberty  or  give  me  death!"22  The 
Constitution  enumerates  liberty  next  to  the  possession  of  life  among 
the  inalienable  rights  of  men.  Lincoln  expressed  it  again  in  his  Gettys- 
burg address.  "...  We  here  highly  resolve  that  these  dead 
shall  not  have  died  in  vain;  that  this  nation,  under  God,  shall  have  a 
new  birth  of  freedom,  and  that  government  of  the  people,  by  the  peo- 
ple, and  for  the  people,  shall  not  perish  from  the  earth."28  The  notes 
of  freedom  and  self-rule  of  the  people  are  the  dominant  ones  in  the 
passage  with  which  Lincoln  closed  the  speech.  It  has  been  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  who  has  most  clearly  and  consistently 
defined  the  aim  of  the  Allies  in  this  present  war  as  that  of  making 
the  world  safe  for  democracy,  i.  e.,  for  freedom.  But  the  countries 
which  are  called  autocratic  also  insist  that  they  are  fighting  for  free- 
dom, and  they  are  proclaiming  to  their  peoples  that  they  are  fighting 
on  the  defensive,  and  in  the  cause  of  liberty.  The  ideal  of  freedom 
is  dear  to  all. 

Along  with  the  demand  for  freedom  goes  the  insistence  that  those 
things  which  are  of  great  value  to  one  shall  be  held  sacred.  The  de- 
fense of  homes  is  a  cause  that  arouses  masculine  patriotism.  There  is 
an  old  saying  found  in  Bacon  that  "Love  of  his  country  begins  in  a 
man's  own  house."24  The  patriot  will  sacrifice  for  his  home;  and  he 
will  die  that  his  posterity  may  enjoy  the  privileges  of  a  free  country. 

The  pursuit  of  happiness  is  another  of  the  privileges  that  men  deem 
inalienable.  And  the  pursuit  of  happiness  in  grown-ups  seems  to  be 
mostly  the  pursuit  of  trade.  Consequently  they  will  prize  what  pro- 
tects, and  hate  what  threatens  business.  One  hates  the  invader  of 
his  country  because  he  does  not  want  the  means  of  his  livelihood  to 
pass  under  the  control  of  an  unsympathetic  power.  The  land  is  the 
form  of  wealth  that  is  inevitably  seized  by  the  invader.  And  patriotism, 
because  of  this,  gains  another  connection  with  the  soil.  "... 
Patriotism  envelops  the  real  estate  because  the  real  estate  nourishes 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  51 

the  lives  and  careers  of  the  patriots.  .  .  .  The  emotions  of  loyalty 
and  value  congregate  about  the  'vital  interests'  of  our  lives."25  The 
laying  on  of  burdens  of  taxation  too  grievous  to  be  borne  is  an  un- 
warrantable interference  with  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  And  so  patriot- 
ism often  starts  over  taxes.  It  was  so  in  the  formation  of  the  United 
States.  The  following  extract  from  a  speech  by  Samuel  Adams  to  the 
newly  elected  representatives  to  the  Massachusetts  colonial  legislature 
from  Boston,  will  show  what  the  drift  then  was:  "...  As  you 
represent  a  town  which  lives  by  its  trade,"  he  said,  "we  expect  in  a 
very  particular  manner,  though  you  make  it  the  object  of  your  at- 
tention to  support  our  commerce  in  all  its  just  rights,  to  vindicate  it 
from  all  unreasonable  impositions  and  promote  its  prosperity."26  The 
trader  looks  to  his  government  for  protection,  and  when  he  receives  it, 
he  has  a  particular  reason  for  desiring  the  continued  good  health  of  his 
country.  The  same  holds  true  of  workingmen.  John  Dewey  says: 
"...  The  simple  fact  of  the  case  is  that  at  present  workingmen 
have  more  to  gain  from  their  own  national  state  in  the  way  of  legis- 
lative and  administrative  concessions  than  they  have  from  some  other 
state,  or  from  any  international  organization."27  And  as  long  as  this 
is  true,  tradesmen,  laborers,  and  all  others  who  have  anything  to  gain 
by  it  will  be  patriots,  and  violent  patriots. 

What  kind  of  patriotism  is  it  that  rests  upon  the  belief  in  one's 
country  as  the  protector  of  self?  Is  it  patriotism  at  all?  It  is  not  that 
disinterested  love  of  country  that  the  common  man  has  been  formally 
taught  to  regard  as  patriotism.  But  it  is  loyalty  to  country,  and  what- 
ever answers  to  that  description  must  be  patriotism.  It  no  doubt  makes 
the  state  a  kind  of  business  affair.  The  primary  motive  is  that  of 
prudence.  A  man  defends  his  country  because  he  needs  it.  But  some 
men  serve  God  in  that  way,  and  we  call  it  religion.  And  so  this 
profit-and-loss  attachment  to  country  may  come  under  the  term  pa- 
triotism. One  reason,  therefore,  for  patriotism  is  that  the  country  is 
needful  for  the  protection  of  life's  values.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  attachment  to  country  is  not  patriotism,  if  the  country  is  looked 
at  merely  as  means.  Patriotism  views  the  country  somehow  as  end. 
If  the  real  and  only  motive  which  is  getting  expressed  is  that  of  self- 
interest,  any  show  of  patriotism  is  after  all  mere  camouflage.  The  point 
is  that  men  will  actually  come  to  feel  real  gratitude  and  love  for  the 
country  which  has  protected  them.  It  is  a  psychological  fact  that 
affection  attaches  itself  to  what  has  been  useful.  In  this  way  and 
for  this  reason,  affection  attaches  itself  to  country,  and  becomes  pa- 
triotism. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Oneness  of  Country  and  Self 

The  patriot  identifies  himself  with  his  country.  He  believes  that 
>  he  and  his  country  are  one.  This  belief  is  the  coming  to  consciousness 
of  the  impulse  to  cling  to  one's  own.  And  this  conviction  becomes 
another  reason  for  patriotism.  Patriotic  loyalty  of  this  kind  is  not  a 
.-business  affair.  It  will  not  abandon  the  country  even  if  the  latter 
/  should  prove  unsuccessful  in  providing  protection,  but  will  remain 
steadfast  through  all  the  country's  vicissitudes.  One's  country  may 
fail  to  protect  him,  but  if  it  is  still  a  recognizable  expression  of  himself, 
he  will  love  it.  The  government  or  state  may  be  faulty,  and  yet  the 
patriot  will  still  be  true.  Veblen  intimates  that  one  might  just  as 
well  have  foreign  officials  as  home-grown  capitalists  administer  one's 
affairs  of  government.28  But  the  patriot  is  not  likely  to  be  persuaded 
to  think  Veblen's  way,  and  the  reason  is  that  the  home-grown  cap- 
italists somehow  seem  closer  than  the  foreign  officials.  It  is  quite 
true  that  there  are  those  who  refuse  to  be  patriotic  because  their  coun- 
try does  not  give  them  what  they  believe  to  be  justice.  Anarchists 
are  not  patriotic.  Socialists  sometimes  are  not  patriotic.  Some  among 
the  laboring  classes  have  come  to  wear  their  patriotic  allegiance  but 
lightly.  But  the  issue  for  them  has  ceased  to  be  merely  that  of 
getting  justice.  It  has  come  to  the  point  where  the  injustice  of  the 
industrial  situation  has  gone  so  far  that  the  dissatisfied  classes  do  not 
even  recognize  themselves  in  the  state  that  is  supposed  to  represent 
them.  And  when  that  feeling  of  strangeness  creeps  into  a  man's 
heart,  he  is  no  longer  likely  to  be  a  patriot.  Patriotism  is  rendered 
to  a  country  that  is  one's  own.  In  view  of  this,  it  seems  rather 
significant  that  the  rise  of  nationalism  has  been  cotemporal  with  the 
rise  of  democracy. 

The  country  is  a  part  of  one's  objectified  self.  And  one  cannot  be 
a  self  without  being  objectified.  He  has  to  come  to  expression  in  some 
way,  and  he  has  to  have  the  means  and  material  through  which  to 
express  himself.  The  individual  would  lose  in  individuality  if  his 
group  were  broken  up.  He  cannot  be  a  normal  human  being  inde- 
pendent of  the  group;  and  the  group  for  the  civilized  man  includes 
"country."  "In  a  profound  sense,  man  is  born  under  the  relations  of 
country  and  of  government.    He  can  no  more  live  a  rational,  civilized 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  53 

life  without  a  country,  and  apart  from  government,  than  without  the 
family  and  apart  from  the  social  order.  Scarce  human  is  the  individual 
to  whom  are  applicable  Homer's  contemptuous  words, — 'No  tribe,  nor 
state,  nor  home  hath  he.'  "ra  The  country  pours  itself  into  the  indi- 
vidual. Jacks  says:  "The  distinction  between  our  own  thoughts  and 
the  nation's  thoughts  is  being  obliterated.  Ask  the  first  honest  man 
you  meet  to  tell  you  what  he  is  thinking,  and  if  he  answers  faithfully, 
he  will  tell  you  something  of  what  the  nation  is  thinking."80  The  pa- 
triot instinctively  feels  the  oneness  between  his  country  and  himself, 
and  often  has  a  clear  belief  concerning  it.  Washington  spoke  of  "that 
country,  in  whose  service  I  have  spent  the  prime  of  my  life;  for  whose 
sake  I  have  consumed  so  many  anxious  days  and  watchful  nights,  and 
whose  happiness,  being  extremely  dear  to  me,  will  always  constitute 
no  inconsiderable  part  of  my  own."sx  Washington  identified  himself 
with  America,  and  so  do  all  patriots  identify  themselves  with  their 
country.  If  the  patriot  were  asked  why  one  should  love  his  country, 
his  reply  might  very  well  be,  "Why  should  one  love  himself?" 

The  identification  of  oneself  with  his  country  is  greatly  helped  out 
by  the  fact  that  the  country  is  an  outgrowth  of  the  family.  The  idea 
of  kinship  has  been  extended  to  the  national  group.  The  nation  is 
believed  to  be  of  one  race.  McDougall  in  speaking  of  the  self-regard- 
ing instinct  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  it  is  extended  to  others,  and 
says:  ".  .  .  This  extension  should  not,  and  usually  does  not,  stop 
short  at  the  family;  in  primitive  societies  the  tribe  and  the  clan,  which 
are  the  collective  objects  of  the  regards  of  other  tribes  and  clans,  be- 
come also  the  objects  of  this  sentiment;  and  among  ourselves  the 
growing  child  is  led  on  in  the  same  way  to  identify  himself  with,  and 
to  extend  his  self-regarding  sentiment  to  his  school,  his  college,  his 
town,  his  profession  as  a  class  or  collective  unit,  and  finally  to  his 
country  or  nation  as  a  whole.32  The  extension  of  the  sentiment  cul- 
minates in  its  application  to  the  country,  and  this  application  has 
been  historically  possible  because  the  country  has  been  believed  to  be 
the  organization  of  a  homogeneous  race. 

But  the  feeling  of  oneness  with  the  country  does  not  rest  solely  upon 
the  belief  in  blood  kinship.  Ethnologists  are  now  pretty  well  agreed 
that  there  are  no  pure  races,  and  that  nationality  does  not  coincide 
with  race  homogeneity.  C.  D.  Burns  points  out  that  the  Belgians, 
at  the  time  they  were  seeking  nationality,  were  of  different  blood.  "The 
group  had  asserted  their  common  ambition  and  their  distinction  from 
all  other  groups.    They  were  not  all  the  same  blood  or  language,  but 


54  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

their  traditions  and  purposes  were  the  same."33  It  is  not  exclusively  a 
common  ancestry,  then,  that  provides  the  basis  for  one  to  feel  at  one 
with  his  country.  It  is  not  so  much  a  question  of  genesis  as  of  condition. 
One  feels  at  home  in  a  country  which  in  general  has  the  same  sort  of 
character  and  life  as  his  own.  The  largest  factor  is  that  of  a  common 
consciousness,  no  matter  how  produced.  What  this  means  may  be  un- 
derstood from  the  words  of  Bosanquet:  "Broadly  speaking,  the  limit 
of  a  country  or  nation  is  the  limit  of  a  common  experience,  such  that  the 
people  share  the  same  mind  and  feelings,  and  can  understand  each 
other's  ways  of  living  and  make  allowance  for  each  other  so  that  the 
same  laws  and  institutions  are  acceptable  and  workable  for  all  of 
them."34  The  patriot  in  a  foreign  land  feels  truly  like  an  innocent 
abroad,  but  his  own  country  is  home,  sweet  home  to  him. 

The  love  of  the  country  as  one's  objectified  self  coincides  with  the 
desire  for  attachment.  Man,  in  other  words,  wants  to  objectify  him- 
self. He  is  not  satisfied  with  solipcism.  He  wants  a  world,  and  a  world 
that  somehow  represents  himself.  Without  that  he  is  a  lost  soul.  "The 
man  without  a  country"  is  pathetic  because  he  has  no  attachment,  no 
fixed  world  that  he  can  call  his  own.  The  country  provides  a  satisfying 
object  of  attachment,  in  which  the  patriot's  soul  can  be  at  rest. 

Patriotism  is  devotion  to  a  cause,  and  the  cause  is  one's  own.  The 
patriot  has  made  it  his  by  his  own  choice.  It  is  a  part  of  himself. 
Royce  in  speaking  of  patriotic  loyalty  says:  "This  plan  of  the  patriot 
has  two  features:  (1)  It  is  through  and  through  a  social  plan,  obedient 
to  the  general  will  of  one's  country,  submissive;  (2)  it  is  through  and 
through  an  exaltation  of  the  self,  of  the  inner  man,  who  now  feels  glori- 
fied through  his  sacrifice,  dignified  in  his  self-surrender,  glad  to  be  his 
country's  servant  and  martyr, — yet  sure  that  through  this  very  readi- 
ness for  self-destruction  he  wins  the  rank  of  hero."85  The  call  of  war 
is  not  only  a  call  to  sacrifice,  but  also  a  call  to  self-expression.  Royce 
continues:  "This  war-spirit,  for  the  time  at  least,  makes  self-sacrifice 
seem  to  be  self-expression,  makes  obedience  to  the  country's  call  seem 
to  be  the  proudest  sort  of  display  of  one's  own  powers.  Honor  now 
means  submission,  and  to  obey  means  to  have  one's  way.  Power  and 
service  are  at  one.  Conformity  is  no  longer  opposed  to  having  one's 
own  will.  One  has  no  will  but  that  of  the  country."36  Patriotism  in 
this  character  simplifies  the  problem  of  duty.  It  provides  a  cause  into 
which  one  can  throw  himself  with  all  his  heart,  avoid  the  conflict  of  a 
divided  mind,  and  it  is  able  to  do  all  this  for  a  man  for  the  reason  that 
the  cause  is  his  own.    It  makes  a  joy  out  of  a  duty.    An  expression  of 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  55 

the  joy  that  comes  to  one  in  the  service  of  his  country's  cause  is  to  be 
found  in  the  words  supposed  to  have  been  uttered  by  Epaminondas 
when  he  was  dying  upon  the  battlefield.  Zimmermann  cites  the  inci- 
dent: "Epaminondas,  the  Theban,  when  lying  on  the  ground  mortally 
wounded  with  a  spear  at  the  battle  of  Leuctra,  all  that  troubled  him  was 
the  event  of  the  battle,  and  what  was  to  become  of  his  arms;  but  on 
his  shield  being  held  up  to  him,  and  with  assurances  that  the  day  had 
gone  for  the  Theban  side,  he  said  to  the  bystanders  with  a  cheerful 
countenance,  'Let  not  this  day,  friends,  be  considered  as  the  end  of  my 
life,  but  as  the  beginning  of  my  happiness  and  the  consummation  of  my 
glory.  I  have  the  satisfaction  of  leaving  my  country  victorious,  haughty 
Sparta  humbled,  and  Greece  freed.'  Then  drawing  the  spear  out  of  his 
breast,  he  expired."37  Even  if  Epaminondas  did  not  express  any  such 
dramatic  sentiment,  it  was  a  common  enough  experience  among  mankind 
to  be  the  subject  of  a  credible  bit  of  fiction.  The  joy  was  in  the  fact 
that  the  cause  had  triumphed,  a  cause  that  he  had  made  his  own.  The 
patriot  identifies  himself  with  his  country;  in  it  he  sees  himself;  and 
he  shares  its  sorrows  and  successes. 

The  patriot  is  provincial.  He  begins  his  life  of  attachment  by  being 
loyal  to  what  is  nearest  the  center  of  his  own  interests.  And  such  attach- 
ment is  natural.  We  are  not  likely  to  be  so  vitally  interested  in  far- 
away things  as  in  the  things  that  are  near.  It  is  simply  a  case  of  where 
the  power  of  gravitation  varies  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  distance  between 
the  gravitating  bodies.  Now,  the  patriot's  own  nation  is  nearer  to  him 
than  is  any  other,  and  consequently  to  it  he  renders  his  warmest  devo- 
tion. Even  many  who  deplore  the  narrowness  of  nationalism  and  them- 
selves do  not  share  that  narrowness,  do  nevertheless  have  a  warm  devo- 
tion for  their  own  country.  This  devotion,  strong  in  spite  of  a  con- 
sciousness of  the  country's  shortcomings,  shows  itself  in  Cowper's  line: 

"England,  with  all  thy  faults,  I  love  thee  still."38 

The  patriot  believes  that  he  is  an  unnatural  son  if  he  is  not  devoted 
to  his  country.  To  turn  against  the  country  is  comparable  to  turning 
against  his  own  mother.  And  of  course  no  real  man  of  flesh  and  blood 
and  the  ordinary  feelings  of  normal  human  beings,  would  do  such  a 
thing  as  that.  The  traitor  is  abnormal,  and  is  something  amounting  to 
almost  a  monster.  All  normal  men  are  believed  to  thrill  to  the  senti- 
ment, 

"This  is  my  own,  my  native  land!"89 


56  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

The  country  is  so  close  that  it  is  felt  to  be  inhuman  baseness  not  to  be 
true  to  the  ties  that  bind  one  to  it. 

Patriotism  is,  then,  in  part  a  clinging  to  the  nation  as  an  expression 
of  one's  own  life.  The  patriot  fiercely  resents  attacks  upon  the  nation, 
for  they  are  attacks  upon  himself.  They  assail  the  periphery  of  his 
personality.  He  wants  his  country  to  be  free  because  in  it  he  finds 
himself  expressed,  and  because  he  claims  the  right  to  continue  his  self- 
expression  through  the  country.  Therefore  he  hates  conquest  by  an 
enemy.  He  would  rather  die  fighting  than  be  subjugated,  because  in 
dying  for  his  country  he  asserts  himself  in  one  last  final  defiant  act. 
It  is  a  supreme  act  of  self-assertion.  The  country  is  the  patriot's,  it  is 
vital  to  him,  and  while  life  lasts  he  will  not  see  it  perish  from  the  earth. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Intrinsic  Value  of  One's  Country 

The  patriot  believes  that  his  country  is  intrinsically  a  fundamental 
value.  It  is  a  cause  that  is  worthy.  He  sees  various  things  in  the 
country  that  furnish  the  bases  for  this  belief.  Sometimes  he  beholds  in 
the  state  a  sacred  or  semi-sacred  institution.  A  philosophy  which  put 
the  theory  of  the  state  in  such  a  way  as  to  furnish  a  basis  for  this  belief 
was  that  of  Hegel.  For  Hegel,  the  state  was  the  development  of  the 
absolute  Idea  in  the  world.  The  state  did  not  arise  in  response  to  the 
needs  of  men,  as  philosophers  like  Mill  and  Spencer 40  have  held,  and 
as  would  probably  be  held  by  the  patriot  who  looks  upon  the  country  as 
protector  or  expression  of  himself.  Hegel  said,  "It  is  a  very  distorted 
account  of  the  matter  when  the  state,  in  demanding  sacrifices  from  the 
citizens,  is  taken  to  be  simply  the  civic  community,  whose  object  is 
merely  the  security  of  life  and  property.  Security  cannot  possibly  be 
obtained  by  the  sacrifice  of  what  is  to  be  secured.  .  .  .  The  nation 
as  a  state  is  the  spirit  substantively  realized  and  directly  real.  Hence, 
it  is  the  absolute  power  on  earth."41  Hegel  felt  that  way  about  the 
Prussian  State.  And  others  have  felt  almost  the  same  way  about  their 
state.  The  desire  for  a  solid  and  immutable  condition  of  life  that  the 
view  represents  is  a  fundamental  one.  And  when  Hegel  or  any  one  else 
takes  that  view  of  his  state,  he  is  at  once  likely  to  be  a  devoted  patriot. 

The  popular  parallel  to  Hegel's  conclusion  is  the  belief  that  the  coun- 
try comes  from  God.  Men  seem  to  want  to  feel  that  their  origins  are 
worthy  of  reverence,  and  that  they  are  especially  favored.  In  ancient 
times  most  people  traced  their  ancestry  back  to  their  God.  The  Jap- 
anese do  the  same  thing  in  modern  times,  and  have  a  religion  which  is 
the  expression  of  that  belief.  The  Shinto  religion  inculcates  reverence 
for  the  sovereign,  ancestral  memory,  filial  piety,  nature  worship,  and 
the  belief  that  the  imperial  family,  which  is  descended  from  their  god, 
is  the  fountain  head  of  the  whole  nation.  These  elements  have  been 
infused  into  Bushido,  which  Nitobe  calls  The  Soul  of  Japan,  and  which 
embodies  and  inculcates  the  Japanese  national  ideals.  But  the  belief 
in  the  semi-sacred  character  of  the  nation  is  common  in  all  countries. 
How  often  do  we  hear  it  said  that  America  is  God's  Modern  Chosen  Peo- 
ple. And  at  least  one  of  the  sovereigns  of  Europe  does  not  cease  to 
mention  the  patriotism  of  his  tutelary  god  not  only  in  his  prayers,  but 
also  in  his  proclamations. 


58  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

This  belief  in  the  sacredness  of  one's  country  has  in  monarchies  a 
splendid  symbol  to  which  to  attach  itself  in  the  person  of  the  king  or 
emperor.  The  ruling  classes  encourage  this  attachment;  they  them- 
selves feel  that  they  rule  by  divine  right.  They  have  inherited  the 
belief  from  the  traditions  of  the  Middle  Ages  and  from  such  philosophi- 
cal theories  as  that  of  Hegel.  And  the  people,  also  habituated  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  in  those  ideas,  share  the  same  belief.  If  they  are  thor- 
oughly loyal,  they  take  an  attitude  towards  their  king  similar  to  that 
assumed  by  religious  devotees  towards  their  God.  But  emperor-worship 
is  not  at  all  necessary  to  state-worship.  Many  who  no  longer  believe  in 
the  divine  right  of  kings  still  believe  in  the  divine  right  of  states.  The 
state  is  still  often  looked  upon  as  sacred  and  sovereign.  The  Greek  con- 
ception of  the  omnipotent  polis  is  in  the  hinterland  of  our  minds.  There 
has  come  down  from  the  Middle  Ages  a  habit  of  sovereignty  which  the 
world  has  not  shaken  off.  And,  moreover,  men  want  a  supreme  power 
which  guarantees  safety.  Patriotism  thrives  in  such  soil.  When  people 
are  possessed  of  these  beliefs,  patriotism  with  them  can  become  almost 
a  religion. 

The  belief  that  one  has  a  glorious  country  is  a  form  of  the  belief 
in  its  value.  This  kind  of  patriotism  is  fed  by  contemplation  of  the 
great  names  of  the  past  and  the  deeds  of  conquering  heroes.  It  can 
attach  itself  to  any  characteristic  in  which  the  country  excels.  Some  of 
the  reasons  for  patriotism  advanced  in  a  school  textbook  ran  somewhat 
as  follows:  Our  country  is  a  great  nation.  Our  territory  is  big.  We 
have  an  immense  population.  Our  wealth  is  surpassingly  great.  Our 
power  is  tremendous.  Our  educational  standards  are  high.  And  we 
are  the  great  exponent  of  a  land  of  freedom.42  The  moral  was  that  any 
American  boy  or  girl  ought  to  recognize  that  he  lived  in  a  grand  and 
glorious  country.  One  of  the  very  common  causes  of  pride  is  the  extent 
of  commerce,  and  in  this  way  the  economic  factor  makes  another  con- 
nection with  patriotism.  A  few  years  ago,  one  of  the  potent  reasons  for 
the  proposal  to  subsidize  an  American  merchant  marine  was  that  the 
country  did  not  like  to  feel  that  the  flag  was  not  floating  over  the  sea 
as  it  once  had. 

The  consciousness  of  national  glory  grows  on  the  pride  of  power. 
The  belief  in  the  country's  greatness  fuses  with  and  derives  dynamic 
from  the  impulse  to  power.  National  power  is  precious  to  a  certain  type 
of  patriot.  It  is  even  more  precious  than  peace.  "The  plain  fact  is 
that  people  do  not  prize  tranquillity  above  all  other  goods.  They  desire 
influence  and  power,  and  are  willing  to  accept  the  responsibilities  and 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  59 

the  suffering  that  these  entail."43  These  facts  throw  light  upon  the 
patriotism  of  aggressive  nations.  The  patriots  of  those  nations  glory 
in  their  country's  glory,  and  grow  great  in  the  consciousness  of  its 
power.  Imperialism  grows  out  of  this  temper.  And  once  a  country 
is  embarked  on  a  career  of  imperialism,  it  is  hardly  to  be  satisfied 
short  of  dominion  over  the  world.  Even  then  it  will  sigh  for  new 
worlds  to  conquer.  And  this  characteristic  of  an  insatiable  lust  for 
glory  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  when  we  are  considering  the  taming 
of  an  enemy  by  nonresistance. 

The  patriotism  that  feeds  upon  the  country's  glory  is  jealous  of  the 
national  prestige.  Prestige  is  glory.  And  a  nation  cannot  continue 
to  glory  either  at  home  or  abroad  if  it  suffers  its  prestige  to  be  lowered. 
Consequently  it  must  sometimes  fight  simply  to  protect  that  prestige. 
Many  of  our  citizens  during  the  period  of  crisis  with  Mexico  over  the 
exploits  of  Villa  and  also  during  the  critical  time  in  our  affairs  with 
Germany  before  war  was  declared,  believed  that  if  we  did  not  fight, 
our  prestige  value  would  be  lowered  all  over  the  world,  and  that  we 
should  be  deprived  of  the  power  of  acting  effectively  in  world  politics. 
The  desire  of  a  nation  for  revenge  also  is  the  desire,  as  much  as 
anything  else,  to  restore  her  fallen  prestige. 

Solicitude  for  the  country's  honor  is  another  outgrowth  of  the  pa- 
triotism that  delights  in  national  glory.  One  kind  of  honor  is  that 
of  Belgium  standing  up  in  the  face  of  aggression  for  its  integrity  and 
for  its  loyalty  to  its  international  obligations.  A  weaker  kind  is  very 
much  like  the  desire  for  prestige.  It  is  a  desire  for  the  respect  of 
others.  It  appears  in  the  reason  that  Nitobe  gives  for  Japan's  opening 
its  doors  to  the  western  world.  "The  sense  of  honor  which  cannot 
bear  being  looked  down  upon  as  an  inferior  power, — that  was  the 
strongest  of  motives."44  This  sense  of  honor  will  lead  to  high  achieve- 
ments, but  the  tragedy  is  that  it  will  so  easily  lead  to  war.  C.  D. 
Broad  says,  ".  .  .  .  It  is  chiefly  when  people  can  be  persuaded 
that  questions  of  honor  are  involved  that  they  can  be  got  to  fight."45 
And  when  a  war  is  started,  no  country  wants  to  accept  defeat.  Each 
one  emblazons  on  its  sword  the  device  which  is  said  to  have  been  on 
the  sword  of  a  faithful  knight  of  feudal  times:  "Never  draw  me  with- 
out right;  never  sheathe  me  without  honor." 

The  trouble  which  is  implicit  in  the  situation  is  that  nations  be- 
lieve that  their  glory  and  welfare  are  matters  of  competitive  success. 
It  is  all  too  commonly  believed  that  the  gain  of  one  nation  must  mean 
the  loss  of  another.     Consequently,  the  attitude  that  is  taken  on  all 


60  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

sides  is  simply  that  of  intelligent  self-interest.  Jealousy  arises  out  of 
such  a  situation,  and  jealousy  is  one  of  the  effective  causes  of  war. 
One  of  the  most  significant  factors  in  the  diplomatic  history  preceding 
the  present  war  was  that  of  the  rivalry  of  the  great  European  powers 
for  strategic  land  areas,  and  for  control  of  the  important  sea  routes 
of  the  world.  There  has  been  a  problem  of  the  Mediterranean,  the 
Adriatic,  Constantinople,  the  North  Sea,  the  Baltic,  the  China  Sea,  the 
Persian  Gulf,  and  so  on.  Germany,  younger  than  the  other  nations, 
has  been  making  a  desperate  effort  to  catch  up  with  them,  and  the 
present  war  is  in  great  part  the  outgrowth  of  the  friction  arising  out 
of  that  effort.46 

But  it  is  encouraging  that  the  glory  of  nations  does  not  consist 
exclusively  in  competitive  success,  and  that  there  are  those  who  realize 
it.  There  are  those  who  see  that  the  true  good  of  all  countries  may 
be  worked  out  at  the  same  time.  J.  S.  Mill  expressed  a  high  ideal  of 
patriotism  when  he  said:  "I  believe  that  the  good  of  no  country  can  be 
obtained  by  any  means  but  such  as  tend  to  that  of  all  countries,  nor 
ought  to  be  sought  otherwise,  even  if  attainable."47  This  may  be 
matched  by  a  passage  from  American  patriotic  eloquence  uttered  by 
no  less  a  patriot  than  Charles  Sumner:  "I  hope  to  rescue  those  terms 
[national  glory],  so  powerful  over  the  minds  of  men,  from  the  mis- 
taken objects  to  which  they  are  applied,  from  deeds  of  war  and  the 
extension  of  empire,  that  henceforward  they  may  be  attached  only 
to  acts  of  justice  and  humanity."48  The  highest  good  of  nations  really 
lies  in  the  use  of  those  things  which  do  not  perish  in  the  using  and  of 
which  there  is  enough  for  all.  They  are  the  things  of  the  mind  and 
of  the  spirit.  The  hope  is  that  the  rivalry  of  nations  may  be  trans- 
ferred from  destructive  to  constructive  pursuits.  Much  better  would  be 
friendly  rivalry  in  the  accomplishments  of  science,  art,  scholarship, 
social  welfare,  and  like  things. 

The  belief  in  the  value  of  one's  country  sometimes  expresses  itself 
in  the  conviction  that  the  country  embodies  lofty  ideals.  Patriots  be- 
lieve that  their  nation  represents  a  great  tradition,  and  stands  for  ideals 
that  are  important  to  the  human  race.  A  country  may  be  said  to  be 
organized  about  these  beliefs.  A  people  is  not  really  effectively  unified 
until  it  is  held  together  by  the  power  of  a  common  ideal.  And  that 
ideal  is  a  source  of  strength  to  patriotism.  This  idealistic  character  has 
impressed  itself  upon  even  the  warlike  temper  of  peoples.  They  do 
not  usually  fight  over  causes  that  are  avowedly  materialistic  and  pred- 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  6i 

atory.  It  takes  a  big  idea  to  appeal  to  the  people.  ".  .  .  Peo- 
ples in  their  larger  corporate  activities  are  not  mercenary,  but  idealist. 
They  know  that  wars  do  not  'pay'  in  the  low,  material  sense.  They 
are  not  seeking  present  ease  and  comfort,  seldom  a  present  good  of 
any  kind,  but  the  triumph  of  an  ideal  which  they  associate  with  their 
national  life.  Their  method  may  be  wrong,  but  their  purpose  is  essen- 
tially altruistic,  perhaps  the  least  selfish  of  any  activity  we  know."48 
And  the  ideal  that  moves  a  people  must  be  a  morally  high  ideal,  or  at 
least  must  seem  to  be  so.  A  government  could  scarcely  hope  to  win 
a  hard  war  without  having  first  enlisted  the  community's  moral  con- 
victions. 

Ideals  are  in  part  inherited  from  the  nation's  past.  What  has 
united  in  the  past  has  been  these  common  ideals ;  and  it  is  because  there 
were  such  that  the  memory  of  the  past  is  so  valuable.  But  for  the 
idealist  the  future  is  fully  as  important  as  the  past.  A  people  is  held 
together  by  what  Green  calls  its  "social  expectation.'"50  What  binds 
us  together  in  America  is  not  so  much  the  past  as  the  future.  Our 
past  is  a  vital  factor  in  our  unity.  It  is  remarkable  how  the  various 
elements  in  our  population  can  apparently  so  naturally  appropriate 
"the  Puritan  fathers"  as  their  own.  The  Puritan  fathers  were  only 
one  element  in  the  founding  of  the  United  States,  and  at  least  three- 
quarters  of  the  present  inhabitants  of  this  land  have  no  physical  in- 
heritance from  them,  but  a  far  greater  proportion  of  the  American 
people  count  themselves  as  their  spiritual  progeny.  Nevertheless,  the 
American  people  contains  great  heterogeneous  groups  and  masses  who 
have  never  been  assimilated  to  the  Puritan  ideals  or  traditions.  There 
is  no  common  past  for  all  our  people.  We  root  back  into  many  lands 
and  many  traditions.  The  tie  that  really  binds  is  what  we  believe 
to  be  our  common  destiny,  the  ideals  that  we  believe  ourselves  to  be 
progressively  realizing.    The  roots  of  our  unity  are  in  the  sky. 

The  ideals  which  a  nation  believes  that  it  exemplifies  are  various. 
Sometimes  it  is  that  of  good  government.  Virgil  felt  that  Rome  was 
spreading  peace  and  order  throughout  the  world.61  Sometimes  it  is 
the  ideal  of  justice.  The  patriot  seems  to  feel  that  in  his  country's 
just  cause  eternal  justice  itself  is  being  incarnated.  "A  patriot  he 
[Washington]  was  in  the  highest  sense,  not  because  he  loved  his 
country  with  a  selfish  love,  but  because  he  loved  justice  on  the  broadest 
scale,  and  believed  that  the  cause  of  his  country  was  that  of  eternal 
justice."52  But  the  ideal  which  has  been  exploited  perhaps  more  than 
any  other  is  that  of  freedom.     Patriots  thrill  at  the  thought  that  not 


62  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

only  is  their  country  the  guardian  of  their  freedom,  but  is  the  champion 
of  freedom  throughout  all  the  world.  This  ideal  has  the  honor  of 
having  most  keenly  aroused  the  consciences  of  states.  "It  is  a  curious 
fact  that  practically  every  case  in  which  altruistic  action  has  been 
professed  by  or  recommended  to  a  nation  has  been  a  case  in  which  the 
'liberty'  of  some  human  beings  was  in  question.  Thus  both  the 
antislavery  and  the  Bulgarian  agitations  [in  England]  were  questions 
of  liberty;  and  the  whole  Palmerstonian  policy  was  directed  against 
tyranny.  There  is  indeed  some  ground  for  believing  that  the  positive 
international  moral  sense  has  at  present  only  developed  with  regard 
to  freedom.  There  are  many  people,  especially  in  this  country,  who 
would  say  that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  state,  regardless  of  its  own  interests, 
to  protect  the  freedom  of  another  state,  especially  if  the  inhabitants 
of  the  latter  are  of  kindred  race  to  themselves."53 

Patriotism  often  rests  upon  the  belief  in  the  value  of  the  country's 
civilization.  The  civilization  of  a  country  is  its  art,  culture,  customs, 
and  in  general  its  way  of  living.  It  is  its  kultur.  Loisy  speaks  for 
France,  ".  .  .  though  we  do  not  brag  of  our  culture,  we  are  sure 
that  the  ruin  of  France  would  be  no  gain  to  civilization.  .  .  .  We 
are  safeguarding  a  notable  portion  of  our  human  inheritance  from  the 
madness  of  the  destroyer."54  Sometimes  the  element  of  the  civilization 
cherished  most  is  that  of  religion.  The  Jewish  patriotism  was  an  ex- 
ample of  this.  Sometimes  there  is  a  belief  that  one's  own  nation  has 
a  way  of  doing  things  better  than  others.  Germany  is  an  example.  At 
other  times,  pride  is  founded  upon  the  greatness  of  one's  institutions. 
The  English  and  Americans  feel  such  pride.  Sometimes  patriotism 
waxes  enthusiastic  over  economic  accomplishment.  The  following  is 
an  expression  of  patriotism  which,  while  it  will  no  doubt  be  astonish- 
ing to  most  people,  nevertheless  seems  to  be  sincere:  "It  is  an  element 
of  patriotism  to  reverence  the  successful  business  man  of  America,  and 
Our  Nation  must  request  and  heed  the  advice  and  admonitions  of  men 
experienced  in  affairs."55  The  context  shows  that  the  author  likes  the 
status  quo  of  industry  and  wealth,  and  wants  more  of  the  same  thing. 

Each  state  group  has  its  own  history,  and  is  convinced  that  it  makes 
its  own  contribution  to  the  world's  civilization.  The  patriot  applies 
to  his  own  country  the  spirit  that  was  expressed  by  Mazzini:  "Every 
people  has  its  special  mission,  which  will  cooperate  towards  the  fulfill- 
ment of  the  general  mission  of  Humanity.  That  mission  constitutes 
its  nationality.    Nationality  is  sacred."56    The  sense  of  having  a  mis- 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  63 

sion  possessed  Israel;  it  possesses  Germany;  it  possesses  America. 
Longfellow  wrote  to  America, 

"Humanity  with  all  its  fears, 
With  all  the  hopes  of  future  years, 
Is  hanging  breathless  on  thy  fate."57 

In  fact,  the  number  of  the  civilizing  missions  that  the  world  is  favored 
with  is  identically  equal  to  the  number  of  countries  that  have  each  a 
national  consciousness.  The  consciousness  of  being  the  anointed  one 
sometimes  strikes  the  level  of  the  ludicrous.  The  following  is  not  an 
example, — for  the  New  Englander:  "As  from  the  first  to  this  day,  let 
New  England  continue  to  be  an  example  to  the  world  of  the  blessings 
of  free  government,  and  of  the  means  and  capacity  of  men  to  main- 
tain it.  And  in  all  times  to  come,  as  in  all  times  past,  may  Boston 
be  among  the  foremost  and  boldest  to  exemplify  and  uphold  whatever 
constitutes  the  prosperity,  the  happiness,  and  the  glory  of  New  Eng- 
land."58 

The  patriotism  that  justifies  itself  with  the  reason  that  the  coun- 
try is  an  intrinsic  value  often  expresses  itself  in  a  desire  for  a  better 
country.  Patriotism  is  not  exclusively  love  of  country  just  as  it  is. 
It  is  love  of  an  ideal  country.  The  actual  country  becomes  a  subject 
of  criticism.  Literary  men  have  often  satirized  their  country  at  the 
same  time  that  they  loved  it.  And  the  criticism  may  be  all  the  more 
bitter  because  the  love  is  great.  The  country's  shortcomings  are  felt 
by  those  who  love  it  the  most.  The  following  lines  inflict  the  faithful 
wound  of  a  true  patriot: 

"The  ever-lustrous  name  of  patriot 
To  no  man  may  be  denied  because  he  saw 
Where  in  his  country's  wholeness  lay  the  flaw, 
Where,  on  her  whiteness,  the  unseemly  blot. 
England!  thy  loyal  sons  condemn  thee. — What! 
Shall  we  be  meek  who  from  thine  own  breasts  draw 
Our  fierceness?    Not  ev'n  thou  shalt  overawe 
Us,  thy  proud  children  nowise  basely  got. 
Be  this  the  measure  of  our  loyalty — 
To  feel  thee  noble  and  weep  thy  lapse  the  more. 
This  truth  by  thy  true  servants  is  confess'd — 
Thy  sins,  who  love  thee  most,  do  most  deplore. 
Know  thou  thy  faithful!     Best  they  honour  thee 
Who  honour  in  thee  only  what  is  best."59 


64  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

Patriotism  consequently  does  not  mean  blind  devotion  to  country, 
right  or  wrong.  And  the  plain  fact  is  that  there  actually  are  patriots 
who  do  not  conceive  that  devotion  to  country  must  be  consistent  even 
at  the  expense  of  one's  moral  convictions.  Loyalty  to  country  with 
them  does  not  set  aside  loyalty  to  the  moral  law.  The  following  lines 
are  taken  from  an  essay  commendatory  to  patriotism:  "Let  patriotism 
wholly  conform  itself  to  the  moral  law;  let  it  judge  all  things,  national 
as  well  as  individual,  by  the  unalterable,  supreme,  standard  of  right 
and  wrong;  let  it  sanction  no  blind  following  of  the  flag,  nor  any 
unethical  exalting  of  the  country's  dominance  above  the  country's 
righteousness;  let  it  reject  the  notion  that  because  war  has  been  de- 
clared, patriots  must  enlist;  let  it  repudiate  the  idea  that  because  a 
war  has  been  begun,  it  must  be  allowed  to  end  only  when  victory  has 
been  secured; — and  there  will  not  only  be  fewer  wars,  but  also,  on  one 
side  at  least,  wars  more  in  keeping  with  justice  and  truth."80  The 
author  is  a  patriot,  but  his  patriotism  is  directed  by  a  high  ethical 
ideal. 

It  follows  that  patriotism  is  not  inextricably  bound  up  with  jingoism. 
Patriotism  is  not  exclusively  a  war-time  virtue.  In  truth  pacifists  may 
well  assert,  and  do  sometimes,  that  they  are  patriots,  and  differ  from 
other  patriots  only  in  the  way  in  which  they  show  their  patriotism. 
There  are  uses  for  the  patriot  in  time  of  peace  as  well  as  in  time  of 
war.  A  practical  statesman  in  a  patriotic  address  has  said,  "We  need 
men  who  will  not  only  be  ready  to  sacrifice  for  their  country  in  time 
of  war,  but  who  will  not  be  a  menace  to  it  in  time  of  peace!  We  want 
patriots  in  finance.  We  want  patriotism  in  the  organization  of  corpora- 
tions. We  want  patriots  in  the  conduct  of  public  utilities.  We  want 
patriots  in  rendering  loyal  obedience  to  the  law."61  Washington,  who 
was  a  patriot  in  war,  preferred  peace,  and  was  a  patriot  in  peace  as 
well  as  in  war.  When  he  was  about  to  resign  his  commission  as  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  army,  he  wrote  his  "Letter  to  the  Governors"  in 
which  he  made  suggestions  for  putting  the  Federal  Government  on  a 
right  basis.  His  "Farewell  Address"  was  characterized  by  paternal 
solicitude  for  the  future  of  his  country.  On  both  occasions  Washing- 
ton, first  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war,  expressed  what  was  a  true  spirit 
of  patriotism. 

The  patriotism  that  looks  within  the  country  demands  public  spirit. 
It  calls  for  unselfishness  on  the  part  of  the  individual  and  devotion  to 
the  betterment  of  the  country.  J.  S.  Mill's  Autobiography  shows  in  its 
pages  that  Mill  was  actuated  in  his  work  by  an  unselfish  and  devoted 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  65 

public  spirit.  High-minded  patriots  demand  everyday  devotion  to  the 
country.  Bosanquet  tells  us  what  patriotism  means  to  him.  He  says: 
"In  their  patriotism,  their  feeling  for  the  community,  Hegel  tells  us, 
people  are  apt  to  follow  their  custom  of  being  generous  before  they 
are  just,  and  excuse  themselves  by  a  potential  romantic  magnanimity 
for  a  lack  of  prosaic  everyday  loyalty  to  the  commonwealth.  But  it  is 
this  latter,  the  sense  of  daily  duty,  which  is  real  patriotism — the  founda- 
tion and  seed-plot  of  the  former."9* 

This  public  spirit  means,  for  one  thing,  that  the  individual  himself 
be  a  good  citizen.  ".  .  .  Patriotism  demands  that,  in  ourselves, 
we  be  good  and  true.  The  country's  worthy  citizen  must  be  personally 
worthy, — emulous  of  culture,  devoted  to  virtue.  No  man  personally 
dishonorable,  can  be  patriotic  in  the  highest  degree."*3  It  means,  for 
another  thing,  that  a  man  shall  be  interested  in  the  welfare  of  the 
people  of  his  country.  Although  an  enthusiasm  for  the  people  some- 
times weakens  nationalistic  feeling,  as  in  the  case  of  Tolstoy,  neverthe- 
less patriotism  often  derives  great  strength  from  humanitarian  sym- 
pathy. This  sympathy  shows  itself  nowadays  in  the  desire  for  a 
greater  measure  of  justice  in  the  relations  between  the  classes.  In  a 
patriotic  address,  John  Grier  Hibben  says:  "In  the  throes  of  its  new 
birth  the  world  today  needs  a  new  industrial  conscience,  a  new  sense 
of  social  responsibility,  a  new  standard  of  national  integrity.  We  must 
realize  that  the  strength  of  a  nation  lies  ultimately  not  in  its  natural 
resources,  or  in  its  method  of  efficiency,  or  in  its  numerical  superiority, 
or  in  its  army,  or  navy,  but  in  its  moral  and  spiritual  vigor."*4  Even 
J.  M.  Robertson,  who  on  the  whole  thinks  that  patriotism  is  a  bad  thing, 
has  for  the  nation  an  ideal  of  "scientific  social  development."86  It 
is  easy  to  see  in  his  book  that  he  has  a  large  sympathy  with  "the 
people"  not  only  of  other  countries,  but  also  of  his  own.  That  is  his 
patriotism.  The  International  Reform  Bureau  published  a  book  en- 
titled "Patriotic  Studies."  And  it  was  not,  as  one  might  suppose,  a 
series  of  learned  articles  on  the  subject  of  Patriotism.  It  was  a  com- 
pilation of  Congressional  documents  of  the  years  1888-1905  for  the 
study  of  public  questions.  The  questions  treated  in  this  volume  were 
the  following:  1.  Moral  and  Social  Functions  of  Education.  2. 
Municipal  Reform.  3.  Immigration.  4.  The  Lord's  Day  and  the 
Rest  Day.  5.  The  Labor  Problem.  6.  The  Family.  7.  National 
Reforms.  8.  Amusements,  With  Special  Reference  to  Purity.  9. 
Gambling.  10.  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  Crime.  11.  The 
Liquor  Problem.     12.    The  New  Charity."88    All  this  was  considered 


66  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

by  an  International  Bureau  of  Reform  to  be  "patriotic  studies."  Pa- 
triotism then,  reveals  itself  in  the  doing  of  those  things  that  aim  at  the 
true  welfare  of  mankind  within  a  country.  And  such  activities  are 
patriotism.  "In  the  peace  movement,  the  temperance  reform,  the 
judicious  and  practicable  schemes  for  the  abolition  of  bondage,  the 
attempts  to  discover  a  more  Christian  organization  of  society; — in  every 
association  and  all  efforts  that  seek  the  highest  welfare  of  man,  and 
prepare  the  way  for  his  free  culture  and  rightful  enjoyment,  as  a 
creature  of  God,  the  American  idea  justifies  itself  and  culminates;  and 
by  strengthening  this  tendency,  and  only  thus  can  Patriotism  be  faith- 
ful to  its  law,  and  vindicate  its  nature."67 

It  is  quite  consistent  with  patriotism  that  the  country  should  be 
cherished  as  the  servant  of  humanity.  The  ideal  of  service  sometimes 
becomes  a  reason  for  patriotism.  Mazzini's68  patriotism  was  of  this 
kind.  His  ideal  was  that  a  nation  should  claim  not  its  own  aggrandize- 
ment, but  its  right  to  serve  humanity  as  a  distinct  group.  This  kind 
of  patriotism  is  that  which  Royce  would  recommend  as  an  example 
of  the  best  loyalty.  "Enlightened  loyalty  takes  no  delight  in  great 
armies  or  in  great  navies  for  their  own  sake.  If  it  consents  to  them, 
it  views  them  merely  as  transiently  necessary  calamities.  It  has  no 
joy  in  national  prowess,  except  in  so  far  as  that  prowess  means  a 
furtherance  of  universal  loyalty.  .  .  .  We  want  loyalty  to  loyalty 
taught  by  helping  many  people  to  be  loyal  to  their  own  special  causes, 
and  by  showing  them  that  loyalty  is  a  precious  common  human  good, 
and  that  it  can  never  be  a  good  to  harm  any  man's  loyalty  except 
solely  in  necessary  defense  of  our  own  loyalty.  .  .  .  And  so,  a  cause 
is  good,  not  only  for  me,  but  for  mankind,  in  so  far  as  it  is  essentially 
a  loyalty  to  loyalty,  that  is,  is  an  aid  and  a  furtherance  of  loyalty  in 
my  fellows."69  And  Royce,  in  his  last  book,  made  the  application 
to  patriotism:  "Let  us,  with  all  our  might,  with  whatever  moral  in- 
fluence we  possess,  with  our  own  honor,  with  our  lives  if  necessary,  be 
ready,  if  ever  and  whenever  the  call  comes  to  our  people,  to  sacrifice 
for  mankind  as  Belgium  has  sacrificed;  to  hazard  all,  as  Belgium  has 
hazarded  all,  for  the  truer  union  of  mankind  and  for  the  future  of 
human  brotherhood'"0  The  truest  patriot,  from  this  point  of  view, 
will  be  the  man  whose  insight  will  reveal  to  him  what  his  nation  can 
most  naturally  and  best  do  for  humanity,  and  who  uses  his  powers  to 
win  the  devotion  of  the  nation  to  the  ideal  of  performing  that  service. 

What  conclusions  now  are  yielded  by  the  bearings  of  the  reasons  of 
patriotism?    Is  patriotism  either  justified  or  discredited  by  them?  Once 


The  Beliefs  of  Patriotism  67 

more  it  is  apparent  that  no  ground  has  been  reached  upon  which  alone 
to  base  a  general  judgment.  To  begin  with,  no  reason  simply  as  such 
is  either  good  or  bad;  some  of  the  reasons  of  patriotism  are  good  and 
some  are  evil.  Moreover,  these  beliefs  are  often  based  merely  upon 
impulse  and  regimentation.  There  is  "instinctive  inference  as  well  as 
.  .  .  instinctive  impulse."71  One  will  hunt  reasons  for  what  he 
believes;  many  of  his  reasons  are  simply  after-thoughts.  And  some- 
times beliefs  are  not  as  accurate  as  instincts  and  habits.  A  man's 
feelings  may  often  have  more  meaning  than  his  beliefs.  So  the  fact 
that  a  thing  appears  to  be  reasoned  does  not  necessarily  make  it  rea- 
sonable. 

The  reasons  found  in  patriotism  are  another  element  adding  to  its 
complexity.  And  the  complexity  is  all  the  more  involved  because  im- 
pulses and  habits  have  remained  in  patriotism  along  with  reasons. 
Patriotism  is  composed  of  all  three, — impulses,  habits,  and  reasons. 
The  nature  of  patriotism  will  have  to  be  found  in  a  concept  that 
unifies  all  these  elements,  and  its  ethical  value  can  be  clearly  assessed 
only  in  the  light  of  that  concept.  Therefore,  the  nature  and  value 
of  patriotism  will  be  the  objects  of  attention  in  the  remaining  chapters. 


PART  IV 
THE  NATURE  AND  VALUE  OF  PATRIOTISM 


CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Will  to  National  Individuality 

Patriotism  is  a  complex  sentiment.  It  grows  out  of  a  great  variety 
of  roots  and  reasons,  and  finds  expression  in  many  forms.  In  the  pre- 
ceding parts  of  this  treatise  these  foundations  and  expressions  of  patri- 
otism have  been  dealt  with.  They  throw  light  upon  the  questions  of 
why  patriotism  is  and  why  it  is  what  it  is.  It  remains  for  patriotism 
to  be  defined. 

No  one  of  the  many  causes  or  appearances  of  the  sentiment  ade- 
quately defines  it.  Those  who  fix  upon  some  one  impulse,  habit,  or 
reason,  and  try  to  fit  all  the  facts  of  patriotism  into  that,  oversimplify 
the  situation.  They  leave  out  essential  features.  This  would  hold  true 
of  J.  M.  Robertson,1  who  makes  patriotism  to  consist  of  the  impulses 
of  fear  and  hatred.  There  are  important  kinds  of  patriotism,  directed 
toward  the  internal  improvement  of  the  country  for  instance,  which 
cannot  be  so  classified.  If  one  followed  the  clue  of  Trotter,2  he  would 
explain  the  phenomenon  as  the  result  of  the  herd  instinct.  But  patriot- 
ism is  not  purely  instinctive.  Veblen8  would  lead  one  to  make  the 
economic  motive  and  the  impulse  of  rivalry  or  emulation  prominent. 
But  patriotism  is  something  more  than  a  contest  and  a  contest,  too, 
which  is  mainly  for  material  goods.  Loisy  *  would  make  patriotism  a 
worthy  religion,  and  recommend  it  as  such.  But  the  love  of  country 
does  not  always  attain  the  dignity  that  it  has  in  Loisy.  Powers B  makes 
men's  interest  in  their  civilization  the  root  of  their  patriotism.  But  he 
opens  his  book  with  the  recognition  that  men  do  fight  over  material 
things.  None  of  these  accounts  can  be  used  as  an  adequate  basis  from 
which  to  define  and  present  the  central  concept  of  patriotism. 

Yet  patriotism  is  one.  There  is  a  common  center  about  which  all 
the  impulses,  habits,  and  beliefs  of  the  sentiment  cluster.  There  is  a 
concept  "patriotism."  It  is  that  concept,  though  perhaps  inarticulate, 
which  guides  even  in  the  gathering  of  material  for  its  own  definition. 
It  will  be  enlarged  after  the  preliminary  examination,  but  it  is  present 
from  the  beginning. 

The  clue  that  one  really  has  in  hand  when  he  sets  out  to  study 
patriotism  is  the  popular  definition  that  it  is  "the  love  of  country."8 
And  it  is  a  hopeful  clue  from  which  to  start.  It  does  lead  one  to  the 
material  that  he  seeks.    Moreover,  it  shows  what  patriotism  has  meant 


72  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

in  racial  wisdom,  the  wisdom  of  the  plain  people  who  have  long  and 
intimately  been  associated  with  and  been  most  moved  by  the  sentiment. 

It  must  be  said  that  in  one  way  the  result  of  an  examination  of 
this  popular  definition  is  negative.  The  preliminary  study  made  in 
this  dissertation  shows  that.  Patriotism  is  hardly  to  be  defined  simply 
as  the  love  of  country.  Devotion  to  one's  native  land  is  in  one  phase 
an  exalted  and  intelligent  loyalty  to  country  as  an  ideal,  but  it  may 
show  another  character.  Its  nature  has  instinctive  roots.  It  may  be 
no  more  than  a  habit.  Even  the  reasoned  support  of  country  is  not 
exclusively  what  may  be  described  as  love;  at  any  rate,  it  not  uncom- 
monly appears  as  a  quite  self-interested  affection.  The  conduct  of 
patriots  has  often  been  such  as  to  cause  wonder  if  the  emotion  con- 
suming them  were  really  pure,  unmixed  love.  It  has  frequently  seemed 
that  there  was  mixed  in  a  full  portion  of  hate.  The  phrase,  "the  love 
of  country,"  covers  a  multitude  of  sins.  Patriotism  is  a  pure  white 
light,  but  seems  to  be  one  in  the  sense  that  it  can  be  broken  up  and 
any  color  desired  extracted  from  it.  Love  of  country,  in  view  of  such 
facts  as  these,  frequently  gets  to  look  like  something  not  quite  the 
same  as  the  exalted  sentiment  of  school  textbooks  and  Fourth-of-July 
oratory. 

And  yet  there  must  have  been  some  considerations  that  led  to  the 
definition  of  patriotism  as  the  love  of  country.  Out  of  what  facts  did 
the  definition  grow?  In  the  light  of  all  the  instincts,  habits,  and 
reasons  of  patriotism,  what  does  it  seem  that  the  phrase  "the  love  of 
country"  covers? 

It  seems  obvious,  for  one  thing,  that  patriotism  is  an  attitude  toward 
country.  It  is  easily  seen  that  "country"  is  a  constant  in  the  phenom- 
ena of  patriotism.  The  country  is  the  object  of  the  patriot's  emotions. 
Patriotism,  in  other  words,  has  to  do  with  "mother  country"  or 
"fatherland."  And  that  is  to  say  that  patriotism  is  a  feeling  of  nation- 
ality. "Patriotism  is  the  sentiment  in  which  consciousness  of  national- 
ity normally  expresses  itself."7  One  would  not  know  where  to  look 
for  patriotism  at  all  if  to  begin  with  he  did  not  know  in  a  general  way 
that  it  was  this  nationalistic  sentiment.  Generically,  patriotism  is  like 
family  pride,  civic  pride,  team  spirit,  university  spirit,  and  the  like;  spe- 
cifically, it  is  nationalistic  spirit.  It  might  be  necessary  that  this  be 
said  only  for  the  sake  of  completeness  were  there  not  a  confusion  of 
language  on  the  subject.  It  is,  strictly  speaking,  a  strange  and  meta- 
phorical use  of  words  to  talk  about  "patriots  of  the  world."  Such  a 
combination  of  words  may  serve  a  useful  purpose  of  propagandism  in 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  73 

furthering  a  desirable  spirit  of  internationalism  or  cosmopolitanism, 
and  it  may  in  time  take  on  the  further  connotation,  but  it  is  not  his- 
torically accurate.  Patriotism  in  its  meaning  as  a  word  and  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  has  to  do  with  a  country,  and  it  will  serve  to  keep  thinking 
clear  if  we  hold  the  term  to  its  historical  meaning.  Patriotism  is  the 
sentiment  of  attachment  to  one's  national  group. 

The  quality  of  the  sentiment  impresses  one.  Patriotism  is  not  mere- 
ly consciousness  of  nationality.  It  is  more  active  and  explosive  than 
that.  It  is  not  even  such  an  emotion  as  that  of  thankfulness  for  the 
country.  Thankfulness  or  joy,  is  the  feeling  of  returning  soldiers  as 
they  land  back  upon  American  shores.  Is  that  feeling  of  satisfaction 
with  the  homeland  at  getting  back,  patriotism?  A  kind  of  love  of 
country  it  may  be  said  to  be.  But  ask  the  man  in  the  street  if  it  is 
patriotism,  and  he  will  hesitate.  He  will,  however,  be  quite  sure  that 
it  is  not  anything  like  as  patriotic  as  the  acts  of  the  same  soldiers  in 
going  across  to  Europe,  or  in  breaking  up  socialistic  parades  after  they 
get  back.  The  mere  joy  at  being  once  more  in  the  bosom  of  one's 
country  doesn't  seem  to  be  patriotism  par  excellence.  There  appears 
to  be  a  great  difference  between  liking  one's  country  and  loving  it.  The 
immigrant  may  like  his  new  home,  like  it  better  than  any  other,  and 
still  not  be  patriotic.  What  is  it  that  must  be  added  to  turn  the  liking 
of  country  into  patriotism?  Patriots  demand  homage  to  the  country. 
Faith  must  be  shown  by  works.  Patriotism  is  a  passion  inspiring  active 
allegiance.  It  is  devotion  that  means  service,  if  necessary  "the  service." 
The  patriot  is  solicitous  for  his  native  land.  He  not  only  pronounces 
his  country  good ;  he  also  wants  some  good  for  it.  He  is,  moreover,  de- 
termined upon  that  good.  That  it  be  secured  and  maintained  is  part 
of  his  ruling  purpose.  In  sum,  his  will  is  set  upon  it.  Patriotism  has  it 
as  an  essential  characteristic  that  it  includes  a  will  towards  one's 
country. 

What  is  it  that  the  patriot  wills?  Briefly,  he  is  vitally  interested 
in  the  selfhood  of  his  country.  The  thought  of  self  as  to  the  country 
is  always  present.  Patriotism  is  the  will  that  the  country  do  some 
such  thing  as  be,  remain,  express,  or  develop  itself.  The  thorough- 
going patriot  in  so  far  as  he  is  such,  is  interested  in  the  country,  the 
whole  country,  and  nothing  but  the  country.8  It  becomes  the  this 
of  his  consciousness  and  affection.  He  has  just  one  object  in  the  focus 
of  his  interests,  and  that  object  is  this  country.  The  patriot  says, 
"This, — this  is  my  own,  my  native  land."  Patriotism  shows  an  in- 
tense singleness  of  affection.    The  country  for  the  patriot  is  the  one. 


1 


74  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

And  now,  the  fact  that  patriotism  is  a  will  toward  the  country  as 
it  is  in  and  for  itself  may  be  expressed  in  another  way  by  saying  that 
the  patriot  has  a  will  toward  the  country  as  an  individual,  and  his 
will  as  to  its  selfhood  is  a  will  toward  its  individuality.  A  self  is  an 
individual  considered  as  an  identity.  The  country  has  an  individual 
place  in  the  patriot's  heart;  and  he  desires  a  singleness  of  the  country 
corresponding  to  his  singleness  of  affection.  Love  of  country  has 
done  what  all  love  does;  it  has  individualized  its  object.  It  makes  its 
object  the  one,  the  individual,  of  its  devotion.  It  is  with  country  as 
with  woman.  A  man  can  love  but  one. 8  It  is  the  one  to  him.  And 
he  wants  it  to  be  the  one  among  all  others.  What  it  means  to  him  he 
wants  it  to  be  objectively. 

And  so  patriotism  may  be  described  as  the  will  to  national  individu- 
ality. It  is  individualism  expressed  upon  the  national  plane.  One 
can  see  what  it  is  when  he  observes  the  reaction  of  patriots  to  any  sug- 
gestion touching  the  identity  of  their  country.  Opposition  to  the  pro- 
posal for  a  league  of  nations  is  patriotism.  It  is  narrow,  perhaps,  but 
nevertheless  patriotism  it  is.  Those  who  oppose  the  idea  are  actuated 
by  the  fear  that  loyalty  to  the  league  will  develop  at  the  expense  of 
loyalty  to  the  nation.  The  patriot  feels  for  his  country,  puts  himself 
in  its  place,  and  cannot  bear  to  see  its  selfhood  or  individuality  im- 
paired. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  will  to  individuality  may  exist  in  strong 
measure  when  the  external  basis  for  it  seems  to  be  weak,  and  vice  versa. 
Switzerland  has  an  active  patriotism  with  a  heterogeneous  people, 
while  Sweden  has  a  weaker  patriotism  with  a  homogeneous  people. 
However,  this  merely  amounts  to  saying  that  patriotism  is  sometimes 
weak  and  sometimes  strong.  The  nature  of  patriotism  remains  the 
same.  There  is  simply  a  stronger  set  of  stimuli  urging  it  to  express 
itself  in  the  one  case  than  in  the  other.  And  the  fact  of  individuality 
is  not  exclusively  the  stimulus  to  the  will  to  it.  There  might  be  a  will 
to  an  individuality  which  as  yet  existed  only  in  ideal,  and  there  can  be 
a  real  individuality  which  leads  only  to  a  very  weak  fervor  for  itself, 
In  the  case  of  Switzerland  and  Sweden,  the  explanation  is  that  the 
Swiss  have  had  to  fight  for  their  identity  much  more  than  the  Swedish. 
There  must,  however,  be  an  actual  individuality  at  least  possible  in 
order  to  justify  the  will.  What  we  are  at  present  concerned  with  is 
the  description  of  patriotism  as  a  sentiment.  Where  there  is  patriotism 
it  is  such  as  described,  whatever  the  stimuli  may  be.  National  indi- 
viduality is  what  the  Swiss  aim  at.    The  next  chapter  will  take  up  the 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  75 

question  of  whether  or  not  patriotism  finds  a  real  individuality  to  rest 
itself  upon.  An  integrating  spectroscope  is  a  spectroscope  the  slit  of 
which  is  illuminated  by  light  from  every  part  of  the  source  under  ex- 
amination; this  concept  of  the  will  to  national  individuality  is  the  in- 
tegrating spectroscope  of  the  data  of  patriotism. 

But  the  term  individuality  is  an  elastic  one.  It  is  necessary  that  it 
should  be  so.  It  has  to  be  able  to  cover  a  great  deal  as  a  concept  de- 
fining patriotism,  for  the  manifestations  of  patriotism  are  various. 
Patriotism  is  so  manifold  that  the  limits  of  the  definition  cannot  be 
drawn  too  closely.  Individuality  is  a  comprehensive  term.  It  is,  how- 
ever, comprehensible.  What  does  it  mean?  What  are  the  main  forms 
that  the  will  to  national  individuality  takes?  And  are  the  main  forms 
of  patriotism  discovered  in  the  answer  to  that  question?  Does  a 
knowledge  of  the  characteristics  of  an  individual  furnish  the  material 
for  the  understanding  of  the  tendencies  of  patriotism. 

The  first  characteristic  of  an  individual  is  that  it  is  unique.  This 
proposition  is  agreed  upon  by  practically  all  philosophers  whatever 
may  be  the  school  of  metaphysics  to  which  they  belong.  All  would 
agree  with  Royce,  for  instance,  in  saying  that,  "An  individual  is  unique. 
There  is  no  other  of  its  individual  kind.  If  Socrates  is  an  individual, 
then  there  is  only  one  Socrates  in  the  universe.  If  you  are  an  indi- 
vidual, then  in  reality  there  is  no  other  precisely  capable  of  taking  your 
place.  If  God  is  an  individual,  then,  as  ethical  monotheism  began  by 
saying,  There  is  no  Other"9  "Taken  individually"  means  taken  sepa- 
rately. Individuality  means,  in  some  sense,  separateness.  An  individual 
case  is  a  distinct  or  isolated  case.  When,  therefore,  one  demands  that  he 
be  allowed  to  be  an  individual,  he  means  that  he  demands  the  right 
to  be  and  remain  himself. 

And  just  this  is  a  fundamental  demand  in  patriotism.  It  is  of  no 
use  to  tell  a  country,  even  though  it  seems  to  others  an  insignificant 
one,  that  it  will  be  better  off  in  another  country;  that  its  citizens  could 
enjoy  to  a  greater  extent  the  physical  satisfactions  of  life;  and  that 
they  will  be  able  to  share  in  a  greater  kultur.  They  will  not  listen. 
They  do  not  wish  to  live  more  comfortably  as  animals;  they  do  not 
wish  to  live  under  the  aegis  of  some  one  else's. greatness,  no  matter  how 
great  that  may  be.  An  individual  will  hardly  consent  to  unself  him- 
self. The  citizens  of  any  country  wish  to  be  themselves,  and  retain 
their  own  national  individuality.  Veblen10  suggests  that  so  far  as 
creature  comforts  are  concerned,  we  might  all  be  fairly  well  off  if  we 
voluntarily  surrendered  to  Germany.     Art  might  also  be  furthered. 


76  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

And  in  view  of  the  high  cost  of  resistance,  so  Veblen  says,  it  might  be 
well  to  accept  the  German  imperial  rule.  But  Veblen  also  knows  that 
no  nation  will  listen  to  his  proposal.  And  why?  It  is  simply  because 
we  do  not  live  primarily  for  creature  comforts,  or  that  a  classical 
science  and  philosophy  should  be  developed.  Self-preservation  is  the 
first  law  of  nature.  We  want  to  exist,  and  exist  as  separate  and  unique. 
We  want  to  be  ourselves,  and  have  an  individuality  that  has  a  continu- 
ous history  of  its  own.  At  its  lowest  terms,  the  will  to  individuality  is 
a  will  to  live.  France  will  not  listen  to  a  counsel  to  negate  that  will; 
neither  will  Belgium;  neither  will  Britain;  neither  will  America;  and 
neither  will  Germany.  Patriotism  seeks  to  make  the  country  unique; 
that  very  will  itself  becomes  a  factor  making  for  the  uniqueness  of 
the  country.  The  country  is  what  the  patriot  wills;  it  is  his;  he 
cherishes  it;  and  in  its  place  he  will  accept  no  other.  The  will  to 
uniqueness,  which  is  a  form  of  the  will  to  individuality,  does  in  fact 
turn  out  to  be  one  of  the  important  forms  of  patriotism. 

In  the  second  place,  an  individual  is  a  unitary  being.  It  is  one 
whole,  an  individuum.  In  comparison  with  others,  it  is  separate;  in 
its  own  inner  constitution,  it  is  a  unity.  It  is  one  in  both  its  external 
and  internal  relations.  Unity  is  of  two  grades,  simple  and  complex. 
The  simple  unity  means  solidarity  and  that  in  the  last  analysis  the  in- 
dividual cannot  be  further  subdivided.  An  atom  would  be  an  indi- 
vidual of  this  kind.  But  in  our  actual  experience  we  do  not  meet  with 
such  individuals.  What  we  ordinarily  mean  by  an  individual  is  not 
that  which  is  such  by  virtue  of  its  indivisibility.  Taken  just  as  a 
physical  fact,  it  is  divisible.  It  is  when  we  take  it  as  a  fact  of  meaning 
that  we  see  what  we  ordinarily  have  in  mind  as  an  individual.  An  in- 
dividual is  such  because  nothing  can  be  subtracted  from  it  without  de- 
stroying its  distinctive  character.  It  is  a  unity  not  because  of  physical 
indivisibility,  not  because  it  is  a  simple  unit,  but  because,  even  in 
complexity,  it  has  in  it  a  principle  of  unity.  The  richness  of  variety 
in  it  only  contributes  to  the  richness  of  its  individuality.  Bosanquet 
has  made  the  distinction  between  the  two  kinds  of  individuals.  " Indi- 
viduality, it  has  been  said,  has  prima  facie  two  extremes.  An  'atom' 
may  claim  it,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  less  than  can  be  divided;  a  world 
may  claim  it,  on  the  ground  that  its  positive  nature  is  ruined  if  any- 
thing is  added  or  taken  away."u  In  another  place  he  says  that  an 
individuality  is  "a  world  self -complete."12  The  principle  that  indi- 
viduality means  unity  and  the  distinction  between  the  two  kinds  of 
unity  are  well  summed  up  in  the  following  quotation:   "That  individu- 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  77 

ality  always  involves  some  sort  of  unity  will  hardly  be  denied.  That 
which  is  in  no  sense  one  is  in  no  sense  an  individual;  and  the  more 
truly  a  thing  can  be  called  one,  the  more  truly  can  it  be  called  an  in- 
dividual. We  must  distinguish,  however,  between  two  aspects  of 
unity, — the  quantitative  aspect  or  numerical  unity,  and  the  qualitative 
aspect  or  inner  coherence."  u  The  atom  was  an  example  of  numerical 
individuality;  the  qualitative  individual  would  be  exemplified  in  the 
life  of  a  man.  A  human  being  can  of  course  be  rent  limb  from  limb, 
but  so  far  as  bodily  life  is  concerned  he  ceases  then  to  be  a  man;  his 
identity  as  a  human  individual  has  been  destroyed. 

Now  a  country  is  an  individual  by  virtue  of  being  a  qualitative 
unity.  It  is  a  unity  in  difference.  Aristotle  says:  "A  state  is  not  made 
up  only  of  so  many  men,  but  of  different  kinds  of  men;  for  similars  do 
not  constitute  a  state." 14  The  unity  of  a  country  is  not  a  simple  but  a 
complex  unity.  It  is  often  quite  rudimentary,  but  its  essentials  are 
there,  if  there  is  any  country  at  all.  And  those  essentials  may  be  de- 
veloped. They  at  least  exist  as  the  material  for  an  ideal  unity.  Na- 
tional individuality,  to  be  sure,  is  often  an  ideal  rather  than  a  present 
fact.  But  the  patriot  holds  just  this  unity  of  his  country  in  ideal,  and 
strives  towards  it.  His  is  a  will  to  national  unity,  national  individual- 
ity. There  were  in  the  revolutionary  period  two  movements  develop- 
ing side  by  side, — the  movements  towards  independence  and  unity. 
Washington  was  a  patriot  not  only  because  he  sought  for  separation 
from  England,  but  because  he  consistently  counselled  unity  as  among 
the  colonies.  Lincoln  was  a  patriot  not  in  the  sense  that  he  stood  for 
the  separation  of  his  country  from  other  countries  (there  was  no  call 
for  that),  but  in  that  he  stood  for  the  preservation  of  the  unity  of  the 
United  States.  He  preserved  the  Union.  The  nationalistic  movements 
of  the  nineteenth  century  in  Europe  were  directed  in  large  part  towards 
unity.  The  Germans  and  Italians  strove  to  the  end  that  all  their  people 
might  be  united.  Those  movements  were  struggles  for  national  unity, 
and  hence  struggles  for  national  individuality. 

The  stimulus  of  war  brings  out  in  supreme  degree  the  demand  of 
the  patriot  for  national  unity.  The  present  war  has  compelled  unity 
within  each  individual  nation  to  an  unparalleled  extent.  The  whole 
population  in  each  country  has  had  to  be  organized  for  the  war.  The 
civil  and  military  populations  are  not  now  as  distinct  as  they  once  were. 
"The  war  is  waged  not  only  by  the  soldier  but  by  the  baker,  the  manu- 
facturer, the  engineer,  the  farmer,  the  small  investor,  the  women.  Un- 
less, therefore,  the  emotions  of  the  entire  country  can  be  keyed  up  to 


78  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

volunteer  pitch  and  maintained  at  the  point  of  fighting  efficiency,  the 
war  machine  loses  momentum."16  The  patriot  sees  the  necessities  of 
the  times,  and  insists  upon  absolute  unity.  It  is  the  form  that  his  will 
to  national  individuality  then  takes. 

The  patriot  ought,  however,  to  remember  that  unity  does  not  mean 
solidarity,  and  that  a  true  individual  is  not  one  which  has  to  be  main- 
tained by  the  suppression  of  all  differences.  The  patriot  insists  so 
strongly  upon  unity,  no  doubt,  because  he  believes  that  to  act  as  one 
is  the  only  way  in  which  the  national  individuality  can  be  preserved. 
But  he  should  remember,  as  some  one  has  remarked,  that  "a  solid  front 
does  not  necessitate  a  solid  head."  The  unity  of  patriotism  is  one  of 
will,  and  moreover  is  one  of  good  will.  There  cannot  be  national 
unity  on  any  basis  that  ignores  that  fact.  The  honest  pacifist  should 
be  treated  accordingly.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  reason  why 
the  pacifist  should  be  made  the  recipient  of  peculiar  honors  or  the 
object  of  special  solicitude.  He  has  thrown  his  opinion  into  the  arena 
of  human  affairs,  and  will  have  to  take  his  chances.  And  he  in  his 
turn  should  remember  that  the  patriot  is  fighting  for  priceless  posses- 
sions, more  valuable  than  any  material  possessions,  his  own  individual- 
ity and  the  individuality  of  his  country.  If  the  pacifist  has  a  right  to 
insist  upon  his  opinion,  he  must  accord  the  patriot  the  same  right  to 
insist  upon  his.  What  will  take  place  if  the  patriot  happens  to  have 
a  large  majority,  and  deems  it  most  fair  to  enact  a  selective  draft  law? 
The  pacifist  can  do  no  other  than  insist  upon  his  inmost  convictions. 
But  neither  can  the  patriot.  There  is  inevitably  a  clash,  and  the  prob- 
lem is  to  be  solved  not  only  as  a  question  of  right,  but  also  of  expedi- 
ency. It  may  easily  be  most  expedient,  it  usually  is  so,  for  the  patriot 
to  grant  easy  terms  to  the  pacifist.  And  the  latter's  right  to  free  speech 
and  agitation,  as  long  as  he  does  not  actually  break  or  incite  to  the 
breaking  of  a  law,  is  really  indisputable.  But  the  danger  to  national 
individuality  may  be  great.  It  is  conceivable  that  an  aggressive  enemy 
may  be  at  the  very  doors.  In  that  case,  the  nonconformist  will  have 
to  become  in  some  sense  a  martyr.  If  his  country  needs  him,  he  ought 
either  to  serve  or  pay  the  penalty.  He  might  have  to  suffer  imprison- 
ment. Or  he  might  find  it  wisest  and  most  effective  to  martyr  his  con- 
victions to  the  extent  of  performing  some  patriotic  service,  even  to 
bearing  arms.  The  fact  that  the  majority  differs  from  him  might  well 
be  an  indication  that  he  is  wrong,  and  that  he  should  revise  his  opinions 
or  at  least  not  insist  upon  them  too  strongly;  and  moreover,  if  one 
martyrs  his  convictions  to  the  extent  of  helping  win  the  war,  he  may 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  79 

expect  then  to  get  a  more  ready  hearing  for  his  opinions.  One  is 
always  listened  to  more  respectfully  when  he  has  identified  himself 
with  the  group  than  when  he  has  cut  himself  off  from  it.  Conformity 
for  the  present  might  prove  the  best  method  of  making  his  ideals  effec- 
tive in  the  long  run.  It  is  often  easier  to  work  from  the  inside  than 
from  the  outside.  The  chick  within  the  shell  is  in  the  very  best  posi- 
tion in  the  world  for  breaking  through  it. 

But  the  essential  point  is  that  patriotism  insists  on  unity  within 
the  nation.  There  is  no  nation  engaged  in  the  war  which  is  not  in- 
sisting upon  the  utmost  unity  of  action  and  even  of  thought.  And  this 
rests  back  upon  the  unity  that  had  already  really  been  developed.  If 
each  country  had  not  developed  and  marshaled  its  resources  to  such  an 
extent  in  peace  time,  they  could  not  be  so  mobilized  in  war  time,  and 
indeed  there  would  be  no  need  for  it;  the  enemy  would  not  be  bringing 
such  resources  to  bear.  It  is  just  the  very  complexity  and  unity  in 
complexity  in  modern  nations  that  makes  war  so  drastic,  and  makes  it 
so  necessary  that  neither  side  should  neglect  the  bringing  of  any  of  its 
resources  to  bear  upon  the  waging  of  the  war.  The  will  to  unity,  a 
form  of  the  will  to  individuality,  is  quite  characteristic  of  patriotism. 

A  characteristic  of  individuality  in  human  beings  and  their  institu- 
tions is  that  an  individual  is  self-directing;  its  destiny  is  worked  out 
from  within.  The  following  quotation  sums  up  what  is  meant:  "We 
pass  on  to  the  third  factor  in  individuality.  We  have  spoken  of  it  as 
completeness  or  self-sufficiency ;  but  in  its  higher  degrees  it  may  also 
be  called  self-direction.  That  some  measure  of  independence  is  essen- 
tial to  our  notion  of  individuality  will  hardly  be  questioned."18  The 
phrase  "have  some  individuality"  means,  in  part  at  least,  that  one 
make  his  actions  the  expression  of  his  own  true  self.  It  means  to 
think  and  act  for  oneself.  If  one  does  not  do  that,  we  say  that  he  is 
not  a  real  individual.  If  one  is  not  self -directing,  and  is  subject  to  the 
will  of  another,  his  individuality  is,  in  so  far,  taken  from  him,  and  he 
becomes  a  part  of  the  individuality  of  that  other.  If  he  is  integrated 
in  the  other's  will,  he  really  in  a  true  sense  ceases  to  be  even  unique. 
Fite  says:  "As  a  spiritual  individual  I  am  found  in  every  action  that 
expresses  my  meaning,  whether  it  be  that  of  my  hand,  my  typewriter, 
my  servant,  or  my  political  party;  and  any  object  that  refuses  to  ex- 
press my  meaning,  though  it  be  a  member  of  my  own  body,  is  so  far 
not  truly  myself."  17  It  follows  that  one  has  to  be  free  and  independent 
to  be  an  individual.  And  this  is  the  reason  that  freedom  is  so  precious; 
not  because  the  free  man  will  live  in  better  material  circumstances,  but 


80  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

because  he  wants  to  be  an  individual.  He  wants  to  be  himself,  and 
have  his  chance  of  working  out  his  life  in  his  own  way. 

And  patriotism  involves  just  this  demand  for  liberty.  The  patriot 
wants  his  country  to  be  free.  It  must,  to  satisfy  him,  be  not  only  a 
recognizable  separate  unit  as  among  the  peoples  of  the  world,  but 
must  run  its  own  affairs.  He  wants  it  to  be  self-directing  and  autono- 
mous. He  cannot  bear  to  have  his  country  used  as  a  thing,  or  a  mere 
piece  of  mechanism  at  the  mercy  of  another's  will  Any  one  who  is 
patriotic  in  China  will  not  be  satisfied  with  a  situation  where  any  for- 
eign power  has  concessions  over  parts  of  his  country's  soil.  Weak  gov- 
ernments frequently  find  it  necessary  to  guard  their  neutrality,  and 
they  do  it  jealously  because  the  patriotic  spirit  will  not  permit  them 
to  allow  others  to  put  them  in  subjection  as  a  means  to  the  furtherance 
of  alien  designs.  Belgium  is  an  instance.  Belgium  does  not  want  to 
be  a  roadway  or  the  battlefield  of  Europe.  She  does  not  want  to  be  a 
pawn  in  a  game.  She  wants  her  territory  to  be  the  expression  of  her 
own  free  life.  To  stand  for  her  neutrality  is  to  stand  for  her  sovereign- 
ty, and  to  assert  herself.  Belgium  might  utterly  perish,  but  in  doing 
so,  she  would  have  asserted  herself,  and  she  would  rather  die  in  that 
magnificent  self-assertion  than  to  be  the  tool  of  another.  It  is  not 
often  that  a  supposedly  sovereign  power  will,  like  Luxemburg,  allow 
its  neutrality  to  be  disregarded  without  a  struggle.  President  Wilson 
understood  the  sensitiveness  of  patriots  when  he  insisted  that  no  for- 
eign troops  should  be  landed  in  Russia  without  her  consent.  Patriot- 
ism is  often  thought  of  altogether  as  the  fight  for  freedom.  The  patriot 
insists  upon  the  freedom,  the  autonomy,  the  sovereignty  of  his  country; 
the  will  to  self-direction  is  one  of  the  moving  forces  of  patriotism. 

To  be  a  true  individual  is  to  have  some  significance  of  one's  own. 
Individuality  comes  to  mean  marked  individuality.  It  stands  for  the 
opposite  of  the  quality  of  being  common.  The  phrase  "have  some  in- 
dividuality" often  means  to  have  something  for  which  one  stands,  and 
something  that  is  really  significant  in  the  world.  It  means  that  one's 
activities  should  be  the  expression  of  a  life  plan  which  is  his,  and 
which  has  real  value.  This  characteristic  takes  a  step  beyond  those 
of  mere  separateness  and  independence.  When  we  say  of  one  that 
he  has  no  individuality,  we  do  not  mean  that  he  is  not  numerically 
separate  from  other  men,  but,  in  part  at  least,  that  he  has  no  life  plan 
which  is  specially  his  own.  He  has  no  significance.  The  man  who 
is  an  individual  is  one  who  has  a  specific  character.  And  if  he  prides 
himself  upon  being  an  individual  he  wants  to  "be  somebody."    He  has 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  8i 

"self-respect."  He  regards  himself  as  significant.  He  wants  not  only 
to  count  as  one;  he  wants  to  count. 

And,  again,  this  is  a  characteristic  of  patriotism.  Patriotism  is  a 
will  be  to  be  nationally  significant.  It  is  national  pride.  It  is  national 
ambition,  a  will  to  self-respect  and  the  respect  of  others,  a  will  to  na- 
tional standing,  greatness,  distinction,  importance,  power.  The  ex- 
istence of  this  will  to  be  significant  is  why  nations  are  so  sensitive  on 
points  of  honor  and  prestige.  Their  national  significance  is  lowered 
if  they  allow,  let  us  say,  a  public  insult  to  go  unavenged.  It  is  a  reason 
why  nations  cannot  back  down  in  a  war  when  it  once  gets  started,  and 
why  they  can  all  be  for  peace  after  the  war,  but  not  while  it  is  being 
waged.  National  significance,  as  national  significance  now  goes,  will 
not  permit  them  to  do  other  than  win  the  war.  This  is  why  states  like 
to  regard  themselves  as  "powers,"  for  it  is  as  a  "power"  that  a  nation 
finds  itself  significant  in  world  politics.  It  is  why  countries  fight  for 
their  "civilization."  The  predominance  of  their  civilization  means  the 
fulfillment  of  their  desire  for  national  significance.  It  is  why  the 
knowledge  of  the  history  and  literature  of  one's  country  is  likely  to 
produce  patriotism;  such  knowledge  creates  both  a  conviction  of  the 
country's  significance  and  the  desire  to  realize  it  further. 

The  grounds  upon  which  a  country  asserts  its  significance  is  an  im- 
portant matter.  As  long  as  military  prowess  and  possession  of  much 
territory  are  esteemed  to  be  things  of  great  importance,  the  nations 
will  strive  to  be  significant  by  being  distinguished  for  those  things.  If 
the  ideals  of  mankind  can  be  more  largely  turned  to  constructive  activ- 
ities, the  nations  will  strive  to  be  significant  along  those  lines.  There 
are  patriots  whose  ideals  are  of  the  latter  type.  They  seek  the  internal 
development  of  their  country  as  a  means  of  making  it  more  worth 
while  and  hence  more  significant.  The  significance  that  they  seek  is 
not  merely  that  which  glories  in  the  admiration  and  perhaps  envy  of 
the  world;  it  is  not  a  significance  adjudged  by  a  jury  of  mankind,  but 
one  that  they  themselves  find  in  making  their  country  approximate  an 
ideal.  Patriotism  is  the  will  to  be  nationally  significant;  another  main 
characteristic  of  the  will  to  individuality  is  what  is  working  in  im- 
portant manifestations  of  patriotism. 

An  individual,  at  least  a  finite  individual,  is  one  of  a  community. 
And  its  individuality,  therefore,  rests  upon  a  "broad  basis  of  likeness."18 
The  conscious  individual,  for  instance,  does  not  strive  to  make  his 
individuality  consist  in  absolute  difference.  He  wants  to  be  different 
only  within  certain  limits.    He  does  not  want  to  be  "outlandish."    He 


82  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

wants  in  certain  broad  ways  to  be  like  his  fellows.  He  would,  if  it 
were  called  to  his  attention,  agree  that  his  individuality  rested  in  great 
measure  upon  membership  in  his  community. 

It  is  impossible  for  one  to  avoid  seeing  the  fact  that  he  is  one  in  a 
world  with  others.  The  human  individual  is  a  social  animal.19  And 
this  fact  is  formulative  of  his  very  individuality.  Fite  says,  "Not 
only  does  ....  intercourse  with  others  broaden  the  range  of 
your  self-consciousness;  it  also  furnishes  the  basis  of  contrast  through 
which  you  become  aware  of  yourself,  and  define  yourself,  and  are  en- 
abled to  assert  yourself  as  a  distinct  and  unique  individual."20  Two 
points  are  involved  in  what  Fite  says.  First,  we  become  self-conscious 
in  contrast  with  others;  we  know  ourselves  in  that  way.  Second,  our 
own  individuality  becomes  richer  because  others  exist.  What  they 
have  become  broadens  one's  own  vision  of  the  range  of  human  possi- 
bilities by  so  much  the  more;  and  that  broader  vision  enriches  and  en- 
larges one's  own  life.  One  will,  then,  find  his  life  expanded  by  the 
multiplication  of  his  social  relations.  "If  our  argument  has  shown  any- 
thing, it  has  shown  that  through  the  extension  of  his  social  relations, 
the  individual  becomes,  not  less,  but  more  of  an  individual,  and  acquires 
a  greater  individual  freedom."  a  The  high  integration  of  society  is  not 
necessarily  inimical  to  the  development  of  the  individual.  The  fact  is 
that  as  society  has  been  builded  into  larger  wholes,  the  individual  has 
also  become  more  and  more  significant.  Royce  says,  "  .  .  .  . 
our  time  shows  us  that  individualism  and  collectivism  are  tendencies, 
each  of  which,  as  our  social  order  grows,  intensifies  the  other."  "  And 
Royce  draws  this  conclusion:  "No  individual  human  self  can  be  saved 
except  through  the  ceasing  to  be  a  mere  individual."  ffl 

The  existence  of  others  has  important  consequences  for  one's  prac- 
tical attitude  toward  life.  When  one  becomes  aware  of  such  existence 
he  can  no  longer  act  as  if  it  were  not.  "When  I  have  perceived  even 
a  chair  standing  in  my  way  I  can  no  longer  proceed  as  if  it  were  not 
there."  2i  And  one's  conduct  will  usually  be  more  radically  changed 
when  it  is  human  individuals  that  are  in  the  way.  The  same  knowledge 
which  shows  one  himself  shows  him  also  other  human  beings  who  are 
just  as  real  and  important  as  himself,  and  upon  the  basis  of  that 
knowledge  he  can  logically  and  ethically  find  no  good  reason  for 
treating  them  merely  as  means  for  the  furtherance  of  his  own  interests. 
He  cannot  simply  walk  over  them  as  if  they  were  not  there.  But  if 
one  is  even  wise,  he  will  adopt  no  such  ruthless  plan  of  life.  He 
will  realize  that  consideration  for  others  is  best  for  himself.    He  will 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  83 

not  only  have  less  trouble,  but  he  will  also  find  his  individuality  en- 
riched by  his  intercourse  with  other  free  beings  who  have  their  own 
meaning.  One  cannot  be  a  positive  reality  unless  his  neighbors  are 
also.  And  if  these  things  are  true,  it  means  that  the  interests  of  the 
individuals  of  a  community  may  be  harmonized.  When  each  one 
understands  his  own  true  nature,  he  at  the  same  time  realizes  that  his 
own  good  is  best  found  in  harmony  with  the  others  of  his  community. 
Individualism,  rightly  interpreted,  attains  the  results  desired  by  those 
who  place  the  emphasis  upon  collectivism.  Howison  says:  "The 
very  quality  of  personality  is,  that  a  person  is  a  being  who  recognizes 
others  as  having  a  reality  as  unquestionable  as  his  own,  and  who  thus 
sees  himself  as  a  member  of  a  moral  republic,  standing  to  other  per- 
sons in  an  immutable  relationship  of  reciprocal  duties  and  rights, 
himself  endowed  with  dignity,  and  acknowledging  the  dignity  of  all 
the  rest."  26  This  is  an  ideal  of  individuality  as  it  appears  in  persons. 
The  enlightened  individual  is  really  concerned  about  finding  his 
proper  place  in  his  world. 

Does  patriotism  recognize  that  individuality  involves  membership 
in  a  community?  Does  the  patriot  actually  wish  to  realize  the  in- 
dividuality of  his  country  in  that  way?  The  answer  is  that  he  often 
does.  There  are  patriots  who  have  their  hearts  in  the  desire  that 
their  country  be  a  good  neighbor.  This  desire  is,  of  course,  not  always 
present  in  the  patriotic  state  of  mind.  But  neither  are  the  other  char- 
acteristics of  individuality  always  invariably  present.  Some  of  them 
are  always  present,  and  together  they  make  up  the  will  to  individual- 
ity which  is  the  essence  of  patriotism.  It  must  be  admitted  that  only 
too  often  does  the  patriot  think  of  the  individuality  of  his  country  as 
realized  apart  from  or  at  the  expense  of  others.  The  more  generous 
notion  of  patriotism  is  still  as  much  a  problem  as  a  fact.  And 
yet,  in  times  of  peace  at  least,  the  patriot  sees  the  good  of  countries 
other  than  his  own.  It  is  a  defensible  proposition  that  even  the  com- 
mon man  is  capable  of  and  actually  does  possess  such  vision.  Cer- 
tainly there  are  examples  of  illustrious  patriots  in  whom  it  is  found. 
The  following  has  been  penned  concerning  Professor  Royce:  "  .  . 
.  .  his  ethical  idealism  is  best  understood  as  an  interpretation  of 
the  spirit  of  modern  civilization  as  it  had  found  expression  in  his 
native  land.  Not  that  there  was  anything  of  the  Chauvinist  in  Royce. 
If  there  were  aught  of  value  in  our  social  and  political  ideals  it  was 
due  to  the  fact  that  they  rested  on  principles  that  cross  the  boundaries 
between  nations,  and  might  equally  serve  as  the  basis  of  that  com- 


84  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

munity  of  nations  to  which  he  hopefully  looked  forward."  2a  But  one 
can  also  place  in  evidence  the  very  words  of  one  of  the  greatest  patriots 
of  all  time,  Joseph  Mazzini.  Mazzini  was  devoted  to  the  ideal  of 
serving  humanity.  He  wrote  to  the  laboring  people  of  his  country: 
"Your  first  duties — first  as  regards  importance — are,  as  I  have  already 
told  you,  towards  Humanity.  You  are  men  before  you  are  either  citi- 
zens or  fathers.""  But  he  was  also  an  ardent  patriot.  He  was 
devoted  to  Italy,  to  her  freedom,  unity,  and  significance.  And  he 
thought  that  Italians,  like  all  other  men,  could  serve  humanity  effec- 
tively only  by  being  in  association.  "This  means  [of  effective  asso- 
ciation]," he  says,  "was  provided  for  you  by  God  when  he  gave  you 
a  country;  when,  as  a  wise  overseer  of  labor  distributes  the  various 
branches  of  employment  according  to  the  different  capacities  of  the 
workman,  he  divided  Humanity  into  distinct  groups  or  nuclei  upon 
the  face  of  the  earth,  thus  creating  the  germ  of  Nationalities."  "  The 
duty  of  a  nation  was  to  be  the  servant  of  humanity,  but  that  was  also 
its  glory  and  its  right  to  be.  Patriotism  and  internationalism  were 
complementary.  "In  labouring  for  our  own  country  on  the  right 
principle,  we  labour  for  Humanity.  Our  country  is  the  fulcrum  of 
the  lever  we  have  to  wield  for  the  common  good.  If  we  abandon  that 
fulcrum,  we  run  the  risk  of  rendering  ourselves  useless  not  only  to 
humanity,  but  to  our  country  itself.  Before  men  can  associate  with 
the  nations  of  which  humanity  is  composed,  they  must  have  a  National 
existence.  There  is  no  true  association  except  among  equals.  It  is 
only  through  our  country  that  we  can  have  a  recognized  collective 
existence."  "  This,  then,  patriotism  quite  often  actually  is.  And  once 
more,  in  its  positive  recognition  of  the  country  as  truly  one  of  a  com- 
munity, patriotism  turns  out  to  be  the  working  of  the  will  to  national 
individuality.    This  last  phase  is  an  altruistic  form  of  the  will. 

The  concept  of  the  will  to  national  individuality,  derived  from  the 
popular  definition  of  patriotism  as  the  love  of  country  and  wrought 
out  in  the  light  of  the  data  which  clusters  about  that  popular  idea, 
proves  to  be  a  seminal  principle.  If  one  follows  out  the  various  forms 
of  the  will,  he  comes  to  the  main  forms  of  patriotism.  He  could,  by 
a  knowledge  of  the  characteristics  of  the  will  to  individuality,  foretell 
in  general  what  the  manifestations  of  patriotism  would  be  found  to  be. 


CHAPTER   IX 

The  Nation  As  an  Individual 

Patriotism  is  the  will  to  national  individuality.  What  justification 
for  its  existence  in  there  in  the  groundwork  of  fact?  Is  there  really 
any  individuality  for  the  will  to  rest  itself  upon?  Is  the  country  an 
individual? 

There  are  those  who  deny  that  patriotism  really  has  anything  ob- 
jective to  feed  upon.  It  is  hard,  they  say,  to  find  anything  that  the 
flag  stands  for  or  to  which  one  addresses  his  choral  chant  when  he  sings, 
"My  Country!  'tis  of  thee."  They  ask  what  one's  country  can  mean 
to  him.  When  one  speaks  of  country,  is  he  not  thinking  of  that  spot 
of  earth  which  he  calls  home,  those  activities  and  institutions  which 
he  has  seen  working  in  his  own  community,  or  perhaps  only  the  map? 
A  country  as  big  as  the  United  States,  for  example,  can  hardly  be  said 
to  be  appreciated  by  the  mind  of  a  single  man.  Most  of  the  country 
no  one  has  ever  even  seen.  The  "collective  mind"  is  shown  to  be  a 
fiction.  A  people  does  not  form  a  "person,"  but  remains  only  a  group 
of  individuals.  And  the  corollary  seems  to  be  that  the  only  ground 
on  which  to  posit  a  nation  has  been  taken  away.  The  state  is  said  to 
be  unreal  and  artificial.  Peoples  may  be  the  product  of  history;  a 
state  can  be  made  in  a  day.  Ponsonby  looks  upon  a  nation  as  such  a 
construction:  "A  nation  is  not  in  its  composition  primarily  a  geo- 
graphical nor  a  racial,  but  a  political  unit It  must  be  able 

to  uphold  its  independent  political  sovereignty."30  Without  the  ne- 
cessity for  a  common  defense,  that  is,  there  would  be  no  nation. 
Charles  Kingsley  remarked  in  the  preface  to  one  of  his  books  that 
while  there  can  be  loyalty  to  a  king  or  a  queen,  there  cannot  be  loy- 
alty to  one's  country.81  And  so  it  is  that  a  "country"  is  an  abstrac- 
tion. For  the  ordinary  patriot  at  least  there  really  is  no  such  thing. 
The  country  is  not  an  individual,  and  there  is  no  individuality  in  it 
for  the  citizen  to  rest  his  patriotism  upon.  Patriotism  is  thus  left  up 
in  the  air. 

Now  one  is  not  driven  to  the  extreme  view  of  the  nation  as  a  "per- 
son" in  order  to  answer  the  criticisms  suggested  in  the  foregoing.  That 
the  state  is  a  "person"  is  a  well-known  theory.  It  is  held  by  those 
impressed  by  the  philosophy  of  Hegel.  It  is  reflected  everywhere  in 
the  terms  they  use.    They  talk  constantly  of  such  things  as  a  "col- 


86  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

lective  mind"  and  a  "general  will."  But  the  state  is  not  personal  in 
the  sense  in  which  human  beings  are  personal.  We  expect  a  person 
to  have  a  body,  a  brain,  and  a  nervous  system.  A  state  or  nation 
has  none  such.  But  a  thing  does  not  have  to  be  a  person  in  order  to 
be  an  individual.  >{ot  all  individuals  are  personal.  All  individuals 
have  inner  unity.  The  nation  has  such  unity,  and  it  is  this  which  the 
philosophers  feel  whose  theory  has  just  been  described.  They  are  the 
"unity  philosophers."  And  they-  feel  a  unity  in  a  state  which  they 
seek  to  describe  in  terms  of  personality.  We  all  feel  the  unity.  For 
instance,  we  assume  a  continuity  as  existent  in  a  country.  Even  a 
democratic  country  must  through  successive  administrations  employ 
the  same  policy  abroad.  Only  we  do  not  feel  it  necessary  to  describe 
the  unity  in  terms  of  personality.  The  conception  of  organization 
will  serve  to  explain  the  unity  we  find  in  the  nation.  What  the  organi- 
zation is  like  is  further  to  appear. 

An  indication  that  a  great  people  forms  a  unit  is  the  fact  that  it 
is  a  growth.  The  ties  that  bind  the  nation  together  are,  in  a  larger 
sphere,  very  much  like  those  that  bind  together  the  family  and  the 
tribe.  The  ties  of  kinship  were  likely  the  first  that  bound  together 
associations  of  men.  Perhaps  what  first  appeared  was  an  undifferen- 
tiated horde.  But  at  least  the  family  must  have  been  the  first  of  any 
close  associations  of  men.  The  great  majority  of  students  are  united 
on  this  point.  McDougall  says:  "Primitive  human  society  was  prob- 
ably a  comparatively  small  group  of  near  blood  relatives."32  Green 
says,  "Every  form  of  right  first  appeared  within  societies  founded  on 
kinship,  these  being  naturally  the  societies  within  which  the  constrain- 
ing conception  of  a  common  well  being  is  first  operative."  "  Sumner's 
words  reflect  his  view:  "The  kin  tie,  which  had  been  the  primitive 
mode  of  association  and  coherence  in  groups,  began  to  break  down 
in  the  sixth  century,  B.  C,  in  Greece.  It  was  superseded  by  the  social 
tie  of  a  common  religious  faith  and  ritual.  The  Pythagorean  and 
Orphic  sects  developed  this  tie."34  The  religious  bond  succeeded  the 
kin  tie  in  this  case.  The  well-knit  state  or  polls  seems  to  have  come 
even  later.  At  any  rate,  civil  units  come  later  than  kin  units,  and 
grow  out  of  them.  The  Eskimos  now  have  no  civil  organization  out- 
side of  the  family.  But  it  is  only  in  backward  areas  that  no  larger 
unit  than  that  of  the  family  has  arisen.  A  process  of  integration  has 
been  working,  and  it  is  a  process  which  has  resulted  in  nations.  Spencer 
speaks  on  this  point,  "  ....  In  the  earliest  stage  of  civiliza- 
tion, when  the  repulsive  force  is  strong  and  the  aggressive  force  weak, 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  87 

only  small  communities  are  possible ;  a  modification  of  character  causes 
these  tribes,  and  satrapies,  and  gentes  and  feudal  lordships,  and  clans, 
to  coalesce  into  nations."35  Friction  and  growing  interests  between 
families  would  in  some  cases  draw  them  together  into  a  tribe;  the 
same  process  would  draw  tribes  into  a  nation.  The  conception  that 
holds  these  societies  together  is  that  of  a  common  well-being.  But  the 
conception  first  arose  in  a  natural  group,  the  family,  and  was  gradu- 
ally extended  through  the  tribe  and  up  to  the  nation.  Green  points 
out  that  while  force  has  been  used  in  the  formation  of  states,  "it  has 
only  formed  states  as  it  has  operated  in  and  through  a  pre-existing 
medium  of  political,  or  tribal,  or  family  rights."38  A  people  is  a 
natural  product  of  natural  forces.  It  at  least  is  not  an  artificial  crea- 
tion. 

Now  a  nation  is  formed  when  a  people  is  organized  under  an  insti- 
tution, a  state.  What  of  the  state?  Is  it  an  artificial  creation?  It  is 
charged  that  states  come  to  be  ends  in  themselves,  cut  themselves  off 
from  the  people,  and  cause  wars  over  artificial  values. 

Some  philosophers,  those  who  uphold  the  high  sovereignty  of  the 
state,  in  capital  letters,  really  identify  the  state  with  the  nation.  If 
this  view  be  accepted  the  whole  case  of  the  critics  of  the  state  as  arti- 
ficial is,  of  course,  at  once  disposed  of.  But  the  state  is  not  identical 
with  the  nation.  A  state  may  embrace  several  nations.  The  British 
empire  is  such  a  super-national  state.  The  state  is  an  institutional 
organization.  And  yet  there  is  good  ground  upon  which  to  maintain 
that  the  state  is  not  an  artificial  creation.  As  a  people  is  a  growth 
so  also  is  the  state.  It  is  true,  as  is  sometimes  asserted,  that  states 
can  be  made  in  a  day  and  that  there  can  be  artificial  states,  that  is, 
states  not  resting  upon  a  homogeneous  people,  but  it  is  not  true  that 
the  state  was  made  in  a  day.  As  a  people,  the  raw  material  of  a  nation, 
grew  out  of  the  family  and  tribe  units,  so  the  state  which  is  the  insti- 
tution of  a  people,  grew  out  of  the  political  institutions  of  the  family 
and  the  tribe.  The  first  institutions  of  men,  as  for  instance  that  of 
the  family,  were  probably  the  result  of  natural  unreflective  coopera- 
tion. They  resulted  almost  as  do  the  effects  of  a  natural  law.  The 
actions  which  gave  rise  to  them  were  in  a  way  like  the  tropisms  of 
primitive  organisms.  "Genuinely  primitive  association  must  have  been 
blind,  without  forethought  of  advantage  to  those  participating."87 
Upon  these  unreflective  associations  states  grew,  also  without  fore- 
thought on  the  whole,  although  some  reflection  no  doubt  entered  into 
the  process.    Spencer  says,  "Men  did  not  deliberately  establish  politi- 


88  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

cal  arrangements,  but  grew  into  them  unconsciously — probably  had 
no  conception  of  an  associated  condition  until  they  found  themselves 
in  it."38  Men  did  not  go  about  it  deliberately  to  form  a  state  as  rep- 
resented in  the  contract  theory  of  Hobbes,  but  waked  up  to  find  they 
were  in  a  state  which  had  grown  out  of  their  actions  in  pursuance  of 
satisfaction  for  their  needs.  The  state  did  not  precede  man's  political 
character,  but  arose  out  of  it.  Men  recognized  common  rights  and 
duties,  and  the  state  arose  in  their  efforts  to  safeguard  and  give  ex- 
pression to  them.  Thus  Green  says,  "The  state,  or  the  sovereign  as  a 
characteristic  institution  of  the  state,  does  not  create  rights,  but  gives 
fuller  reality  to  rights  already  existing.  It  secures  and  extends  the 
exercise  of  powers,  which  men,  influenced  in  dealing  with  each  other 
by  an  idea  of  common  good,  had  recognized  in  each  other  as  capable 
of  direction  to  that  common  good,  and  had  already  in  a  certain 
measure  secured  to  each  other  in  consequence  of  that  recognition." 88 

The  maturity  of  nations  has  come  in  the  modern  period.  Likewise 
patriotism,  in  the  strong  degree  in  which  we  know  it,  is  comparatively 
modern.  The  United  States,  Germany,  Italy  are  modern  states.  Tribal 
loyalty  was  once  the  strongest  bond.  But  the  tribe  settled  down  to 
and  came  to  rule  a  definite  extent  of  territory.  Localized  tribes  formed 
small  units  of  government.  The  government  was  not  the  representa- 
tive of  the  will  of  the  whole  people,  but  expressed  the  will  of  the  man 
or  small  group  of  men  strong  enough  to  possess  the  seat  of  authority. 
Gradually  government  became  more  representative.  In  time  small 
states  arose.  There  were  such  city-states  as  Athens.  These  small 
states  did  not  organize  all  the  people  of  the  same  race  as  those  under 
their  jurisdiction.  And  when  they  were  enlarged  by  conquest,  they 
were  representative  of  only  a  comparatively  small  group  near  the  seat 
of  government.  All  conquests  were  ruled  from  the  outside  and  from 
the  height  of  superior  power.  This  power  became  capable  of  tremen- 
dous extension.  The  city  of  Rome  became  ruler  of  a  large  empire. 
Then  ensued  the  mediaeval  period  in  which  the  notion  of  catholicity 
was  dominant,  and  in  whose  political  thinking  the  all-inclusive  and 
sovereign  empire  was  the  ideal.  The  period  of  nationalism  had  not 
yet  come.  The  empires  of  Rome  and  of  Charlemagne  were  not  na- 
tions. Their  strength  depended  not  upon  the  spirit  of  the  whole,  but 
upon  the  existence  of  a  strong  force  at  the  center.  The  fact  should 
be  noted  that  the  dialectic  toward  nationalism  has  not  been  in  a  simple 
straight  line.  Sometimes  there  have  been  cases  of  dissolution  on  the 
part  of  large  and  strong  integrations  of  government.       But  on  the 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  89 

whole  there  is  a  pretty  clear  movement  toward  larger  and  larger  gov- 
ernmental integrations,  and  these  integrations  have  in  the  main  been 
forced  to  follow  the  building  up  of  peoples.  The  mediaeval  empires 
fell.  The  papacy  became  distrusted  as  a  corrupt  and  tyrannical  foreign 
power.  The  bloody  chaos  of  feudalism  became  unbearable.  The  Cru- 
sades acquainted  men  with  others  who  were  like  or  unlike  themselves. 
The  Renaissance  heightened  the  emotions  of  men,  and  prepared  the 
soil  for  nationalistic  passion.  Peoples  became  welded  together,  and  at 
the  beginning  of  the  modern  period  nations  emerged  which  took  up 
into  themselves  the  feudalistic  establishments  and  city-states  which  had 
flourished  during  the  Middle  Ages.  These  nations  met  the  needs  of 
men,  and  persisted.  They  entrenched  themselves,  and  gathered  force. 
Thus  they  came  to  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  when  the 
spirit  of  nationalism  was  fanned  into  a  consuming  flame  by  the  wars 
of  Napoleon,  and  when  again  the  nationalistic  passion  was  ministered 
to  by  the  romantic  movement  which  aroused  once  more  the  emotional 
side  of  human  nature.  The  crowning  height  of  the  process  has  been 
reached  at  the  present  time  when  the  Great  War  has  made  nationalistic 
loyalty  the  ruling  passion  of  mankind. 

A  state,  then,  is  the  outgrowth  of  the  life  of  a  people.  The  people 
is  a  growth,  and  the  state  is  an  institution  which  has  grown  along  with 
the  people.  Therefore  it  would  seem  as  if  there  were  good  indica- 
tions for  calling  each  of  them  real. 

What  makes  a  nation?  The  elements  of  a  nation  show  both  ob- 
jective reality  and  inner  unity.  There  are,  roughly,  three  things  which 
enter  into  the  makeup  of  a  country.  The  first  of  these  is  a  people 
with  a  common  language,  customs,  traditions,  history,  and  land  with 
its  associations.  Sometimes  religion  has  been  an  element.  In  the 
case  of  cultured  peoples,  literature  has  also  been  such.  "The  dawn 
of  English  nationality  coincided  with  the  dawn  of  a  truly  English 
literature."  *°  We  have  already  seen  how  such  a  people  grows.  It  is 
a  natural  group;  it  is  based  on  instinctive  association  and  the  stress 
of  the  struggle  for  existence.  The  instincts  of  patriotism  are  them- 
selves instrumental  in  forming  the  objective  basis  of  patriotism.  They 
make  for  the  solidarity  of  a  people.  This  people  doesn't  have  to  be- 
long to  one  race,  for  it  may  be  made  up  of  a  fusion  of  races.  There 
may  be  a  diversity  of  classes  and  interests  within  the  nation.  It 
does  not  have  to  be  absolutely  homogeneous,  for  only  a  very  small 
group  indeed  could  be  such.  Similars  do  not  constitute  a  nation.  A 
country  is  a  qualitative  individual.    A  unity  can  be  obtained  in  di- 


90  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

verse  elements.  The  things  that  have  been  named  seem  to  be  suffi- 
cient to  weld  together  such  a  unity,  a  people.  A  people  is  an  objective 
reality,  and  one  of  the  bases  of  a  nation. 

The  second  element  is  an  organization,  an  institution,  in  other 
words,  a  state.  The  Poles  have  a  common  language,  customs,  tradi- 
tions, and  land,  but  they  have  no  government  of  their  own,  and  do  not 
form  a  nation.  A  nation  comes  into  being  when  a  state  is  formed  by 
a  people.  The  state,  if  a  true  one,  grows  out  of  the  life  of  the  people, 
and  is  to  the  people  what  the  body  is  to  the  soul.  The  state  and  the 
people  form  a  unity.  Moreover,  the  institution  is  just  as  real  as  the 
people  and  their  desires,  and  with  the  people  forms  the  objective  basis 
of  a  nation. 

The  third  element  is  that  of  a  common  consciousness.  This  is 
built  upon  and  implied  in  the  conditions  already  named.  A  people 
and  a  state  are  both  external  and  internal  facts.  The  raw  material  of 
which  they  are  formed  is  external  and  objective.  But  that  raw  mate- 
rial does  not  come  to  its  full  meaning  until  there  is  added  to  it  a  con- 
sciousness in  which  it  is  taken  up  in  unity.  There  would  really  be  no 
unified  people  and  no  state,  as  the  expression  of  united  political  life, 
in  spite  of  the  external  elements  which  are  necessary  to  the  being  of 
people  and  state,  unless  there  existed  in  the  individuals'  minds  a  com- 
mon consciousness  or  consciousness  of  community.  The  very  existence 
of  a  common  language  testifies  to  the  existence  of  a  common  con- 
sciousness, as  do  common  customs,  traditions,  history,  literature,  and 
ideals.  A  land  even  is  something  which  a  people  possesses,  and  which 
furnishes  a  common  bond  between  the  individuals  of  the  group.  There 
was  a  time  when  the  land  was  literally  a  common  possession,  in  the 
sense  that  there  was  no  private  property,  but  ownership  is  not  the  only 
way  in  which  a  people  can  have  a  common  interest  in  the  land;  there 
may  be  many  associations  besides  that  of  common  ownership  con- 
nected with  it.  Esthetic  appreciation  is  one  of  them.  Affection  for 
the  scenes  of  childhood  is  another.  Esenwein,  in  describing  the  art 
of  Gogol,  the  Russian  author,  uses  the  following  phrases:  "Rarely  do 
power  and  delicacy  unite  in  a  stylist  as  they  do  in  Gogol,  For  the 
one  [power],  we  may  find  an  origin  in  his  love  for  the  sun-steeped 
and  snow-blown  plains  of  his  native  Cossack  country.  .  .  .  "tt 
What  gifted  writers  have  felt  other  more  common  folk  have  felt  also. 

These  things,  then,  imply  a  common  consciousness.  This  con- 
sciousness is  a  recognition  and  ratification  of  existing  interrelationships, 
and  such  a  community  of  thought  and  feeling  and  will  is   funda- 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  91 

mentally  important  in  the  unity  of  a  nation.  "No  mere  interaction 
will  constitute  a  social  relation.  Nor  yet  an  interaction  of  otherwise 
self-conscious  agents.  Not  merely  must  each  agent  know  himself, 
he  must  know  the  others  ....  Unless  there  be  on  both  sides 
a  perfect  consciousness  of  self  and  of  other,  and  of  the  relations  of 
self  and  other — in  a  word,  perfect  mutual  understanding — there  will 
be,  so  far,  no  completely  social  relation.  A  social  relation  is  a  self- 
conscious  relation In  other  words,  society  is  constituted 

by  mutual  understanding."42  This  understanding  is  that  which  en- 
ables the  group  to  act  as  one.  "Through  this  mutual  knowledge  the 
group,  like  the  individual,  is  enabled  to  assert  itself  as  an  independent 
force."  "  Mazzini  understood  that  the  unity  of  a  country  rested  upon 
a  sense  of  oneness  in  the  minds  of  the  people:  "Country  is  not  a  mere 
zone  of  territory.  The  true  country  is  the  Idea  to  which  it  gives  birth; 
it  is  the  thought  of  love,  the  sense  of  communion  which  unites  in  one 
all  the  sons  of  that  territory."  **  Here  we  get  a  suggestion  regarding 
the  unity  of  Switzerland.  It  is,  in  large  part,  a  unity  in  idea.  That 
is  not  saying  that  it  has  no  objective  basis.  The  Swiss  have  a  com- 
mon land  and  other  bonds  of  oneness.  But  the  strongest  bond  seems 
to  be  that  of  a  conception  of  common  welfare.  The  unity  of  Switzer- 
land has,  of  course,  been  stimulated  from  without.  One  of  the  most 
potent  reasons  for  Swiss  unity  is  that  of  necessity  for  defence.  They 
must  be  one  to  preserve  their  freedom.  But  the  fact  is  that  what- 
ever the  stimulus  was,  whatever  the  difficulties  that  stood  in  the  way, 
however  diverse  the  original  materials  may  have  been,  the  Swiss  are 
now  one  in  the  beliefs  of  the  individual  members  of  the  nation,  and 
that  feeling  of  communion  is  actually  unity  in  fact. 

It  is  true,  then,  that  in  one  way  the  essence  of  an  institution  is  in 
idea.  "Perhaps  the  Identical,  in  this  matter  of  groups,  is  neither  a 
real  person  nor  a  nominalist  fiction.  Let  us  call  it  an  idea.  .  .  "** 
All  true  unity  is  really  contributed  by  the  mind.  The  external  falls 
apart,  and  becomes  a  mere  congeries  and  not  a  unity  when  not  held 
together  in  idea.  The  external  elements  form  the  materials  for  a  unity; 
they  make  up  the  basis  of  an  institution;  they  aid  in  giving  rise  to  a 
common  consciousness;  but  it  is  the  common  consciousness  itself  that 
is  the  essence  of  the  unity.  In  this  way  the  will  to  individuality  as 
an  inner  fact  will  in  turn  make  for  individuality  in  objective  reality. 
Only,  it  should  be  noted  on  the  other  hand,  when  the  unity  is  based 
on  external  grounds,  it  is  not  a  mere  fiction,  and  is  not  left  up  in  the 
air. 


92  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

To  have  a  common  consciousness,  the  individuals  of  a  group  do  not 
have  to  be  acquainted  by  sense  experience  with  all  their  land  or  its 
people.  Imagination  and  sympathy  are  means  by  which  men  feel 
themselves  one  of  a  society  and  parts  of  an  institution.  And  if,  even 
after  imagination  and  sympathy  have  come  to  one's  help,  a  country  and 
its  ideals  are  said  to  be  abstract  and  vague,  even  so,  it  is  such  abstract 
things  that  become  a  cause,  and  it  is  such  vague  ideals  that  have  the 
greatest  motive  power.  They  possess  us.  We  think  with  them  rather 
than  of  them,  and  they  become  a  spirit  in  which  we  approach  all 
things.  It  is  not  necessary  that  we  should  have  an  exact  formula  of 
them  in  order  to  make  them  real.  Realities  do  not  only  then  come 
to  exist  when  we  have  a  clear-cut  formula  for  them,  nor  do  ideas 
first  have  being  when  they  are  put  into  formal  expression. 

One  quest  of  men  has  been,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  to  create 
for  themselves  a  unified  world.  In  doing  this  they  have,  among  other 
things,  formed  themselves  into  nations.  Nations  have  met  their  needs, 
and  helped  them  to  feel  at  home  in  their  world.  Countries  are  real, 
and  come  close  home.  With  this  in  mind  we  can  appreciate  the  feel- 
ing of  the  traveler  abroad  who  has  a  sense  of  the  wholeness  of  his 
home-land  and  longs  for  it.  The  following  quotation  is  an  illustra- 
tion of  this  feeling  at  the  same  time  that  it  catalogues  some  of  the 
elements  that  go  into  the  makeup  of  a  country.  "Every  time  his 
passport  is  presented,  every  time  he  enters  a  new  dominion  or  crosses 
a  new  frontier,  every  time  he  is  delayed  at  the  custom-house,  or 
questioned  by  a  policeman,  or  challenged  by  a  sentinel,  every  time  he 
is  perplexed  by  a  new  language,  or  puzzled  by  a  new  variety  of  coin- 
age or  currency, — he  thanks  his  God  with  fresh  fervency  that  through 
all  the  length  and  breadth  of  that  land,  beyond  the  swelling  floods, 
which  he  is  privileged  and  proud  to  call  his  own  land,  there  is  a  com- 
mon language,  a  common  currency,  a  common  Constitution,  common 
laws  and  liberties,  a  common  inheritance  of  glory  from  the  past,  and, 
if  it  be  only  true  to  itself,  a  common  destiny  of  glory  for  the  fu- 
ture!"46 

Is  there  anything  to  indicate  that  the  organizing  principles  of  a 
nation  are  permanently  necessary  ones?  The  ultimate  existence  and 
value  of  patriotism  will  be  involved  in  the  answer  to  that  question. 
Is  patriotism  called  for  by  the  fundamental  order  of  reality? 

One  of  the  essential  centers  of  life  is  a  community,  a  neighborhood, 
those  who  live  near  enough  to  one  another  that  the  interests  of  their 
lives  are  closely  interwoven  by  the  fact  of  association  in  space.    This 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  93 

would  seem  to  be  a  self-evident  proposition.  Mazzini  hit  the  truth 
when  he  said  that  mankind  had  been  placed  in  groups  or  nuclei  upon 
the  face  of  the  earth.  The  community  is  an  irreducible  minimum  of 
association  among  mankind.  It  is  a  permanent  association,  and  the 
sentiments  that  grow  out  of  it  will  be  permanent.  There  is  true 
reason  why  one  of  the  fundamental  virtues  is  that  of  being  a  good 
neighbor.  And  Veblen  was  right  in  saying,  "Even  with  no  patriotism, 
love  of  country,  and  use  and  wont  as  it  runs  in  one's  home  area  and 
among  one's  own  people,  would  not  pass."47  Patriotism  seems  to  be 
vitally  connected  with  a  permanent  sentiment,  community  spirit. 

A  community  is  attached  to  the  soil.  It  has  its  basis  in  a  local 
area.  That  is  what  makes  a  community.  In  other  words,  it  is  organ- 
ized upon  the  geographical  principle.  The  geographical  principle  is 
one  of  the  permanently  necessary  principles  of  human  association. 
Now  a  nation  is  so  associated.  A  country  must  have  a  territory,  and 
it  is  the  only  institution  of  which  this  can  be  said.  "A  nation  .... 
is  primarily  a  group  of  men  and  women  related  physically.  .  .  . 
The  state  represents  not  the  common  interests  of  those  who  are  intel- 
lectual, or  musical,  or  religious,  but  chiefly  the  common  interest  of 
those  who  live  in  the  same  district."48  Patriotism  is  loyalty  to  one's 
native  land.  At  least  one  fundamental  principle  of  a  country  is  a  per- 
manent one,  the  geograohical  principle.  We  have  here  a  suggestion 
as  to  why  the  soil  is  so  important  in  patriotism.  Patriotism  is  nour- 
ished by  the  soil.  The  soil  not  only  is  what  sustains  the  vital  eco- 
nomic interests  of  those  who  live  upon  it,  but  is  the  basis  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  nation  itself.  Without  the  land,  and  land  is  country, 
there  would  be  no  patriotism. 

There  has  arisen  of  late  the  contention  that  it  would  be  better  to 
do  away  with  the  geographical  principle  of  government.  Russell 
says,  "There  is  no  reason  why  all  governmental  units  should  be  geo- 
graphical." 49  It  is  felt  that  if  geographical  frontiers  were  destroyed 
the  cause  of  peace  would  be  furthered.  "When  civil  war  breaks  out 
in  a  country,  no  real  fighting  is  possible  until  the  contending  factions 
are  organized  on  separate  territory."  ™  It  is  worse  when  trouble  with 
another  country  arises.  "In  domestic  affairs  we  live  with  and  know 
the  men  who  disagree  with  us;  in  foreign  affairs  the  opposition  lives 
behind  a  frontier,  and  probably  speaks  a  different  language."81  But 
it  is  not  clear  that  we  shall  gain  anything  by  heeding  these  sugges- 
tions to  obliterate  national  frontiers.  The  substitute  planned  is  that 
of  syndicalistic  organizations.     But  under  such  an  arrangement  fron- 


94  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

tiers  would  be  infinitely  multiplied.  Men  of  conflicting  loyalties  and 
interests  would  be  in  touch  everywhere.  It  would  simply  be  an  ex- 
change of  one  antagonism  for  another.  And  class  wars  would  be  no 
better  than  nationalistic  wars.  It  would  be  no  better  to  have  class 
against  class  than  nation  against  nation.  So  what  we  come  back  to 
is  governmental  organization  upon  the  geographical  principle.  And 
this  means  that  we  come  back  to  some  such  unit  as  the  nation.  And 
why  not?  Environment  makes  people  alike,  and  to  have  a  homogene- 
ous people  is  one  of  the  necessities  of  a  successful  government.  More- 
over, we  must  form  an  attachment  somewhere,  else  live  entirely  alone. 
And  it  is  right  to  begin  where  we  are. 

"God  gave  all  men  all  earth  to  love, 
But  since  our  hearts  are  small, 
Ordained  for  each  one  spot  should  prove 
Beloved  over  all." 

We  have  said  that  the  territorial  arrangement  is  an  inescapable 
one  in  government,  and  that  the  community  is  a  unit  below  which  we 
cannot  go.  But  there  cannot  help  but  be  interests  growing  up  between 
communities.  And  historically  these  interests  have  led  to  association 
of  communities.  Rivalry  and  friction  arise.  War  follows.  The 
mediaeval  city-states  fought  with  one  another.  New  York  and  New 
Jersey  are  rivals;  the  writer  recalls  one  occasion  when  New  Jersey 
was  threatening  suit  against  New  York  for  befouling  the  Hudson 
River.  The  only  safeguard  against  internecine  warfare  between  com- 
munities is  a  more  comprehensive  power.  So  a  larger  unit  grows. 
And  these  units  must  be  still  further  integrated.  The  process  will  not 
stop  until  it  comes  to  the  nation  with  its  government,  the  state.  How 
much  further  it  will  go  will  be  disclosed  by  future  events. 

Is  the  state  a  permanently  necessary  institution?  The  principle 
of  integration  embodied  in  the  state  is  a  fundamental  one.  It  is  the 
principle  of  cooperation  for  cooperation.  The  good  of  any  institu- 
tion is  that  of  cooperation  for  some  end.  The  primary  end  of  the 
state  is  that  of  cooperation  itself.  Its  purpose  is  that  of  enabling 
men  to  live  and  work  together  in  peace.  Loyalty  to  the  national 
group  is  loyalty  to  the  principle  of  human  cooperation.  The  most 
valuable  thing  about  the  state  is  not  that  it  does  this  or  that,  but  that 
it  gets  men  working  together.  It  provides  the  setting  for  further  co- 
operation.   In  its  protection  against  enemies  either  within  or  without 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  95 

the  group,  it  is  acting  to  keep  the  cooperation  of  the  members  of  the 
group  from  being  interfered  with. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  the  state  is  essentially  a  peace  unit.  There 
are  those  who  deny  this.  There  are  two  theories  of  the  state.  One 
is  that  it  is  a  peace  unit.  The  other  is  that  it  is  a  war  unit.  It  is, 
according  to  this  latter  view,  organized  for  the  waging  of  war.  Be- 
cause of  this  latter  view  there  has  been  of  late  a  great  deal  of  opposi- 
tion to  and  criticism  of  the  state.  It  is  alleged  that  all  the  other 
things  besides  fighting  which  the  state  once  did  have  been  taken  over 
by  other  agencies  better  fitted  to  do  them,  and  that  really  the  only 
thing  which  the  state  now  has  as  its  purpose  is  that  of  declaring  and 
making  war.  The  citizens  cooperate  in  the  state  only  when  they  have 
a  fight  on  with  another  state.  But  it  may  be  replied  that  it  is  hardly 
fair  to  charge  all  our  troubles  in  war  to  the  state.  Wars  have  been 
waged  where  there  was  no  state  in  the  modern  sense;  they  have  been 
carried  on  by  other  agencies  than  states;  and  states  have  lived  to- 
gether peaceably.  Savage  individuals,  savage  tribes,  feudal  barons 
have  all  fought.  Race  riots  have  given  vent  to  hatred.  Representa- 
tives of  labor  and  capital  have  fought  pitched  battles.  The  United 
States  and  Canada  have  lived  side  by  side  without  ever  having  found 
it  necessary  to  declare  war  or  even  fortify  the  frontier. 

And  the  state  is  really  a  peace  unit.  It  exists  primarily  for  the 
purpose  of  keeping  order  within  the  area  of  its  jurisdiction.  It  be- 
comes apparent  here  how  some  of  the  beliefs  of  patriotism  are  well- 
founded.  The  state  is  needed  as  the  protector  of  one's  self.  In  the 
Middle  Ages,  in  the  absence  of  any  other  agency  to  provide  protection, 
there  grew  up  voluntary  associations,  founded  and  operated  usually 
by  warriors,  and  called  regna,  whose  business  it  was  to  keep  the  peace. 
Here  was  an  attempt  to  do  the  work  of  the  state.  But  the  attempt 
failed,  and  there  are  now  no  such  organizations.  One  would  not  miss 
the  mark  far  in  hazarding  the  opinion  that  they  failed  because  they 
did  not  represent  a  peace  unit  composed  of  an  integrated  people  occu- 
pying a  given  extent  of  territory.  What  has  been  said  here  would  indi- 
cate that  what  we  need  to  do  is  so  to  extend  the  integration  of  society 
that  the  whole  world  will  be  a  peace  unit.  The  whole  problem  of 
keeping  peace  should  be  made  an  internal  problem.  There  should  be 
no  foes  without. 

The  state  is  the  ultimate  protector  of  all  the  values  of  life.  The 
citizen  was  right  when  he  believed  that  his  earthly  salvation  depended 
upon  his  state.    The  state  itself  does  not  usually  furnish  the  goods  of 


96  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

life,  although  it  does  on  occasion  furnish  them.  That  is  not  its  pri- 
mary business.  It  does  not  even  guarantee  the  goods  of  life.  Much, 
of  course,  depends  upon  the  individual  himself.  But  the  just  state 
does  ultimately  protect  the  individual  in  all  rightful  opportunities  in 
which  he  as  an  individual  or  in  voluntary  association  with  others 
cannot  protect  himself.  The  civilized  life  itself  at  present  depends 
upon  the  state.  The  very  word  "civilization"  is  derived  from  a  term 
meaning  "state."  It  is  that  which  is  possible  where  there  is  a  settled 
order  provided  by  the  state.  One  can  imagine  what  the  state  means 
if  he  pictures  himself  at  the  fringe  of  civilization  where  he  would 
miss  the  many  values  of  life  which  the  state  makes  possible.  The 
state  does  its  work  for  the  most  part  noiselessly,  but  it  is  just  because 
it  is  so  efficient  that  it  is  so  noiseless.  We  are  not  conscious  of  its 
working,  and  therefore  assume  that  it  is  otiose.  But  it  is  with  us 
all  the  time,  and  providing  the  opportunity  for  all  the  values  of  life. 
The  state  is  a  kind  of  second  nature  which  does  not  guarantee  happy 
living,  but  offers  the  opportunities  for  such  a  life. 

The  state  does,  however,  go  beyond  its  primary  purpose.  It  has 
not,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  been  restricted  purely  to  acting  the  part  of 
policeman  or  night-watchman.  Philosophers  have  disputed  a  good 
deal  about  the  functions  of  the  state.  But  when  all  is  said  and  done 
it  has  been  found  necessary  for  the  state  to  engage  in  some  activities 
which  were  not  purely  those  of  providing  protection,  but  were  de- 
signed to  promote  positively  the  general  welfare.  The  state  truly,  as 
Aristotle  said,  even  though  it  has  originated  in  the  bare  needs  of  life, 
has  continued  for  the  sake  of  the  good  life.  The  state  strives  to  aid 
men  in  a  positive  way.  Some  community  interests  thought  to  be  in 
the  province  of  the  state  are  those  of  education,  transportation,  com- 
munication, sanitation,  taxation,  and  the  maintenance  of  economic  jus- 
tice. And  this  positive  character  of  the  state's  functions  renders 
patriotism  all  the  more  strongly  entrenched. 

As  already  has  been  intimated,  syndicalistic  organizations  are  be- 
ing put  forward  as  rivals  of  the  state.  Industry  is  one  of  the  chief 
interests  of  men,  and  is  especially  virulent  at  the  present  time.  There 
are  those  who  would  organize  society  according  to  occupation.  And 
when  society  was  completely  organized  in  this  way  there  would  be, 
so  it  is  thought,  no  further  excuse  for  the  existence  of  the  state.  All 
the  legitimate  common  concerns  of  men  would  be  taken  care  of  by 
syndicalistic  organizations.  The  economic  arguments  for  or  against 
syndicalism   are   of   secondary   importance   in   this   connection;     the 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  97 

point  of  interest  is  that  which  bears  on  syndicalism  as  a  principle  of 
government.  Graham  Wallas  has  studied  these  questions.  He  points 
to  the  mediaeval  experience  under  the  guild  system.  He  says  that 
quarrels  between  the  crafts  were  rife,  as  were  quarrels  between  the 
craftsmen  and  the  merchants;  that  the  people  hated  strangers  as 
well  as  the  police;  that  the  public  health  was  neglected;  and  that  the 
cities  found  it  impossible  to  keep  order  in  their  own  streets  during  a 
trade  dispute. M  The  fact  is  that  the  growth  of  power  on  the  part  of 
Labor  and  Capital  and  the  conflicts  arising  because  of  that  power 
render  the  state  more  necessary  rather  than  less  so. 

There  is  a  true  sense  in  which  the  state  embodies  the  general  will. 
It  is,  in  the  area  of  its  jurisdiction,  the  representatives  not  of  a  class,  / 
but  of  all  the  people  living  in  that  area.  It  is  the  repository  of  the 
collective  will  of  its  citizens.  Therefore,  it  is  fitted  to  keep  the  peace, 
and  to  be  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  peace,  the  user  of  force.  The 
cry  has  been  raised,  "Why  is  the  state  armed?  No  other  institution 
feels  it  necessary  to  be  equipped  with  an  armament."  But  the  truth 
is  that  it  is  just  because  the  state  is  armed  that  no  other  institution 
needs  to  be.  One  police  force  is  enough.  We  shall  always  need  the 
state  to  keep  other  institutions  in  harmony.  And  institutions  which 
exist  for  other  purposes  than  that  of  the  maintenance  of  law  and 
order  will  have  to  submit  to  regulation  by  the  state  for  the  sake  of  law 
and  order.  It  will  be  the  state's  business,  among  other  things,  to  main- 
tain a  democracy  of  institutions. 

The  state,  because  of  the  generality  of  its  character,  plays  an  im- 
portant role  in  federating  the  loyalties  of  men.  Economic  interests, 
religious  interests,  and  so  on,  do  not  exhaust  the  catalogue  of  human 
activities.  Each  individual  will  have  touch  with  other  individuals  with 
whom  he  would  not  outside  the  state  be  organized  in  any  institution. 
One  may  have  a  neighbor  who  is  of  another  trade  or  church.  The 
state  brings  one  into  a  common  life  with  his  neighbors.  The  state's 
character  as  a  power  helps  it  to  occupy  this  role  as  federator  of  loyal- 
ties. It  is  back  of  all  the  institutions  of  life;  it  sustains  them.  Con- 
sequently the  loyalties  given  to  the  other  institutions  tend  to  head  up 
in  the  state.  It  is  a  universal,  too,  because  its  unifying  principle,  that 
of  space,  is  so  universal.  Such  a  principle  is  very  general,  and  may 
be  empty  unless  enriched  by  many  differentiations  within  itself;  the 
life  that  it  unifies  may  be  very  meagre  without  those  differentiations, 
but  generality  is  akin  to  universality,  and  just  because  the  principle 
is  so  general,  it  may  act  as  a  unifier  of  many  in  one.    A  loyalty  that 


98  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

shall  be  an  organizer  of  all  loyalties  is  needed.  For  the  individual, 
even  after  he  is  a  member  of  all  the  voluntary  organizations  to  which 
he  is  eligible,  there  ought  to  be  that  which  will  unify  his  whole  life. 
So  likewise  there  ought  to  be  that  which  will  unify  the  whole  of  man- 
kind. The  state  and  the  church  seem  to  be  the  only  institutions  which 
in  ideal  are  capable  of  achieving  these  results.  And  at  the  present 
time  we  seem  nearer  a  universal  political  than  religious  unification  of 
mankind.  Human  nature  is  a  long  way  from  being  ready  to  warrant 
putting  one's  trust  in  it  as  the  guarantee  of  peace  and  justice  because 
each  human  being  loves  his  neighbor  as  himself.  At  any  rate,  the 
state  will  have  a  fundamental  purpose  as  an  integration  of  mankind 
for  so  long  a  time  to  come  that  it  may  be  said  to  be  permanently 
necessary.  The  character  of  the  state  as  being  the  condition  of  all 
the  values  of  civilized  life,  the  embodiment  of  the  general  will,  and 
the  federator  of  human  loyalties,  throws  light  upon  the  phenomenon 
that  when  the  state  calls  the  individual  every  other  loyalty  must  go. 

The  state  seems  still  to  be  entitled  to  its  place  in  the  sun.  But 
we  must  keep  ourselves  at  the  point  where  we  can  criticize  our  political 
loyalties.  Some  states  on  occasion  need  reform.  The  morality  of 
nations  must  be  criticized.  States  have  grown  in  response  to  the  needs 
of  human  beings.  They  must  be  kept  subservient  to  those  needs. 
The  state  is  not  divine.  There  is  no  divine  right  of  kings,  and  there 
is  no  divine  right  of  states,  except  as  these  institutions  meet  the  real 
needs  of  real  human  beings.  The  state  has  justified  its  existence, 
but  that  doesn't  mean  that  the  existence  of  any  particular  kind  of 
state  is  justified. 

In  other  words,  patriotism  seems  to  be  necessitated  by  the  funda- 
mental order  of  reality.  Its  existence  is  justified.  Patriotism  is  essen- 
tially a  fundamental  human  good.  But  that  fact  doesn't  justify  all 
that  is  found  in  patriotism.  Consequently,  the  problem  is  not  only 
to  evaluate  patriotism  as  an  essential  ideal,  but  also  to  criticize  the 
faults  and  virtues  of  its  different  forms.  Something  of  that  criticism 
will  be  the  effort  of  the  concluding  chapter. 


CHAPTER   X 

The  Ethical  Value  of  Patriotism  in  the  Concrete 

Patriotism  serves  a  necessary  purpose,  and  is  therefore  a  funda- 
mental human  good.  In  some  form  it  is  existentially  necessary.  The 
problem  of  patriotism  now  becomes,  then,  "What  is  its  form  to  be?" 
For  patriotism  as  it  actually  appears  in  persons  and  nations  is  not 
all  good.  It  may  be,  as  an  individual  possession,  morally  colorless. 
There  are  barnacles  attached  to  the  ship  of  state.  Zimmermann  made 
a  keen  remark  when  he  said,  "The  love  of  one's  country,  however  ex- 
tolled, is,  in  many  cases,  no  more  than  the  love  of  an  ass  for  its  stall."  M 
It  may  be  either  noble  or  narrow.  There  is  a  higher  and  lower  patriot- 
ism. It  depends  on  how  it  expresses  itself.  Before  the  ethical  value 
of  nationalistic  loyalty  can  be  fully  determined  it  must  be  looked  at  in 
its  concrete  forms.  The  varying  motives  and  effects  of  patriotism 
must  be  considered. 

Why  is  patriotism  noble?  The  reason  why  it  has  been  popularly 
extolled  is  that  it  is  a  form  of  unselfishness.  There  is  hardly  another 
cause  in  the  world  today  that  calls  forth  such  heroic  self-sacrifice  as 
the  cause  of  one's  country.  Royce  included  the  state  among  the 
causes  that  have  organized  men  in  unselfish  devotion.  He  said, 
"  ....  we  have  certain  human  activities  that  do  now  already 
tend  to  the  impersonal  organization  of  the  life  of  those  engaged  in 
them.  Such  activities  are  found  in  the  work  of  art,  in  the  pursuit  of 
truth,  and  in  genuine  public  spirit.  Beauty,  Knowledge,  and  the  State, 
are  three  ideal  objects  that  do  actually  claim  from  those  who  serve 
them  harmony,  freedom  from  selfishness,  and  a  wholly  impersonal  de- 
votion." M  And  unselfishness  is  one  of  the  fundamental  human  virtues. 
It  makes  the  individual  himself  a  better  man,  and  is  most  certainly 
needed  in  the  structure  of  society. 

\  Patriotism  has  the  tendency  to  make  men  idealists.  It  is  hard 
enough  to  get  men's  thoughts  off  of  purely  material  things,  and  what- 
ever can  draw  their  devotion  to  an  ideal  cause  is,  so  far,  worth  while. 
Patriotism  has  made  for  cooperation  among  men.  The  primary 
purpose  of  the  state  is  that  of  cooperation,  that  is,  of  making  it  pos- 
sible for  men  successfully  to  live  together.  That,  on  the  face  of  it, 
is  a  noble  purpose.  And  the  state  has  actually  secured  a  larger  range 
of  cooperation  than  what  had  been  attained  before  it.    It  has  secured 


ioo  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

a  wider  range  of  peace.  It  is  a  larger  peace  unit.  Hence,  the  state 
as  an  integration  of  men  is  a  gain,  and  is  not,  if  it  is  avoidable,  to  be 
destroyed.  It  would  not,  for  instance,  be  a  gain  to  condemn  even 
Germany  to  destruction  as  long  as  any  other  mode  of  treatment  is 
possible.  Of  course  this  argument  assumes  that  the  state  is  indis- 
pensable as  an  institution  for  the  integration  of  mankind.  But  it 
really  is  indispensable.  An  irreducible  unit  of  society  is  a  community 
— those  living  in  close  contact  in  some  given  limited  territory.  Hence, 
the  territorial  principle  is  an  inescapable  one  in  the  organization  of 
society.  And,  if  so,  communities  will,  by  their  conflicts,  if  by  nothing 
else,  be  organized  into  states.  That  is  what  has  happened.  No  organi- 
zation of  society  on  any  other  plan  is  likely  to  find  it  possible  to  dis- 
pense with  the  state.  And  now,  if  the  state  is  so  necessary  and  val- 
uable in  the  organization  of  society,  patriotism  as  a  force  that  pre- 
serves the  state  and  its  benefits  is  of  value  to  men. 

But  the  relations  of  patriotism  to  war  and  internationalism  are  now 
its  most  crucial  problems.  It  is  often  argued  that  while  patriotism 
has  done  and  does  what  is  claimed  for  it,  it  has  in  large  measure  out- 
lived its  usefulness,  and  is  a  prolific  source  of  the  world's  greatest 
troubles  at  the  present  time  in  that  it  makes  for  jealousy,  conflict, 
and  war.  Patriotism  is  said  to  be  divisive,  when  thought  of  in  world 
terms.  Hasn't  it,  therefore,  outlived  its  usefulness,  and  isn't  it  time 
to  entrust  the  keeping  of  the  cooperation  of  men  to  a  still  larger  insti- 
tution that  shall  be  worldwide,  and  thus  avoid  the  conflicts  of  the 
present?  The  feeling  that  prompts  this  argument  is  embodied  in  the 
following  words:  "  ....  a  striking  factor  in  today's  thinking 
is  the  perception  of  the  immoral  consequences  of  patriotism.  We  see 
that  while  devotion  to  country  entails  the  final  sacrifice  of  self,  it  en- 
tails also  the  most  inhumane  sacrifice  of  others.  We  have  not  yet 
been  able  to  think  the  matter  out.  Distraught,  we  reverence  the  men 
who  are  dying  for  their  separate  flags  and  strain  our  eyes  beyond  the 
battlefields  for  the  oriflamme  of  internationalism."  M  It  is  evident  that 
when  countries  go  to  war,  all  cannot  be  right,  and  that  fact  puts  the 
patriots  of  some  country  in  a  false  position.  One  cannot  take  simply 
the  attitude  of  uncritical  patriotism.  The  good  man  and  the  good 
patriot  are  not  necessarily  one  and  the  same.  If  the  contrary  were 
true,  then  neither  we  nor  the  Germans  would  have  any  moral  grounds 
upon  which  to  be  indignant  at  one  another.  Not  all  causes  become 
just  simply  for  the  reason  that  one's  country  chooses  to  defend  them. 
Aristotle  called  attention  to  the  fact  of  varying  governments  in  the 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  PATRiotrsM  ^ibi 

world,  and  drew  the  following  conclusion:  "If,  then,  there  are  many 
forms  of  government,  it  is  evident  that  the  virtue  of  the  good  citizen 
cannot  be  the  one  perfect  virtue.  But  we  say  that  a  good  man  is  he 
who  has  perfect  virtue.  Hence,  it  is  evident  that  the  good  citizen 
need  not  of  necessity  possess  the  virtue  which  makes  a  good  man."88 
A  larger  view  than  that  of  uncritical  patriotism  is  therefore  needed, 
and  the  critic  says  that  such  is  just  what  the  patriot  cannot  be  ex- 
pected to  attain.  The  critic  makes  the  charge  that  the  cooperation 
that  has  been  gained  in  patriotism  is  an  obstruction  in  the  way  of  at- 
taining a  larger  cooperation.  Patriotism,  in  other  words,  is  not  a 
proper  force  for  saving  the  world.  For  one  thing,  it  contents  a  man 
with  his  own  country;  the  patriot  doesn't  strive  for  any  higher  organi- 
zation of  men,  and  so  the  spirit  of  progress  is  deadened.  Moreover, 
so  the  critic  sometimes  says,  patriotism  is  simply  a  cooperation  for 
conflict.    It  is  setting  men  at  each  other's  throats. 

It  will  have  to  be  admitted  first  of  all  that  patriotism  may  be  the 
kind  of  force  that  its  critic  describes  it  to  be.  And  if  it  were  irrev- 
ocably and  wholly  committed  to  be  such  a  spirit,  one  would  have  to 
pass  an  unfavorable  verdict  upon  it.  Whatever  its  benefits  might  other- 
wise be,  the  world  would  not  tolerate  it,  if  that  meant  to  be  forever 
confronted  with  the  possibility  of  another  conflict  such  as  the  present 
one.  It  may,  however,  be  pleaded  that  the  present  internecine  con- 
flict of  patriots  is  not  a  permanent  condition  of  mankind.  It  is  a  stage 
through  which  the  race  is  having  to  pass  in  its  development  towards 
world-wide  organization.  And  it  is  not  altogether  strange  that  in  the 
process,  patriotism  should  be  a  temporary  difficulty,  just  as  family, 
clan,  and  provincial  pride  once  were.  The  factors  making  for  a  world 
integration  have  not  yet  fully  found  themselves,  and  of  course,  are 
not  adequate  for  the  job  of  overcoming  the  prejudices  of  patriots. 
Moreover,  it  is  natural  for  any  stage  of  progress  gained  to  be  a  bar 
to  further  progress.  Each  stage  has  to  be  sharply  and  definitely  con- 
ceived in  order  to  be  reached,  but  that  in  turn  makes  it  a  bar  to  fur- 
ther development.  The  vision  of  the  next  step  simply  doesn't  come 
easily  to  men's  minds.  Moreover,  it  is  easy  for  them  to  take  achieved 
results  as  final.  Those  results  have  to  be  taken  seriously,  if  they  are 
to  yield  their  full  value.  And  besides,  a  stage  of  progress  doesn't 
know  itself  simply  as  a  link  in  a  single  logical  line  of  development; 
it  has  many  individual  interests  of  its  own, — interests  which  may  give 
it  a  tendency  to  fly  out  of  what  has  been  the  line  of  progress.  Other 
things,  too,  get  mixed  up  with  it  that  tend  to  pull  it  put  of  its  straight 


A02  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

and  narrow  path.  Patriotism  has  been  mixed  up  with  and  betrayed 
by  junkeristic,  dynastic,  and  profiteering  interests.  Patriotism  itself 
surely  should  not  have  to  bear  the  full  blame  for .  the  faults  of  those 
evil  companions,  although  patriotism,  it  must  be  admitted,  has  been 
in  bad  company.  In  the  light  of  all  the  facts,  it  seems  most  accurate 
to  say  that  patriotism  taken  as  a  whole  does  offer  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  welding  men  into  larger  peace  units.  But  after  all  they  are 
only  difficulties,  and  not  impassable  barriers.  They  are  practical 
rather  than  theoretical,  not  rational  and  necessary.  They  offer  no 
grounds  for  a  final  condemnation  of  patriotism. 

It  does  not  seem  to  be  fair,  at  any  rate,  to  say  that  patriotism  is  a 
disintegrating  factor  in  world  affairs.  There  is  no  larger  unit  of  co- 
operation that  it  is  breaking  up.  And  patriotism  can  claim  for  itself 
that  it  has  come  in  as  a  force  making  for  larger  groupings  of  men.  If 
patriotism  were  at  one  sudden  blow  stricken  out  of  the  world,  we 
should  be  set  backward  rather  than  forward  in  the  process  of  win- 
ning the  conditions  of  world  peace. 

Patriotism  cannot  be  set  down  as  an  ultimate  enemy  of  peace  on 
earth  and  good  will  among  men  because  it  sometimes  supports  a  war. 
The  purpose  of  a  state  is  not  primarily  that  of  waging  war,  but  that 
of  enabling  men  to  live  together  in  peace.  And  correspondingly 
patriotism  is  not  exclusively  or  mainly  a  war-waging  virtue.  In  fact, 
it  more  commonly  expresses  itself  as  a  peaceful  and  constructive  public 
spirit.  Patriotism,  as  matters  now  stand,  is  not  likely  to  cause  the 
opening  of  hostilities,  although  it  will  support  a  war  which  has  al- 
ready been  started.  And  it  is,  even  in  war,  usually  a  defensive 
rather  than  an  offensive  attitude.  This  is  virtually  proved  by  the  fact 
that  all  the  belligerent  countries  have  to  make  their  peoples  believe 
that  they  are  fighting  a  defensive  war.  That  is  the  way  in  which 
the  martial  spirit  of  patriots  has  to  be  appealed  to.  And  it  is  a  sig- 
nificant thing  that  such  is  the  case.  It  indicates  that  the  destruction 
of  patriotism  is  not  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  world  peace,  but 
that  the  end  may  be  secured  simply  through  the  decay  of  the  bellicose 
spirit.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  conscience  of  the  world  has  already 
undergone  great  changes  with  regard  to  war.  It  is  probable  that  the 
earliest  savage  state  was  that  of  almost  incessant  warfare.  And  in 
those  days,  it  wasn't  necessary  to  find  any  pretext  for  opening  hostili- 
ties. The  sufficient  reason  for  an  attack  was  that  the  other  group  had 
something  that  the  party  of  the  first  part  wanted.  The  earliest  stage 
of  savage,  and  even  civilized  life,  therefore,  was  one  in  which  wars 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  103 

could  quite  uniformly  be  frankly  wars  of  aggression.  The  stage  in 
which  the  present  generation  seems  to  be  living  is  that  of  "wars  of 
defense."  There  are  some  signs  that  the  next  era  will  be  that  of  peace. 
The  whole  world  is  getting  tired  of  war,  and  longing  for  international- 
ism. And,  what  is  new,  these  feelings  are  springing  up  all  over  the 
world  at  the  same  time.  Perhaps  we  are  already  in  the  transitional 
period.  At  at  rate,  it  does  not  seem  to  be  quite  accurate  to  charge 
that  patriotism  is  the  first  cause  of  wars  in  these  days.  It  is  safe  to 
say  that  the  populations  of  the  world  wanted  peace  in  1914.  Some- 
thing else  is  the  first  cause  of  wars.  A  dispute  arises  between  two 
governments,  and  patriotism,  to  be  sure,  adds  fuel  to  the  flames.  But 
patriotism  in  itself  is  for  the  most  part  peaceful  until  it  is  fanned 
into  fury. 

But  even  if  patriotism  does  go  to  war,  it  is  not  simply  for  that  to 
be  condemned  without  further  ado.  The  resistance  that  a  nation 
offers  is  often  really  a  service  to  the  cause  of  integration  in  the  world. 
For  world  cooperation  cannot  be  based  upon  world  conquest.  That 
is  not  the  way  to  a  broader  unity.  And  whoever  opposes  such  con- 
quest is  the  friend  of  true  unity.  There  can  be  such  a  thing  as  an 
integration  on  a  thoroughly  bad  principle.  A  robber  band  or  a  con- 
scienceless monopolistic  "trust"  would  be  examples  of  just  such  an 
organization.  And  there  also  may  be  a  thoroughly  unholy  alliance  in 
the  political  realm.  It  is  just  that  which  the  spirit  of  patriotism  is  at 
the  present  time  preventing.  World  domination  and  world  brother- 
hood are  incompatible,  and  that  proposition  right  now  just  as  truly 
has  a  practical  application,  although  in  a  different  way,  for  those  who 
live  west  of  the  Rhine  as  for  those  who  live  on  the  other  side.  If  it 
is  wrong  for  Germany  to  build  up  a  world-empire  on  the  principle 
of  domination,  it  is  wrong  for  us  to  let  her  do  it.  Integration  implies 
a  unity  of  differences.  There  can,  then,  be  no  true  integration  where 
significant  differences  are  ignored.  And  there  will  be  no  just  organiza- 
tion of  all  the  peoples  of  the  world  where  the  individuality  of  some 
of  the  parts  is  disregarded.  Within  the  nation,  we  demand  that  the 
individuality  of  each  unit  be  respected.  The  pacifist  makes  that 
demand  for  himself.  And  it  is  just  as  much  right  that  the  individual- 
ity of  each  nation  should  be  respected  in  the  community  of  which  it 
is  a  part.  The  nation  occupies  the  same  position  with  regard  to  the 
world  that  the  individual  occupies  with  regard  to  the  country.  Simi- 
lar rights  and  similar  duties  may  be  claimed  for  both.    It  is  fair  that 


104  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

the  same  organizing  principle  should  be  applied  on  both  the  national 
and  international  levels,  namely,  unity  in  difference. 

In  other  words,  the  same  principles  of  justice  and  liberty  that  must 
guide  within  the  nation  must  also  be  normative  of  the  relations  be- 
tween states.  The  integration  of  a  nation  is  one  of  will,  and,  more- 
over, one  of  good  will.  The  same  thing  can  be  said  of  a  world  organi- 
zation. The  permanent  integration  of  the  world  will  have  to  be  upon 
the  basis  of  good  will.  And  that  cannot  have  been  accomplished 
where  a  great  many  apparently  within  the  fold  are  not  in  it  at  heart. 
Peace  wouldn't  necessarily  mean  good  will  or  true  integration.  If, 
for  instance,  we  voluntarily  surrendered  to  Germany,  as  the  pacifists 
sometimes  urge,  and  showed  good  will  on  our  part,  that  wouldn't 
necessarily  call  forth  the  same  spirit  on  the  part  of  Germany.  Their 
spirit  might  simply  be  that  of  exaggerated  egoism.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  will  it  make  for  good  will  to  go  on  fighting  Germany?  In  the 
long  run,  it  seems  to  be  the  way  that  is  necessary  to  follow  in  order 
to  bring  her  to  a  frame  of  mind  where  she  can  be  cooperated  with. 
^  ^  It  is  therefore  not  completely  out  of  harmony  with  the  cause  of 
world  cooperation  that  a  state  should  sometimes  go  to  war.  And 
the  nation  itself  has  rights  and  duties.  It  would  not  be  any  more  mor- 
ally good  for  a  country  to  consent  to  its  extinction  or  the  serious  crip- 
pling of  its  individuality  than  it  would  be  for  the  human  individual 
to  commit  suicide  or  incapacitate  himself.  The  state  fights  for  its 
individuality,  and  individuality  is  a  thing  worth  fighting  for.  It  is 
right  that  each  individual  nation  should  have  the  privilege  of  living  a 
life  of  its  own,  that  is,  as  long  as  it  does  not  forfeit  its  privilege  by 
ignoring  the  rights  of  others. 

The  recognition  of  the  tendencies  and  power  of  patriotism  shut 
one  up  to  the  conclusion  that  a  world  organization  will  have  to  be 
established  along  the  lines  of  internationalism  rather  than  those  of 
cosmopolitanism.  Each  group  has  its  own  consciousness  which  will 
have  to  be  taken  into  account.  Wallas  says  that,  "In  England  the 
'particularism'  of  trades  and  professions  and  the  racial  feeling  of 
Wales  and  Ulster,  of  Scotland  or  Catholic  Ireland,  seem  to  be  grow- 
ing stronger  and  not  weaker."57  It  will  be  the  same  with  patriotism  in 
a  world  organization.  The  successful  line  of  development  in  world 
organization  seems  to  be  one  in  which  the  preceding  stages  are  not 
wiped  out,  but  are  preserved  and  made  the  basis  of  a  new  integration, 
jy Therefore,  it  seems  as  if  the  next  larger  grouping  or  groupings  of  men 
will  have  to  be  joined  onto  nationalism.    Sumner  stated  a  truth  when 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  105 

he  said,  "  .  .  .  .  changes  which  run  with  the  mores  are  easily 
brought  about,  but  ....  changes  which  are  opposed  to  the 
mores  require  long  and  patient  effort,  if  they  are  possible  at  all."  "  If 
a  reform  is  to  be  made  in  the  direction  of  a  world  integration,  it  will, 
if  it  wishes  to  succeed,  have  to  be  joined  onto  patriotism. 

But  there  are  reasons  why  it  is  better  that  we  should  develop  into 
internationalism  rather  than  cosmopolitanism.  The  latter  contains 
fundamental  dangers.  It  makes  too  much  for  detachment,  aloofness, 
and  selfishness.  The  Stoics  were  an  example  of  how  cosmopolitanism 
passed  into  those  things.  The  eighteenth  century  was  an  "age  of 
Reason"  which  tended  towards  cosmopolitanism,  and  it  was  a  cosmo- 
politanism which  though  enlightened  was  chill  and  abstract.  Cosmo- 
politanism tends  to  reduce  all  life  to  a  mediocre  type.  This  danger 
is  well  pointed  out  in  the  following  words:  "I  believe  largely  in  the 
comparative  permanence  of  what  we  call  racial  characteristics;  I  sin- 
cerely hope  they  will  not  be  merged  into  a  common  humanity.  .  .  . 
Nearly  every  group  of  peoples  has  developed  its  own  mentality,  its 
own  psychology,  ideas  and  ideals.  We  need  to  preserve  the  difference 
between  those  ideas  and  ideals.  If  you  merge  them,  you  get  a  common 
— a  very  common — humanity.  All  progress  takes  place  in  the  re- 
action between  extremes.  All  philosophy  has  arisen  from  a  mixture 
of  races  which  brought  to  one  another  different  ideas  and  ideals."89 
The  condition  of  progress  is  the  preservation  of  national  characteris- 
tics. But,  what  is  even  more  important,  there  are  in  cosmopolitanism 
grave  moral  dangers  involved.  G.  F.  Barbour  says:  "The  great 
meeting-places  where  the  currents  of  Oriental  and  Occidental  life 
have  come  together  have  indeed  produced  a  vivid  and  brilliant  type 
of  life,  but  hardly  one  that  has  been  morally  stable  and  sound."80 
Each  side  finds  it  easy  to  adopt  the  vices  of  the  other,  but  not  the  vir- 
tues, and  both  sides  are  liable  to  become  superficial.  The  brilliant 
but  shallow  and  immoral  life  of  Corinth  in  the  days  of  Paul  offers  an 
example. 

The  problem  at  the  present  time  is  to  federate  groups.  Individuals 
have  already  become  unified.  But  what  sets  the  problem  gives  rise 
also  to  a  hope.  The  existence  of  groups  will  prove  an  aid  in  the  ac- 
complishment of  world  unification.  And  the  wise  humanitarian  will 
work  through  the  groups  that  already  exist,  that  is,  countries. 

World  cosmopolitanism  would,  at  least  at  present,  leave  the  indi- 
vidual cold;  he  could  not  comprehend  it,  and  could  not  be  intelli- 
gently loyal  to  it.     Hence,  in  order  to  get  effective  sympathy  and 


106  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

action  among  men,  there  must  exist  a  group  of  the  size  and  meaning 
that  is  able  to  appeal  to  the  individual.  There  must  be  aroused 
something  like  what  Royce  called  "provincialism."  Provincialism 
might  be  interpreted  in  one  way  as  loyalty  to  that  integration  of  men 
whose  individuality  expressed  the  individuality  of  oneself.  And  from 
it  will  be  derived  dynamic  for  humanitarianism.  Royce  said  that, 
"...  philanthropy  that  is  not  founded  upon  a  personal  loyalty 
of  the  individual  to  his  own  family  and  to  his  own  personal  duties  is 
notoriously  a  worthless  abstraction."61  And  the  application  was  that 
"the  province  will  not  serve  the  nation  best  by  forgetting  itself,  but 
by  loyally  emphasizing  its  own  duty  to  the  nation  and  therefore  its 
right  to  attain  and  to  cultivate  its  own  unique  wisdom."62  Therefore 
Royce  said  that,  "Every  one  .  .  .  ought,  ideally  speaking,  to  be 
provincial, — and  that  no  matter  how  cultivated,  or  humanitarian,  or 
universal  in  purpose  or  in  experience  he  may  be  or  may  become."88 
Provincialism  did  not  mean  exclusiveness  or  jealousy.  To  Royce, 
"...  our  province,  like  our  own  individuality,  ought  to  be  to 
all  of  us  rather  an  ideal  than  a  mere  boast.  .  .  .  The  better 
aspect  of  our  provincial  consciousness  is  always  its  longing  for  the 
improvement  of  the  community."  6i  But  the  point  is  that  the  spirit 
of  provincialism  is  a  useful  force  in  securing  the  attachment  of  men. 
And  the  clue  that  one  finds  in  it  is  that  the  best  way  to  get  a  world 
integration  is  to  do  it  by  the  federation  of  nationalities.  The  organi- 
zation of  patriotic  loyalties  would  secure  an  integration  that  would 
hang  together.  Under  such  an  arrangement,  the  patriot  would  con- 
tribute strength  to  internationalism  by  his  very  attachment  and  loyalty 
to  his  own  nation.  Nationalism  would  thus  become  a  spur  to  a  wider 
humanitarian  impulse.  And  patriotism  can,  if  properly  educated,  be 
counted  upon  to  support  international  government.  The  patriot  him- 
self will  develop  an  insistent  demand  for  internationalism  when  he 
once  clearly  sees,  what  is  true,  that  the  individuality  of  his  own  nation 
is  best  realized  in  a  community  of  nations  where  legitimate  national 
differences  are  synthesized  in  justice. 

This  program  of  the  unification  of  nationalities  is  to  be  taken  seri- 
ously. Emphasis  must  be  laid  not  only  on  nationality  but  also  upon 
unification.  The  patriot  must  really  recognize  that  he  has  another 
loyalty  than  that  to  country,  namely,  that  to  internationalism.  It  is 
plain  that  improvements  can  be  made  upon  the  present  world  order, 
and  the  most  important  thing  to  do  is  to  work  towards  some  kind  of 
arrangement  whereby  national  disputes  can  be  settled  according  to 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  107 

international  law,  and  the  peace  can  be  kept  at  the  same  time  that 
justice  is  done.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  most  thoughtful  individuals  do 
long  for  some  kind  of  internationalism  at  the  same  time  that  they 
are  patriotic.  In  a  situation  like  the  present  many  are  torn  by  a  con- 
flict between  loyalty  to  humanitarianism  on  the  one  hand  and  patriot- 
ism on  the  other.  And  it  is  a  situation  with  which  the  individual 
cannot  deal  satisfactorily  alone.  There  must  be  an  end  put  to  the 
system  which  makes  such  conflicts  possible.  But  one  must  remember 
also  that  the  nation  is  just  about  as  helpless  as  the  individual.  The 
nation,  too,  is  faced  with  a  conflict  of  loyalties  which  it  cannot  by 
itself  solve.  The  rescue  must  come  out  of  a  concerted  action  of 
nations.  The  situation  must  be  dealt  with  in  the  very  beginning  by 
an  international  act.  It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  any  one  country 
can  deal  adequately  with  the  present  world  problems.  The  disarma- 
ment or  non-resistance  of  any  one  nation  will  not  be  a  solution,  and 
it  seems  unreasonable  for  any  one  to  counsel  his  own  country  to  take 
any  such  action.  However,  we  must  relate  our  patriotism  to  inter- 
nationalism. "We  must  keep  patriotism,  and  yet  go  beyond  it,  if  we 
are  to  save  what  is  best  in  patriotism  itself,  just  as  for  the  sake  of 
religion,  religious  men  had  to  go  beyond  their  own  willingness  to  die 
for  their  own  faith.  Toleration  demanded  not  irreligion,  but  a  better 
religion,  and  we  might  have  a  better  patriotism  if  we  could  remember 
that  we  are  also  citizens  of  the  world."86  The  nations  must  be  in 
some  respects  like  the  planets  in  the  system  of  the  universe.  The 
planets  have  each  a  free  swing  in  their  own  orbits,  but  they  do  not 
collide.  Each  helps  to  hold  all  the  rest  in  place,  and  together  they 
all  form  one  system.  We  all  have,  at  the  present  time,  in  addition 
to  the  duty  of  winning  the  war,  the  further  obligation  of  working  for 
permanent  conditions  of  peace.  We  may  fairly  claim  that  we  have 
inherited  this  war  and  are  not  really  responsible  for  it,  but  if  we  do 
not  discharge  our  international  duties  both  now  and  when  the  con- 
ditions of  peace  are  being  planned  at  the  end  of  this  present  conflict, 
we  shall  be  responsible  for  the  next  war. 

It  is  a  reassuring  fact  to  the  internationalist  at  the  same  time  that 
it  is  a  justification  for  the  continued  existence  of  patriotism  that  there 
actually  have  been  and  are  tendencies  making  not  only  for  closer 
relations  between  nations,  but  also  for  the  moralizing  of  those  rela- 
tions. M  In  material  things  countries  have  been  drawn  closer  and 
closer  together.  They  are  not  economic  wholes.  They  are  debtors 
and  creditors  of  one  another.    They  do  not  keep  improved  methods 


108  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

of  industry  in  the  country  where  they  originated;  even  improved 
methods  of  war  have  not  been  so  restricted.  And  they  are  interde- 
pendent in  non-material  things.  Physicians  and  surgeons  do  not  hide 
their  ideas  within  their  own  group.  And  art  and  science,  of  course, 
have  long  been  ties  that  have  bound  together  associations  of  the  citi- 
zens of  diverse  countries.  There  is,  in  short,  a  wide  unofficial  inter- 
course between  the  citizens  of  different  countries,  a  fact  which  leads 
Burns  to  exclaim,  "Nor  will  even  diplomatic  subtleties  be  able  to 
keep  us  back:  for  trust  between  the  citizens  of  diverse  states  is  trust 
between  the  states,  and  the  official  governments  will  soon  have  to 
submit  to  the  new  situation." "  But  states  as  such  consider  them- 
selves to  be  in  moral  relations  with  one  another.  What  else  can  it 
mean  that  they  have  foreign  secretaries,  and  employ  an  extensive 
diplomatic  service  which  does  a  continuous  business;  that  they  have 
been  increasingly  taking  common  action  for  the  control  of  disease  or 
the  management  of  postal  and  telegraphic  communication;  that  they 
have  been  more  and  more  concluding  such  peace  treaties  as  exist,  for 
instance,  between  England  and  the  United  States?  " 

The  present  war  even  is  proving  that  the  nations  of  the  world  are 
closely  interrelated.  The  struggle  is  world-wide,  and  it  could  not  have 
assumed  such  tremendous  proportions  were  not  every  part  of  the 
world  in  close  touch  with  all  the  rest.  And  it  is  significant  that  the 
contestants  are  alliances.  Lippman  well  remarks:  "The  process  of 
fusion  has  gone  so  far  that  war  itself  has  ceased  to  be  a  national 
enterprise."60  The  existence  of  alliance  is  portentous  of  the  relations 
of  the  future.  It  will  do  something  towards  creating  a  feeling  of  sym- 
pathy between  the  citizens  of  the  allied  countries,  and  it  will  show 
that  the  nations  can  work  together.  And  if  they  can  cooperate  in 
war,  it  ought  to  be  fairly'  easy  for  them  to  draw  the  conclusion  that 
they  can  act  together  in  peace.  Moreover,  if  the  Allies  win  the  present 
war,  the  peace  that  will  result  will  be  representative  of  the  interests 
of  a  large  group  of  very  different  peoples.  It  is  encouraging,  too,  in 
the  attitude  of  at  least  one  nation  that  President  Wilson,  at  the  very 
time  when  he  went  to  war,  declared  for  a  league  of  nations.  We 
should  do  well  to  remind  ourselves  that  one  form  of  patriotism  finds 
its  satisfaction  in  its  country  as  a  good  neighbor  and  a  servant  of 
humanity. 

The  observation  of  moral  relations  as  expressed  in  the  "rules  of 
war"  has  received  a  jolt  in  this  present  conflict.  But  that  doesn't 
necessarily  mean  that  the  morality  of  nations  is  smashed.    The  essen- 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  109 

tial  moral  temper  of  the  world  is  shown  by  the  horror  that  has  been 
manifested  at  the  atrocities  that  have  been  committed.  And,  more- 
over, every  belligerent  nation  has  been  eager  to  justify  itself  before  the 
world.  That  in  itself  is  an  indication  that  a  world  sentiment  has 
been  formed  on  the  conduct  of  nations  in  the  declaring  and  waging 
of  war.  A  century  ago  militarists  did  not  need  to  bother  themselves 
much  about  the  world's  opinion.  The  moral  relationships  of  states 
in  war  is  further  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  we  even  hear  what  is 
officially  announced  in  the  war  bulletins  of  our  enemies,  and  that  we 
send  word  to  them  upon  questions  in  which  they  still  have  a  common 
interest  with  ourselves.70  In  view  of  all  these  facts  it  may  well  be 
asked  what  forces  are  doing  any  better  in  the  direction  of  a  broader 
integration  of  mankind  than  the  several  countries  and  the  patriotic 
citizens  of  those  countries. 

The  fact  of  the  business  is  that  patriotism  is  a  stage  in  the  growth 
of  loyalty.  States  and  nations  are  steps  in  the  process  of  world  inte- 
gration. After  families,  tribes,  city-states,  and  all  the  rest,  have 
come  nations.  Nations  must  have  the  loyalty  of  mankind  because 
they  are  the  largest  peace  units  so  far  attained,  and  because  they  will 
be  the  foundations  of  larger  peace  units}  The  next  step  in  the  organi- 
zation of  the  race  seems  to  be  that  of  internationalism.  And  the  logic 
of  history  seems  to  indicate  that  international  government  will  come. 
The  tendency  of  societal  organization  has  been  toward  larger  and 
larger  wholes.  "The  tendency  to  the  enlargement  of  the  social  unit 
has  been  going  on  with  certain  temporary  relapses  throughout  human 
history.  Though  repeatedly  checked  by  the  instability  of  the  larger 
units,  it  has  always  resumed  its  activity,  so  that  it  should  probably 
be  regarded  as  a  fundamental  biological  drift  the  existence  of  which 
is  a  factor  which  must  always  be  taken  into  account  in  dealing  with 
the  structure  of  human  society."71  The  process  of  enlargement  is 
still  carrying  on.  States  and  nations  have  actually  grown  very  close 
together,  and  are  increasingly  establishing  official  relations  between 
themselves.  And  the  temper  of  the  patriotic  spirit  has  become  such 
that  on  the  whole  it  will  not  only  welcome  but  further  international 
government.  In  this  character  patriotism  shows  itself  to  be  a  force 
making  not  only  for  the  salvation  of  the  one  country  but  of  mankind. 
This  is  at  once  its  justification  and  an  indication  of  what  there  is  in 
it  that  the  morally  good  man  ought  to  approve  and  support.  If  the 
fundamental  justification  of  patriotism  is  that  it  strengthens  the  prin- 
ciple of  cooperation  among  men  and  makes  for  peace,  then  its  con- 


no  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

tinued  vindication  will  be  in  its  further  support  and  extension  of  the 
primary  principle  for  which  it  stands.  There  is  good  reason  why  its  re- 
lations to  war  and  internationalism  are  crucial  problems  of  patriotism. 
The  fundamental  good  of  the  nation  is  that  it  is  a  peace  unit,  and  if 
patriotism  comes  to  the  place  where  it  stands  for  war  more  than  for 
peace,  and  is  in  the  way  of  larger  groupings  of  men,  it  will  have  de- 
feated itself.  The  higher  patriotism  is  that  which  looks  toward  inter- 
nationalism. 

The  practical  ethical  problem  in  patriotism  is  that  of  separating 
the  good  from  the  evil,  and  of  preserving  the  former  while  allowing 
the  latter  to  fall  into  disuse.  It  is  fairly  certain  that  nationalism  and 
patriotism  could  not  be  destroyed  even  if  one  thought  that  such  was 
the  best  thing  to  do.  Some  form  of  an  organization  of  men  based 
upon  the  geographical  principle  is  with  us  to  stay  in  at  least  the 
predictable  future.  And  countries  will  not  consent  to  extinction. 
Patriotism  is  the  will  to  national  individuality,  and  patriots  will  in- 
sist upon  that  individuality.  In  view  of  these  facts,  it  seems 
that  our  salvation  does  not  lie  in  breaking  up  the  units  that  al- 
ready exist,  but  in  securing  a  larger  measure  of  cooperation  between 
them.  And  it  is  all  the  more  sure  that  we  should  proceed  in  that 
way  for  the  reason  that  patriotism  secures  things  of  great  value 
in  the  world.  If  we  destroyed  it,  we  should  lose  the  good  along  with 
the  evil.  This  can  be  illustrated.  Patriotism  in  one  way  is  national 
pride.  And  pride  often  causes  trouble.  But  on  the  other  hand,  it 
often  causes  good.  It  may  be  said  of  national  pride  along  with  Zim- 
merman: "Virtues  and  vices  are  often  put  in  motion  by  the  same 
spring.  It  is  the  philosopher's  part  to  make  known  these  springs,  and 
the  legislator  to  profit  by  them.  Pride  is  the  gem  of  so  many  talents 
and  apparent  virtues,  that  to  destroy  it  is  wrong,  it  should  only  be 
turned  to  good. 

"Were  men  not  proud  what  merit  should  we  miss/"72 

If  patriotism  were  destroyed,  it  is  likely  that  we  should  be  forced  to 
recreate  it.  N, 

The  literature  on  the  subject  of  the  details  of  reconstruction  after 
the  war  proposes  two  main  lines  of  approach.  Some  writers  place  the 
greatest  stress  upon  the  readjustment  of  the  arrangements  of  national 
and  international  government.  For  instance,  this  school  emphasizes 
the  need  for  the  international  control  of  backward  countries  and  the 


The  Nature  and  Value  of  Patriotism  hi 

main  highways  upon  the  seas.  Lippmann  says,  "...  the  su- 
preme task  of  world  politics  is  not  the  prevention  of  war,  but  a  satis- 
factory organization  of  mankind.  Peace  will  follow  that."73  The 
idea  seems  to  be  that  if  the  causes  of  friction  are  effectively  removed, 
trouble  will  not  arise.  Another  school  of  writers  places  its  reliance 
upon  broadening  the  vision  of  men.  Powers  represents  this  method 
of  approach.  He  says,  "The  chief  remedy — perhaps  we  may  say  the 
only  remedy — for  ills  that  flesh  is  heir  to,  is  to  be  found  in  the  in- 
creased intelligence  and  forbearance  of  men."74  These  methods  will 
have  to  be  used  in  conjunction  with  each  other.  It  is  not  safe  in  the 
near  future  to  trust  entirely  to  human  nature  as  long  as  irritating 
causes  of  friction  remain,  and  by  removing  the  causes  of  friction  we 
may  allow  the  belligerent  type  of  patriotism  to  fall  into  disuse.  But 
neither  will  any  merely  external  arrangements  provide  security  so  long 
as  human  nature  finds  its  glory  in  a  chauvinistic  patriotism.  Patriot- 
ism is  the  will  to  national  individuality.  It  is  a  major  task  of  man- 
kind to  see  that  that  will  is  intellectualized  and  ethicized. 


NOTES 

Part  I 

^here  is  a  widespread  recognition  among  psychologists  and  students  of  charac- 
ter that  the  study  of  conduct  should  begin  with  these  unreasoned  impulses.  For 
examples  of  such  a  recognition  see  the  following:  Jas.  R.  Angell,  Chapters  from 
Modern  Psychology,  pp.  24,  25 ;  Wm.  McDougall,  An  Introduction  to  Social  Psy- 
chology, pp.  2,  3,  43;  Gilbert  Murray,  Herd  Instinct  and  the  War,  a  lecture  in  The 
International  Conflict  by  Murray  and  others,  p.  23 ;  Wilfred  Trotter,  The  Instincts 
of  the  Herd  in  Peace  and  War,  p.  IS;  Graham  Wallas,  The  Great  Society,  p.  41; 
E.  B.  Holt,  The  Freudian  Wish,  p.  132 ;  Walter  Lippmann,  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy , 
p.  SO;  A.  F.  Shand,  The  Foundations  of  Character,  Introduction,  pp.  1-9. 

2Cf.  Francis  Galton:  Inquiries  Into  Human  Faculty  and  Its  Development, 
p.  72. 

3Wm.  James:  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  p.  430.  Quoted  by  Wm. 
McDougall:  Social  Psychology,  pp.  85,  86. 

4Wilfred  Trotter:  The  Instincts  of  the  Herd  in  Peace  and  War.  Other  writers 
have  emphasized  gregariousness,  but  Trotter's  book  is  the  most  elaborate  and 
important  in  recent  literature.  Aristotle  declared  that  man  was  a  social  animal. 
See  Politics,  Book  I,  Chap.  I.    Cf.  also  McDougall:  Social  Psychology,  p.  84. 

eW.  G.  Sumner:  Folkways,  p.  15. 

6Martin  Conway :  The  Crowd  in  Peace  and  War,  p.  76. 

'Gilbert  Murray :  Herd  Instinct  and  the  War,  p.  34. 

'Ibid.,  p.  37. 

9Conway:  The  Crowd,  p.  79. 

10Bertrand  Russell:  Why  Men  Fight,  p.  51. 

uWe  have  been  following  here  an  article  by  Anne  C.  E.  Allinson  entitled  "Virgil 
and  the  New  Patriotism"  in  the  Yale  Review,  October,  1917. 

12Prof.  Max  F.  Meyer,  of  the  University  of  Missouri,  in  a  letter  in  the  New 
York  Times  of  August  16,  1917. 

"McDougall:  Social  Psychology,  p.  208.    Footnote. 

"The  terms  out-group  and  in-group  are  borrowed  from  Sumner.  See  W.  G. 
Sumner:  Folkways. 

"Alfred  Loisy :  The  War  and  Religion. 

"Ibid.,  p.  65. 

17 Ibid.,  p.  62. 

"Ibid.,  p.  20. 

"Ibid.,  p.  79. 

"J.  M.  Robertson :  Patriotism  and  Empire. 

^Ibid.,  p.  36. 

22Wm.  McDougall:  Social  Psychology,  p.  55. 

^Walter  Lippmann:  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,  p.  208. 

2*J.  M.  Robertson :  Patriotism  and  Empire,  p.  138. 

^Goethe:  Faust,  Part  II,  Act  2.  The  translation  here  used  is  quoted  by  F.  M. 
Stawell:  Patriotism  and  Humanity.    /.  J.  E.,  April,  1915,  p.  299. 

^McDougall :  Social  Psychology,  p.  140. 


1 14  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

"For  a  book  that  emphasizes  the  emulative  impulse  in  its  account  of  the 
behavior  of  nations  see  Thorstein  Veblen:  The  Nature  of  Peace.    Cf.  pp.  31  ff. 

^William  James  has  contended  that  the  center  of  the  problem  of  peace  and  war 
is  that  there  is  an  impulse  of  pugnacity.  Cf.  The  Moral  Equivalent  of  War  and 
Remarks  at  the  Peace  Banquet  in  Memories  and  Studies. 

Part  II 

Graham  Wallas :  The  Great  Society,  p.  SO. 

'Ibid.,  p.  SO. 

8Lessing :  Nathan  the  Wise,  Act  IV,  Scene  IV.  The  translation  used  here  is  that 
of  the  edition  of  Geo.  Alex.  Kohut.    New  York,  1917. 

4W.  G.  Sumner:  Folkways,  p.  23. 

BFor  data  concerning  such  societies  in  America  see  Sydney  Aaron  Phillips: 
Patriotic  Societies  of  the  United  States.    No  less  than  forty-four  are  listed. 

eJ.  M.  Robertson :  Patriotism  and  Empire.    Part  II.    The  Militarist  Regimen. 

7Hegel :  The  Philosophy  of  Right,  Dyde's  edition. 

8Ibid.,  p.  310. 

Hbid.,  pp.  313,  314. 

10Edward  Everett  Hale :  The  Man  Without  a  Country. 

UJ.  M.  Robertson :  The  Jingoism  of  Poets.    See  his  Criticisms,  Vol.  II. 

"Graham  Wallas :  The  Great  Society,  p.  153. 

13Sumner:  Folkways,  pp.  630,  631.  t 

14The  Teaching  of  Patriotism.    In  Social  and  International  Ideals.    Lect.  I. 

15The  Citizen  of  Milford,  Conn. 

"Cf.  Harry  Pratt  Judson:  The  Young  American,  Ella  Lyman  Cabot  and  Others: 
A  Course  in  Citizenship;  Constance  D'Arcy  Mackay:  Patriotic  Plays  and  Pageants 
for  Young  People. 

"Russell:  Why  Men  Fight,  pp.  160,  161. 

18W.  G.  Sumner :  Folkways,  pp.  635,  636. 

wIbid.,  p.  177. 

trotter :  Instincts  of  the  Herd  in  Peace  and  War,  p.  205. 

aRussell :  Why  Men  Fight,  p.  154. 

22McDougall:  Social  Psychology,  p.  97. 

^Cooley :  Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order,  p.  265. 

24Graham  Wallas:  The  Great  Society,  pp.  281,  282. 

*M.  Gabriel  Tarde  has  made  more  of  this  disposition  than  any  other  writer. 
See  Tarde:  The  Laws  of  Imitation.  His  definition  of  imitation  is  on  p.  XIV,  in 
preface  to  the  second  edition. 

^Sumner :  Folkways,  p.  S.    Italics  mine. 

WC.  D.  Burns :  The  Morality  of  Nations,  p.  106. 

^Lippmann:  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,  p.  51. 

^Sumner:  Folkways,  p.  30. 

aoIbid.,  pp.  77,  173,  174. 

31Ibid.,  p.  71. 

82Cf.  C.  D.  Burns:  The  Morality  of  Nations,  pp.  14,  15. 

^Lessing:  Nathan  the  Wise,  Act  III,  Sc.  VII.    Kohut's  edition. 

34Cooley :  Human  Nature  and  the  Social  Order,  p.  36.  Quoted  by  Ross :  Social 
Psychology,  p.  4. 


Notes  115 

36Ross:  Social  Psychology,  p.  273. 

36Russell :  Why  Men  Fight,  p.  236.    The  fact  that  patriotism  has  been  relatively 
uncriticized  is  not  its  only  source  of  strength ;  it  is  an  important  one. 
37Sumner:  Folkways,  p.  95.    Italics  mine. 

Part  III 

xThe  beliefs,  however,  are  often  closely  related  to  the  impulses  and  habits,  and 
may  simply  be  the  latter  raised  to  the  level  of  consciousness.  In  fact,  when  an 
impulse  or  a  habit  gets  raised  to  the  conscious  level,  it  becomes  a  belief. 

2Graham  Wallas :  The  Great  Society,  p.  36. 

3Alfred  Tennyson.  Poem  has  no  title.  Stanza  given  is*  the  opening  one.  See 
The  Works  of  Alfred  Lord  Tennyson,  London  and  New  York,  MacMillan  Co., 
1892,  p.  64. 

4Herbert  Spencer:  Social  Statics,  p.  283. 

6Daniel  Webster :  Reply  to  Hayne.    Jan.  26,  1830. 

"Green :  Works.  Vol.  II.  The  Principles  of  Political  Obligation,  p.  384.  Italics 
mine. 

7Cf.  Thomas  Hobbes:  Leviathan. 

8J.  S.  Mill.  In  letter  to  John  Sterling,  Oct.  20-22,  1831.  Elliott:  Letters,  Vol. 
I,  p.  IS. 

9Josiah  Quincy,  Jr.:  Second  Centennial  of  Boston.    Sept.  17,  1830. 

10L.  T.  Chamberlin :  Patriotism  and  The  Moral  Law,  p.  10. 

UJ.  S.  Mill:  Principles  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  II,  p.  397. 

"Cf.  Aristotle:  Politics,  Bk.  I,  Chap.  1,  p.  3.    Jowett's  edition. 

"Cf.  Plato :  The  Republic. 

"Edward  Everett  Hale:  The  Man  Without  a  Country.  Preface,  pp.  IV,  V. 
School  edition;  Boston;  Little,  Brown,  and  Co.;  190S. 

15The  term  "syndicalism"  as  here  used  means  roughly  the  principle  that  societal 
control  should  be  in  the  hands  of  organizations  based  upon  the  fact  of  common 
occupation.    Cf .  G.  D.  H.  Cole :  The  World  of  Labour. 

"Plato:  Crito,  pp.  371  ff.    Jowett's  edition. 

"Bernard  Bosanquet :  Social  and  International  Ideals,  p.  8. 

18Bertrand  Russell:  Why  Men  Fight,  p.  55. 

"Herbert  Spencer :  Social  Statics,  pp.  296,  297. 

^Loisy:  The  War  and  Religion,  pp.  36,  37. 

^Zimmermann :  On  National  Pride,  p.  94. 

22Patrick  Henry:  Speech  in  Virginia  Legislature,  1775. 
^Abraham  Lincoln:  Gettysburg  Address.    Nov.  19,  1863. 

24Bacon:  De  Augmentis  Scientarum,  B.  VI,  Ch.  III.  (Spedding  and  Ellis). 
Quoted  by  Alexander  F.  Shand:  The  Foundations  of  Character,  p.  7. 

^Walter  Lippmann:  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,  pp.  74,  75. 

26Samuel  Adams:  Protest  of  Boston  Against  Taxation.    May  24,  1764. 

^John  Dewey:  Progress,  /.  J.  E.,  April,  1916,  p.  321.  ( 

^Cf.  Veblen:  The  Nature  of  Peace,  pp.  166,  167. 

^Chamberlain :  Patriotism  and  The  Moral  Law,  p.  6. 

^L.  P.  Jacks:  The  Changing  Mind  of  a  Nation  at  War,  pp.  78,  79.  Jacks  is 
talking  of  war-time  conditions. 


n6  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

81George  Washington:  Letter  to  the  Governors.    June  18,  1783.    Italics  mine. 

32McDougall:  Social  Psychology,  p.  207. 

MC.  D.  Burns:  The  Morality  of  Nations,  p.  11. 

84Bosanquet:  Social  and  International  Ideals,  p.  3. 

35Royce :  The  Philosophy  of  Loyalty,  p.  40. 

"Ibid.,  p.  41. 

87Zimmermann :  On  National  Pride,  pp.  280,  281. 

^William  Cowper :  The  Task,  II,  206. 

39Sir  Walter  Scott :  The  Lay  of  the  Last  Minstrel.    Canto  Sixth. 

"Cf.  Mill:  On  Liberty;  and  Spencer:  Social  Statics. 

"Hegel:  The  Philosophy  of  Right,  pp.  330,  337. 

^Cf.  H.  P.  Judson:  The  Young  American.    Chap.  I,  pp.  9,  10. 

"H.  H.  Powers:  The  Things  Men  Fight  For,  p.  283. 

"Nitobe:  Bushido,  The  Soul  of  Japan,  p.  116. 

"C.  D.  Broad:  The  Prevention  of  War.    /.  J.  E.,  Jan.,  1916,  p.  243. 

"For  a  clear  statement  of  the  diplomatic  aims  of  the  different  nations  in  this 
present  war  see  H.  H.  Powers :  The  Things  Men  Fight  For. 

47J.  S.  Mill:  Letter  dated  Oct.  25,  1865.    Elliott:  Letters.    Vol.  II,  p.  47. 

48Chas.  Sumner:  The  True  Grandeur  of  Nations.    Boston,  July  4,  1845. 

"Powers :  The  Things  Men  Fight  For,  p.  340. 

""Green :  Works.    Vol.  II.    The  Principles  of  Political  Obligation,  p.  338. 

^See  Anne  C.  E.  Allinson:  Virgil  and  the  New  Patriotism,  Yale  Review,  Oct., 
1917,  p.  158. 

B2King:  Washington  or  Greatness.    In  Patriotism  and  Other  Papers,  pp.  72,  73. 

ML.  S.  Woolf :  International  Morality.    /.  /.  E.,  Oct.,  1915,  p.  18. 

64Loisy:  The  War  and  Religion,  p.  21. 

^Elroy  Headley :  Patriotic  Essays,  Introduction,  p.  XV. 

MMazzini :  1834.    Quoted  by  Rose :  Nationality  in  Modern  History,  p.  74. 

57Longfellow :  The  Building  of  the  Ship. 

^Josiah  Quincy,  Jr.    Speech  at  Second  Centennial  of  Boston,  Sept.  17,  1830. 

69Wm.  Watson :  The  True  Patriotism.    See  The  Poems  of  William  Watson,  New 
York  and  London,  Macmillan  Co.,  1893,  p.  76. 

^Chamberlin :  Patriotism  and  The  Moral  Law,  pp.  24,  25. 

"Chas.  E.  Hughes:  Addresses  Before  the  Empire  State  Society,  S.  A.  R.    Nov. 
26,  1906. 

62Bosanquet :  Social  and  International  Ideals,  preface,  pp.  VI,  VII. 

^Chamberlin :  Patriotism  and  The  Moral  Law,  p.  14. 

e4John  Grier  Hibben :  The  Higher  Patriotism,  p.  18. 

"J.  M.  Robertson:  Patriotism  and  Empire,  p.  202. 

""International  Reform  Bureau :  Patriotic  Studies,  1888-1905. 

67Thos.  S.  King :  Patriotism  and  Other  Papers,  p.  49. 

""Cf .  E.  A.  Venturi :  Joseph  Mazzini,  with  two  essays  by  Mazzini :  Thoughts  on 
Democracy  and  The  Duties  of  Man. 

"Royce:  Loyalty,  pp.  214,  215,  118. 

70Royce:  Duties  of  Americans  in  the  Present  War.    In  The  Hope  of  the  Great 
Community,  pp.  3,  4.    Italics  mine. 

"Graham  Wallas :  Human  Nature  in  Politics,  p.  100. 


Notes  117 

Part  IV 

lJ.  M.  Robertson:  Patriotism  and  Empire. 

2W.  Trotter:  The  Instincts  of  the  Herd  in  Peace  and  War. 

3T.  Veblen :  The  Nature  of  Peace. 

4Loisy:  The  War  and  Religion. 

5H.  H.  Powers :  The  Things  Men  Fight  For. 

"Cf.  statement  of  procedure  in  the  preface. 

7Sophie  Bryant:  Hastings  Encyclopedia  of  Religion  and  Ethics,  Vol.  IX,  p. 
678:2. 

8Of  course,  one  can  care  about  the  fate  of  countries  other  than  his  own  and  be 
interested  in  institutions  of  another  order,  the  church,  for  instance,  but  when  he 
does  these  things,  he  does  them  in  his  character  as  something  other  than  a  patriot. 
No  person  is  merely  a  patriot.  In  so  far  as  he  is  a  patriot  his  interest  is  absorbed 
in  his  country. 

9Royce:  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  p.  292. 

10Veblen :  The  Nature  of  Peace.    Cf .  Chap.  IV,  Peace  Without  Honour. 

"Bosanquet :  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value,  p.  68. 

12Ibid.,  margin  of  p.  68. 

18E.  B.  Talbot:  Individuality  and  Freedom.  Philosophical  Review,  November, 
1909,  p.  600. 

"Aristotle:  Politics.    Book  II,  Chap.  2,  p.  28.    Jowett's  translation. 

16Gertrude  B.  King:  The  Servile  Mind.    /.  /.  E.,  July,  1916,  p.  S03. 

"Ellen  B.  Talbot:  Individuality  and  Freedom.  Philosophical  Review,  Novem- 
ber, 1909,  p.  603. 

"Warner  Fite :  Individualism,  p.  14. 

"Ellen  B.  Talbot:  Individuality  and  Freedom.  Philosophical  Review,  Novem- 
ber, 1909,  p.  602. 

"Cf.  Aristotle:  Politics.    Book  I,  Chap.  2,  p.  4.    Jowett's  edition. 

^Warner  Fite:  Individualism,  p.  126. 

"Ibid.,  p.  122. 

^Royce:  The  Problem  of  Christianity,  Vol.  I,  p.  1S2. 

™Ibid,  preface,  p.  XXV. 

24Fite:   Individualism,  p.  173. 

2BHowison:    The  Limits  of  Evolution,  p.  7. 

"C.  M.  Bakewell:  Royce  As  an  Interpreter  of  American  Ideals.  /.  J.  E.,  p. 
307,  April,  1917,  Vol.  XXVII. 

^Joseph  Mazzini:  On  the  Duties  of  Man,  Ch.  V.  In  E.  A.  Venturi:  Joseph 
Mazzini,  p.  312. 

™lbid.,  p.  313. 

™Ibid.,  pp.  314,  315. 

'"Arthur  Ponsonby,  /.  J.  E.,  Jan.,  1915,  pp.  143,  144. 

"Cited  by  Edward  Everett  Hale:  The  Man  Without  a  Country,  introduction, 
p.  VIII. 

82McDougall:   Social  Psychology,  p.  85. 

^Green:  Works,  Vol.  II,  Principles  of  Political  Obligation,  p.  523. 

34Sumner:   Folkways,  pp.  566,  567. 

^Spencer:   Social  Statics,  p.  300. 


n8  Patriotism  as  an  Ethical  Concept 

""Green :  Works,  Vol.  II,  Principles  of  Political  Obligation,  table  of  contents,  p. 
XXXV,  for  p.  446. 

OTH.  C.  Brown:  Human  Nature  and  the  State,  /.  J.  E.,  Jan.,  1916,  p.  179. 

^Spencer:  Social  Statics,  p.  279. 

89Green :  Works,  Vol.  II,  Principles  of  Political  Obligation,  p.  444. 

*°Rose:    Nationality  in  Modern  History,  p.  12. 

41J.  Berg  Esenwein:  Short  Story  Masterpieces :  Russian.  Introduction- to  Gogol, 
p.  67. 

42Warner  Fite:  Individualism,  p.  100.  Italics  mine.  The  last  sentence,  also, 
comes  before  the  rest  of  the  passage  in  the  author's  own  text. 

"Ibid.,  p.  112. 

"Joseph  Mazzini:  On  the  Duties  of  Man,  Ch.  V.  In  E.  A.  Venturi:  Joseph 
Mazzini,  p.  317. 

"Ernest  Barker:  The  Discredited  State,  Political  Quarterly,  Feb.,  1915,  p.  111. 

"Robert  C.  Winthrop:  The  Patriot  Traveler  in  a  Foreign  Land.  See  H.  P. 
Judson:  The  Young  American,  p.  118. 

47Veblen:   The  Nature  of  Peace,  p.  142. 

"C.  D.  Burns:  The  Morality  of  Nations,  pp.  7,  65. 

49Russell:  Why  Men  Fight,  p.  151. 

^Lippmann :  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,  p.  38. 

"Ibid.,  p.  50. 

"Cf.  Graham  Wallas:    The  Great  Society,  p.  308. 

MZimmermann :  On  National  Pride,  p.  137. 

MRoyce:    The  Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy,  p.  212.    Italics  mine. 

MAnne  C.  E.  Allinson:  Virgil  and  the  New  Patriotism,  Yale  Review,  October, 
1917,  p.  141. 

^Aristotle:   Politics,  Book  III,  Ch.  3,  p.  72.    Jowett's  translation. 

57Graham  Wallas:    The  Great  Society,  p.  10. 

^Sumner:    Folkways,  p.  94. 

"'A.  C.  Haddon:  Universal  Races  Congress,  Record  of  Proceedings,  London, 
1911,  p.  26.  Quoted  by  G.  F.  Barbour,  /.  /.  E.,  Oct.,  1913,  pp.  14,  15.    Footnote. 

"G.  F.  Barbour,  /.  J.  E.,  Oct.,  1913,  p.  15. 

fllRoyce :  Provincialism,  p.  99.  In  Race  Questions  and  Other  American  Problems. 

a2Ibid.,  p.  99. 

^Ibid.,  p.  65. 

"Ibid.,  pp.  100,  102. 

"F.  Melian  Stawell,  /.  J.  E.,  April,  1915,  pp.  296,  297. 

"C.  D.  Burns  and  L.  S.  Woolf  have  made  a  good  deal  of  these  tendencies.  Cf. 
C.  D.  Burns:  The  Morality  of  Nations,  and  L.  S.  Woolf:  International  Govern- 
ment. 

67C.  D.  Burns:  The  Morality  of  Nations,  p.  237. 

Tor  these  and  similar  facts  see  C.  D.  Burns:  The  State  and  Its  External  Re- 
lations.   Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  1915-1916,  p.  300. 

69Lippmann:  The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,  p.  45. 

70The  New  York  Times  of  Nov.  27,  1917,  contained  a  report  to  the  effect  that 
the  United  States  Government  was  preparing  to  notify  Berlin  of  the  steps  that  had 
been  taken  in  the  United  States  regarding  the  internment  of  unnaturalized  Ger- 
mans in  this  country.    It  was  the  purpose  to  inform  Germany  of  the  number  of 


Notes  119 

those  interned,  who  they  were,  and  how  they  were  treated.  The  object  was  to  re- 
assure Germany  that  the  interned  Germans  were  not  being  ill-treated,  and  so  to 
protect  Americans  interned  in  Germany. 

"Trotter:  The  Instincts  of  the  Herd  in  Peace  and  War,  pp.  121,  122. 

"Zimmerman:  On  National  Pride,  p.  306. 

"Lippmann:    The  Stakes  of  Diplomacy,  p.  224. 

"H.  H.  Powers:    The  Things  Men  Fight  For,  p.  7. 


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